Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

George Rodrique, II, a photographer for WCVB-TV, sued his employer, Hearst Stations, Inc. ("Hearst"), after it denied his request for a religious exemption from the company's COVID-19 vaccination requirement and subsequently terminated him for refusing to receive the vaccine. Rodrique claimed that Hearst's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits religious discrimination in employment.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Hearst's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Rodrique's objections to the vaccine were not religious in nature. The court did not address whether accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on Hearst.Rodrique appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, arguing that his objections were indeed religious and that granting the exemption would not have caused undue hardship. He contended that Hearst provided insufficient evidence that the COVID-19 vaccine reduces virus transmission.The First Circuit assumed, without deciding, that Rodrique's objections were religious. However, it affirmed the district court's summary judgment on different grounds, holding that Hearst reasonably relied on objective medical evidence, including public health guidance, to conclude that the vaccine reduces the likelihood of transmitting COVID-19. The court found that Hearst's reliance on such evidence was reasonable and that accommodating Rodrique's request would have imposed an undue hardship on the company. Thus, the First Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to Hearst. View "Rodrique v. Hearst Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, three people were shot and killed outside a nightclub in Houston, Texas. Feanyichi E. Uvukansi was identified by an eyewitness, Jeresano, who picked him out of a photo array. Uvukansi was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life without parole. At trial, Jeresano testified that he had no agreement with prosecutors regarding his testimony, but it was later revealed that he did have an agreement that could reduce his federal drug sentence in exchange for his testimony.Uvukansi did not raise the issue of false testimony on direct appeal but did so in state habeas proceedings. The state district court found that Jeresano's testimony was false but deemed it immaterial because the jury was aware of parts of the agreement through other testimony. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied Uvukansi’s application without a written order. Uvukansi then filed a Section 2254 application in federal district court, which was dismissed on the grounds that the state court's decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state district court applied the correct "reasonable likelihood" standard for materiality and did not impose a higher burden of proof on Uvukansi. The court also found that the state district court did not err in considering the false testimony's impact on Jeresano's credibility rather than the identification itself. The Fifth Circuit concluded that the state court's decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent and affirmed the dismissal of Uvukansi's Section 2254 application. View "Uvukansi v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

A pretrial detainee at Goose Creek Correctional Center was asked to provide a urine sample for random drug testing. Under the Department of Corrections (DOC) policy, inmates have two hours to provide a sample. The detainee attempted to comply but was unable to urinate within the required time. Consequently, he was charged with refusing to provide a urine sample, which is considered a high-moderate infraction, and was disciplined.The detainee pled not guilty at a disciplinary hearing, arguing that he tried to comply but could not urinate. The prison tribunal found him guilty using the preponderance of the evidence standard and imposed punitive segregation. The detainee appealed to the facility’s superintendent, who upheld the decision. He then appealed to the superior court, arguing that the preponderance of the evidence standard violated his due process rights and that he should have been offered a saliva test instead of a urine test.The superior court affirmed the administrative decision, concluding that the preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutional. The court also noted that the detainee did not raise the saliva test argument until his reply brief, thus it was not preserved for review.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the Alaska Constitution permits the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in prison disciplinary proceedings, balancing the inmate’s interest in avoiding harsher conditions against the prison’s interest in maintaining order. The court also declined to address the saliva test argument, as it was not properly preserved during the administrative proceedings or raised in a timely manner in the superior court. The decision of the superior court was affirmed. View "Valoaga v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

Deari Cole was committed to a developmental center under California Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500, which allows for the commitment of individuals with developmental disabilities who are deemed a danger to themselves or others. Cole was charged with several crimes and found incompetent to stand trial. Subsequently, he was committed to the Porterville Developmental Center for one year. Just before the expiration of his commitment, the People filed a petition to extend it, and Cole was held pending trial on the recommitment petition. Cole filed a petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus, arguing that equal protection principles required his release pending trial.The Contra Costa County Superior Court denied Cole's request for release pending trial, relying on section 6506, which allows for interim placement at a suitable facility. Cole's petition for writ of mandate or habeas corpus was summarily denied by the Court of Appeal. Cole then petitioned for review, and the California Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to vacate its order and issue an order to show cause.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and rejected Cole's equal protection arguments. The court held that the statutory scheme under section 6500, which allows for continued confinement pending a hearing on a recommitment petition, did not violate equal protection principles. The court reasoned that the differences between individuals with developmental disabilities and those with mental health disorders or found not guilty by reason of insanity justified the different procedures. The court concluded that the legislative distinctions were reasonable and factually based. Consequently, the court dismissed Cole's petition as moot, as he had already been released from custody for unrelated reasons. View "Cole v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In the 1950s, the Tucson Unified School District (the District) operated a dual school system for Black and non-Black students. In 1974, class action lawsuits were filed on behalf of African American and Latino students, leading to a 1978 settlement agreement and desegregation decree. Over the years, the District undertook numerous efforts to remedy past discrimination. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's preliminary finding of unitary status, remanding the case for further supervision. A Unitary Status Plan (USP) was created in 2013 to guide the District towards unitary status.The District Court for the District of Arizona found partial unitary status in 2018, retaining jurisdiction over unresolved issues. By 2021, the court found the District had achieved unitary status in most areas, except for two subsections of the USP. In 2022, after further revisions and compliance, the district court declared the District had achieved full unitary status and ended federal supervision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District had achieved unitary status, meaning it had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree and eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable. The court found no error in the district court's conclusions regarding student assignments, transportation, staff diversity, quality of education, student discipline, family and community engagement, and transparency and accountability. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that perfect implementation of the USP was not necessary for unitary status and that the District had demonstrated a lasting commitment to the USP and the Constitution. View "MENDOZA V. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

