Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a petition asserting that Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) failed to provide her daughter, A.C., with a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled for Plaintiff on two of the seven issues she had raised but against her on all others. Plaintiff sought review contending that the ALJ had improperly delegated the remedy for the two issues and erred in deciding the rest. Plaintiff further argued that the ALJ’s adverse findings were not entitled to deference. The district court granted summary judgment to CMS.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that based on the extensive process Plaintiff received in the handling of her case, as well as the detail provided in the ALJ’s written decision, the court concluded that the ALJ’s findings were regularly made. The court further held that the district court was correct to accord those findings deference and to determine that Plaintiff failed to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence on the five issues she disputes. While the deference in these cases is owed the ALJ, it is not remiss to point out that the district court likewise proceeded with its own thorough review in a lengthy opinion. Plaintiff does not persuasively challenge the court’s decision on appeal. Further, the court wrote, it discerns no abuse of remedial discretion on the part of the district court in allowing the respondent to fashion “benchmark(s) and criteria” in A.C.’s IEP indicating when she may move on from Metro School. View "Hind Bouabid v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

Lincare, Inc. terminated Plaintiff, concluding that she had violated Lincare’s “Corporate Health Care Law Compliance Program” and “Code of Conduct.” While Plaintiff does not dispute her conduct, she contends that Lincare discriminated against her on the basis of sex because it gave a fellow male employee, who had engaged in similar conduct, only a “final written warning.” Plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. The district court found Lincare liable to Plaintiff and awarded her damages. On appeal, Lincare contends that there was no evidence of discrimination on the basis of sex and that, therefore the district court’s finding that it violated the Human Rights Act was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff cross-appealed, contending that the district court erred in determining her compensatory damages award.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court explained that while the district court’s findings are entitled to substantial deference, the core evidence showed that Plaintiff was fired by a woman and replaced by a woman and that, during the entire process, there was no indication that gender was even remotely a factor in Lincare’s decision. The only explanation Plaintiff offered to substantiate the claim that Lincare had discriminated against her on the basis of sex was her “belief” that she and her comparator “were doing the same thing” and the fact that “he’s a man; [she’s] a woman.” The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient for a factfinder to conclude that it was the product of discrimination based on sex. View "Chandra Balderson v. Lincare Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an employee of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division of the Department of Homeland Security (“ICE” or “Agency”), petitions for review of the final judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”), which rejected Petitioner’s claim that the Agency suspended him for two days in retaliation for his disclosures of misconduct.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that after conducting a hearing and considering the evidence, the administrative judge denied the corrective action sought by Petitioner, concluding that Petitioner’s protected disclosures were not contributing factors to the discipline imposed and, alternatively, that the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the action even in the absence of the disclosures. The court denied the petition explaining that the administrative judge committed no legal error and his factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. View "Yuriy Mikhaylov v. Dept. of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Pro se Plaintiff filed a whistleblower claim against his former employer, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and his former supervisors in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. But before doing so, Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) and the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. The district court thus dismissed the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff did not file a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel or the Merit Systems Protection Board, as required by the CSRA. Instead, he went straight to federal court. The district court thus lacked “jurisdiction to entertain a whistleblower cause of action . . . in the first instance” because Plaintiff failed to follow the proper administrative process. Second, the court wrote that Plaintiff’s argument that his failure to exhaust should be excused on equitable grounds is meritless. The court noted that it has “no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.” And, in any event, Plaintiff offers no reason why he should be granted such an equitable exception. View "Chinniah v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After his employment was terminated in May 2008, plaintiff Harold Hansen brought claims against Rite Aid and other defendants alleging age discrimination, sexual orientation discrimination, and gender discrimination in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), as well as several common law claims. After three trials, a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor on his LAD sexual orientation discrimination claim and awarded him a total of $420,500 in compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiff moved for an award of counsel fees and costs. In plaintiff’s initial submission, he asked the trial court to determine that a reasonable hourly rate for his lead counsel and the attorney who assisted in the first of the three trials was $725, and that a reasonable number of hours spent on this matter was 3,252. He requested that the trial court determine the lodestar to be $2,355,892.50, and that the court apply a one hundred percent enhancement to the lodestar. Plaintiff also sought an award of costs. In total, plaintiff requested an award of $5,035,773.50. The trial court issued a seventy-three-page decision with a fifty-four-page spreadsheet reflecting its analysis of the time entries and disbursements set forth in plaintiff’s invoice. The court ruled that a reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s lead counsel in this case was $375 per hour and a reasonable hourly rate for the assistant attorney was $325 per hour. The court identified several categories of legal work improperly included in plaintiff’s fee application, including work on unrelated matters. The trial court also excluded all time entries reflecting plaintiff’s counsel’s representation of plaintiff in the Appellate Division and to the Supreme Court. Noting that plaintiff was successful on only one claim and that plaintiff’s lead counsel performed tasks that should have been assigned to a junior attorney or a paralegal, the trial court reduced the lodestar by twenty percent. Ultimately, the trial court awarded $741,387.97 in fees and costs. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court concurred with the Appellate Division that the trial court properly exercised its discretion when it set the reasonable hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel’s work, assessed the number of hours reasonably expended by plaintiff’s counsel in pretrial proceedings and at trial, reduced the lodestar because of plaintiff’s limited success and other factors, and determined plaintiff’s application for an award of costs. View "Hansen v. Rite Aid Corp." on Justia Law

