Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Rights
Durham v. Kelley
Durham, a prisoner with lumbar stenosis, received epidural steroid injections for pain and was prescribed a walking cane. In 2020, Durham was sent to a quarantine unit without his cane. For 10 days, Durham repeatedly, unsuccessfully requested his cane because he was in severe pain. His requests to see a doctor and to use a shower chair were ignored. Durham fell in the shower. Durham filed suit, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA).The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that Durham’s claims for money damages against the defendants in their capacity as state officials barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity; Durham failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, having failed to plausibly allege that the prison officials were “subjectively aware of a substantial risk of serious harm”; and Durham failed to state ADA and RA claims, having failed to show that he is a qualifying individual with a disability. The Third Circuit vacated. Durham is a “qualified individual” and the provision of showers in prison is an activity that must be made accessible to people with disabilities. Durham sufficiently pleaded that the defendants had knowledge that his federally protected ADA right was substantially likely to be violated. A state program that accepts federal funds waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity to RA claims. Durham adequately alleged deliberate indifference. View "Durham v. Kelley" on Justia Law
Samantha LaCoe v. City of Sisseton
Plaintiff was hired as a Law Enforcement Officer by the Sisseton, South Dakota, Police Department. Plaintiff and the City signed a Sisseton Police Department Employment Contract (the “Contract”) requiring Plaintiff to reimburse the City for the cost of her training if she left the Department before completing 36 months of employment. In January 2022, Defendant, the City’s Chief of Police, informed Plaintiff that the Police Commission had lost confidence in her, and Defendant asked Plaintiff to resign, which she did. Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action, asserting, along with other claims, that the City and numerous individual defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights. The district court granted Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff appealed only the dismissal of her due process claims.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court agreed with the district court the Supreme Court of South Dakota would rule that the Contract did not change an at-will employment relationship. The court explained that for Plaintiff’s claim against the City to survive a motion to dismiss, her complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” The court agreed with the district court that the Complaint “failed to allege any unconstitutional policy or custom that enabled” Defendants to deprive Plaintiff of her alleged federal due process rights. Counsel for Plaintiff could only respond that the Complaint plausibly alleged the practice of violating the three-year term in the City’s employee reimbursement contracts. That practice was not alleged in the Complaint and, in any event, is nothing more than a “facially lawful municipal action.” View "Samantha LaCoe v. City of Sisseton" on Justia Law
Biggs v. Chicago Board of Education
Biggs served as interim principal of Burke Elementary School on an at-will basis. Under the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) Transportation Policy, no CPS school employee may drive a student in a personal vehicle without written consent from the school’s principal and the student’s legal guardian. The principal must retain copies of the driver's license and insurance documentation. An investigation revealed that for many years, Biggs had directed her subordinates to mark late students as tardy, rather than absent, regardless of how many instructional minutes they received in a day, which likely skewed Burke’s attendance data. Biggs admitted that she had ordered Burke employees to pick up students in personal vehicles without written parental consent and did not keep copies of the drivers’ licenses or insurance documentation. Biggs was fired and designated Do Not Hire. The designation does not necessarily prevent the employee from being hired at a non-CPS school. It was disclosed at community meetings that Biggs’s firing was “about integrity” and a redacted copy of the report was read aloud.Biggs sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deprivation of her liberty to pursue her occupation without due process, citing "stigmatizing public statements" in connection with her termination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of the suit. No reasonable jury could find that Biggs had suffered a tangible loss of employment opportunities within her occupation; she experienced nothing more than the customary difficulties and delays that individuals encounter when looking for a new job, especially after being fired. View "Biggs v. Chicago Board of Education" on Justia Law
Jackson v. Wright
Plaintiff is a music theory professor at UNT, a leading expert on the Austrian music theorist Heinrich Schenker, the director of the Center for Schenkerian Studies, and the founder of the Journal of Schenkerian Studies. Plaintiff published an article defending Schenker against charges of racism. The Dean of the College of Music announced that the College of Music would be launching a “formal investigation into the conception and production of” the Journal’s symposium issue. After interviewing eleven individuals, the panel produced a report. The provost sent Jackson a letter instructing him to “develop of a plan to address the recommendations.” After Plaintiff submitted his plan, Board members charged the department with launching a national search for a new editor-in-chief for the Journal, who is a full-time tenured faculty member. Plaintiff sued the Board defendants, among others, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court found that sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has standing to bring his First Amendment claim against the Board defendants. Accordingly, the court found that Plaintiff has “alleged an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Thus, at the motion to dismiss stage, sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against the Board defendants. The court also found that Plaintiff also has standing to bring his First Amendment claim. For Article III standing. View "Jackson v. Wright" on Justia Law
Hebrew v. TDCJ
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice fired Plaintiff after he refused to cut his hair and beard in violation of his religious vow. Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. He then filed a pro se lawsuit against TDCJ and various officers, which alleged claims of religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
The Fifth Circuit, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023), reversed. The court explained that Title VII forbids religious discrimination in employment. The statute defines “religion” broadly to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Further, the court explained that Title VII also requires employers to accommodate the religious observances or practices of applicants and employees. The court held that TDCJ breached both duties. TDCJ (A) failed to accommodate Hebrew’s religious practice and (B) discriminated against him on the basis of his religious practice
The court reasoned that the only issue is whether TDCJ has met its burden to show that granting Hebrew’s requested accommodation—to keep his hair and beard—would place an undue hardship on TDCJ. The court held that (1) TDCJ cannot meet the undue hardship standard and (2) the Department’s counterarguments are unavailing. The court noted that, in this case, TDCJ cannot hide behind its “otherwise-neutral policy.” This policy must “give way” to Plaintiff’s requested accommodation. View "Hebrew v. TDCJ" on Justia Law
ORLANDO GARCIA V. GATEWAY HOTEL L.P.