Jorge Rivera-Guadalupe was living in a rooming house in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was mugged and robbed. His friend, Christopher Valkosak, came to stay with him for protection. The next evening, Valkosak was shot by a stranger in the hallway outside Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. Detective Jacob Pierce investigated the incident, interviewed a neighbor who described the shooter as a tall Black male, and obtained a search warrant for Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. The search yielded marijuana, a knife, and IDs but no gun. Rivera-Guadalupe was arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including attempted homicide and possession of marijuana. He was acquitted of all charges after being incarcerated for over eighteen months.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed claims against other defendants but allowed the malicious prosecution claim against Det. Pierce to proceed. Det. Pierce sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, arguing that probable cause for some charges precluded a malicious prosecution claim. The District Court, referencing Johnson v. Knorr, held that probable cause for one charge does not insulate officers from liability for malicious prosecution on other charges lacking probable cause. Det. Pierce’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the right to be prosecuted only on charges supported by probable cause was not clearly established at the time of Rivera-Guadalupe’s prosecution due to conflicting precedents within the circuit and among other circuits. The court reversed the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity for Det. Pierce and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on that basis. The court clarified that the any-crime rule applies to false arrest claims but not to malicious prosecution claims. View "Rivera-Guadalupe v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Marcus Todd, a state employee in Minnesota, alleged that a union violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by deducting union dues from his paycheck without his consent. Todd joined the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees in 2014 and authorized dues deductions. In 2018, a new authorization card was allegedly signed electronically with Todd's name, which he claims was forged. After the Supreme Court's decision in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, Todd attempted to resign from the union and stop dues deductions, but the union continued until May 2021, citing an annual opt-out period.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Todd's federal claims, stating that he voluntarily agreed to the dues deductions before Janus and was contractually bound to the opt-out period. The court also found that the union did not act under color of state law regarding the alleged forgery and dismissed Todd's claims for prospective relief as moot. The court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Todd's state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Todd's claims failed due to the lack of state action, as the union's actions were based on private agreements, not state statutes. The court referenced Hoekman v. Education Minnesota and Burns v. School Service Employees Union Local 284, which established that private agreements for dues deductions do not constitute state action. The court also found that the alleged forgery did not establish state action, as it was a private misuse of state law. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Todd v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

Clarence Lewis, an inmate at Hill Correctional Center, sued various medical staff members, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his health issues, violating the Eighth Amendment. Lewis claimed misdiagnosis and mistreatment of diabetes, COPD, irritable bowel syndrome, and Hepatitis C. He also contended that his grievance about a delay in diabetes medication was not properly addressed.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Lewis's motions for recruited counsel, stating he could represent himself and obtain relevant documents. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, concluding no reasonable juror could find deliberate indifference. The court also granted summary judgment for Dr. Paul, citing claim splitting due to a similar prior lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, finding no reasonable likelihood that recruited counsel would have changed the outcome. The court noted that Lewis's disagreement with his diagnoses and treatments did not constitute deliberate indifference. As for Administrator Lindor, her limited role and the lack of harm from the medication delay further supported the judgment.However, the court vacated the judgment in favor of Dr. Paul, agreeing with Lewis that the district court's application of claim splitting was erroneous. Dr. Paul had raised this defense too late, effectively acquiescing to the claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Dr. Paul, with the district court advised to reconsider Lewis's request for recruited counsel if the claim proceeds to trial. View "Lewis v Sood" on Justia Law

Joshua Stapleton was arrested for public intoxication by Officer Ernesto Lozano after failing a field sobriety test. During the booking process, Stapleton informed Officer Lozano that he was not feeling well and exhibited signs of intoxication. Despite this, he did not receive medical attention and was placed in a holding cell. Over the next few hours, Stapleton's condition deteriorated, and he eventually died from "combined drug toxicity." His family sued the officers and the police chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to Stapleton's serious medical needs.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied the officers' and police chief's motion to dismiss the lawsuit based on qualified immunity. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that the officers and chief were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm or that their conduct violated clearly established law. The district court's denial of the motion led to the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a deliberate-indifference claim against the officers. The court found that the symptoms exhibited by Stapleton were initially ambiguous and did not suggest a need for immediate medical attention. The court also determined that the plaintiffs failed to show that the officers acted with deliberate indifference, as required to overcome qualified immunity. Additionally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs did not establish that the constitutional right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. View "Stapleton v. Lozano" on Justia Law

Marci Walkingstick Dixon, a Native American woman and member of the Cherokee Nation, worked at Northeastern State University (NSU) in the Information Technology Services Department. After being supervised by Dr. Richard Reif, she reported experiencing discriminatory comments and actions based on her race and sex. Following her complaint to NSU's Title IX officer, she faced increased hostility from Dr. Reif. In 2018, after a dispute over compensatory time and subsequent reprimand, she formally complained about a hostile work environment. NSU then began characterizing her time report as falsified and eventually terminated her employment, citing poor job performance and improper timekeeping.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of NSU and Dr. Reif on Dixon's claims of Title VII sex and race discrimination, Title VII retaliation, and FMLA retaliation. The court found that Dixon failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and could not show that NSU's reasons for her termination were pretextual. The court also concluded that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment on Dixon's Title VII sex and race discrimination claims and her Title VII retaliation claim, finding that she had established a prima facie case and presented sufficient evidence of pretext. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Reif on the FMLA retaliation claim, agreeing with the lower court's application of the economic reality test to determine that Dr. Reif was not Dixon's employer under the FMLA. View "Dixon v. Regional University System of the Oklahoma Board" on Justia Law