In a custody dispute between Hadzi-Tanovic and her former husband, Pavlovich, an Illinois state court ordered that Hadzi-Tanovic’s parenting time with her children be supervised. She filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 against her ex-husband, the children’s guardian ad litem, and the state court judge, alleging they conspired to violate her and her children’s rights to family association and her right to a fair and unbiased trier of fact. The district court dismissed her complaint on abstention grounds.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is well established that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review such state court decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine imposes a “jurisdictional bar” that prohibits federal courts other than the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing final state court judgments The state court order at issue is final, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine’s finality requirement is met. Allegations of state court corruption are not sufficient to avoid the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Hadzi-Tanovic has not argued that state law or procedures prevented her from raising her federal constitutional issues in state court. Parties may raise procedural and substantive due process challenges to custody orders in Illinois state court. View "Hadzi-Tanovic v. Johnson" on Justia Law

This writ proceeding involves a statutory challenge for cause filed against a trial court judge presiding over a wrongful termination lawsuit. The parties are Plaintiff and his former employer, Defendant Bassett Unified School District. Following a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the trial judge in this action, Honorable Stephanie Bowick, received a text message from another judge on the court, Honorable Rupert Byrdsong. According to Judge Bowick, Judge Byrdsong had previously informed Judge Bowick that attorneys from his former firm were trying the case. Pointing to Judge Byrdsong’s apparent support for Plaintiff and the resulting verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, the school district sought Judge Bowick’s disqualification, asserting that a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. The disqualification motion was assigned to Orange County Superior Court Judge Maria D. Hernandez. The assigned judge denied the disqualification motion. Defendant sought review by petition for writ of mandate   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court held that the disqualification motion was properly denied. The court reasoned that there is no adverse inference arising from Judge Bowick’s final ruling on the evidentiary issue. Further, the court found that the facts Judge Bowick disclosed do not require disqualification. Moreover, the court wrote, the timing of Judge Bowick’s disclosure does not suggest an appearance of bias. View "Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Philander Smith College fired Plaintiff after she referred to a student as “retarded” for using a cell phone during class. She sued for sex discrimination, retaliation, and breach of contract. After granting summary judgment to the college on the first two claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the third.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Plaintiff has not put forward sufficient evidence of pretext. So summary judgment marks the end of the road for her sex-discrimination claim. Further, the court reasoned that even if the conditions were intolerable, in other words, Plainitff’s own role in provoking these incidents undermines the claim that the college created a workplace full of discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult. Moreover, the court explained once Plaintiff’s federal claims were gone, the district court had no obligation to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Arkansas breach-of-contract claim. View "Patricia Walker-Swinton v. Philander Smith College" on Justia Law

Four police officers unlawfully arrested Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The officers appeal the district court’s denial of their summary judgment motion as to (1) excessive force (Officer W.), (2) false arrest (all officers), and (3) fabrication of evidence (Officer L.).   The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and held that it lacked jurisdiction. The court explained that Officer W. argued that Plaintiff took a defensive and threatening posture, resisted being pulled from the vehicle, struggled after being removed, and willfully and aggressively refused to follow commands while resisting the officer’s detainment. Contrary to Officer W.’s argument, those facts are of a genuine dispute. Officer W. failed to take the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, instead relying on facts different from those assumed by the district court. Accordingly, the court wrote that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Officer W.’s appeal of the genuineness of the district court’s factual determinations.   Further, the court addressed the basis of our jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal, which does not invoke qualified immunity. Federal courts of appeal have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” Denial of summary judgment is not a final decision. Thus, the court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over Officer L.’s appeal of this claim. View "Ducksworth v. Landrum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action against Defendants Amazon.com Services, Inc. and Amazon.com, Inc., alleging that Defendants’ failure to compensate employees for time spent waiting for and passing through mandatory security screening before and after work shifts and breaks violates Oregon’s wage and hour laws. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to Defendants, and Plaintiff timely appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings in favor of Defendants. The panel had certified the following issue to the Oregon Supreme Court: “Under Oregon law, is time that employees spend on the employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings compensable?” In response, the Oregon Supreme Court held that Oregon law aligns with federal law regarding what activities are compensable. Therefore, time that employees spend on the employer’s premises waiting for and undergoing mandatory security screenings before or after their work shifts is compensable only if the screenings are either (1) an integral and indispensable part of the employees’ principal activities, or (2) compensable as a matter of contract, custom, or practice. Plaintiff’s complaint did not allege that either of the identified exceptions applied. Accordingly, the panel held that the district court properly granted judgment on the pleadings to Defendants. View "LINDSEY BUERO V. AMAZON.COM SERVICES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law