Appellee Gateway Hotel L.P. (“Gateway”) contends that the standard for awarding costs to ADA Defendants is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), which allows courts the discretion to award costs to prevailing parties “unless a federal statute . . . provides otherwise.” Appellant contends that the ADA’s fee- and cost-shifting statute “provides otherwise” because it permits ADA Defendants to receive their costs only where there is a showing that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless. Therefore, he contends that the district court should have granted his motion to retax costs, which would have, in effect, denied Gateway’s application for costs. The district court denied Appellant’s motion because it concluded that the decision in Brown was irreconcilable with the United States Supreme Court’s intervening opinion in Marx v. General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013) and was therefore effectively overruled.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Brown v. Lucky Stores was effectively overruled by Marx v. General Revenue Corp. The panel held that, accordingly, the fee- and cost-shifting provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. Section 12205, does not “provide otherwise” within the meaning of Rule 54(d)(1). Rule 54(d)(1), therefore, governs the award of costs to a prevailing ADA defendant and allows such an award in the court’s discretion, thereby keeping the court’s prior award of costs to the defendant intact. View "ORLANDO GARCIA V. GATEWAY HOTEL L.P." on Justia Law
State v. Dolinar
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's plea in bar alleging that a trial on the pending charges for violations of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act would subject him to Double Jeopardy, holding that forfeiture under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-431, as amended in 2016, is civil in nature, and therefore, the district court did not err in denying the plea in bar.In his plea in bar, Appellant argued that he was already criminally punished for the same crime in a separate forfeiture action brought pursuant to section 28-431. In denying the plea in bar, the district court concluded that Appellant had failed to demonstrate he was punished by the forfeiture. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the sanction imposed by forfeiture under section 28-431 is civil and not criminal for purposes of a double jeopardy analysis. View "State v. Dolinar" on Justia Law
State v. Torgerson
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence found during a search of his vehicle, holding that the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, alone, is insufficient to create the requisite probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.After a traffic stop and subsequent search of his vehicle Defendant was convicting of possession of methamphetamine paraphernalia in the presence of a minor and fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the odor of marijuana, alone, is insufficient to create the requisite probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence of medium-strength odor of marijuana, on its own, is insufficient to establish a fair probability that the search would yield evidence of criminally-illegal conduct or drug-related contraband. View "State v. Torgerson" on Justia Law
Ringsred v. City of Duluth
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the determination of the district court that the underlying First Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was time-barred, holding that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply to toll the statute of limitations.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendant, the City of Duluth, retaliated against him in violation of his rights under the First Amendment by making false statements and engaging in other negative conduct toward him. In dismissing the claim, the trial court rejected Plaintiff's reliance on the continuing violation doctrine. The court of appeals reversed and reinstated Plaintiff's section 1983 retaliation claim against the City, concluding that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply because the acts Plaintiff alleged as retaliation were discrete acts that were actionable when committed and therefore did not constitute a continuing violation that tolled the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply in this case. View "Ringsred v. City of Duluth" on Justia Law
State v. Mosley
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence discovered in the vehicle that Defendant was driving, holding that the totality of the circumstances supported probable cause to search the vehicle.Law enforcement initiated a traffic stop after receiving a tip from an informant that a male in possession of a firearm was in the vehicle Defendant was driving. The district court granted Defendant's motion to suppress the firearm on the grounds that the officers lacked probable cause to search the vehicle. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State met its burden and established probable cause to search the vehicle that Defendant was driving. View "State v. Mosley" on Justia Law