Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the Supreme Court held in HUD v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002), that a public housing authority may enforce a term in a tenant’s lease allowing eviction if a member of the household or guest commits a crime (even without the tenant’s knowledge), some cities enacted ordinances extending that approach to private leases. Granite City, Illinois, required private landlords to evict tenants not as a condition of receiving a subsidy but as a matter of regulatory compulsion. Plaintiffs permitted their adult daughter to stay in their leased home occasionally, and one night they welcomed their daughter and her boyfriend into their house briefly. After they left, they were arrested for stealing a van. The City served a “Notice of Violation.” A hearing officer directed Plaintiffs’ landlord to begin eviction proceedings. The landlord dragged his feet long enough for them to file suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. A district court entered a temporary restraining order, which it later converted to a preliminary injunction. In January 2022, Plaintiffs gave up their lease voluntarily and moved out of Granite City.   The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of a justiciable controversy. Plaintiffs contend that if they prevail on the merits, they will be entitled to nominal damages. The court explained Plaintiffs’ potential problem is that their complaint did not allege a “completed” violation of their rights, so they have failed to identify a concrete injury that could be redressed by nominal damages. View "Deborah Brumit v Granite City, Illinois" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Sharhea Wise worked as a mail carrier for the United States Postal Service. When she got pregnant, she asked to avoid handling heavy items. The Postal Service agreed to provide help when items were too heavy, but Wise needed to tell someone when she needed help. On two occasions, Wise allegedly had to handle items that were too heavy. Both times, she blamed the Postal Service for failing to accommodate her need for help. The Postal Service argued in response that Wise hadn’t asked for help. Days after Wise allegedly had to handle the heavy items, she walked off the job and the Postal Service fired her. Wise claimed retaliation, attributing the firing to her requests for help. The Postal Service denied retaliation, explaining that it had fired Wise because she walked off the job. Wise characterized this explanation as pretextual. The district court granted summary judgment to the Postal Service, and Wise challenged the rulings. The Tenth Circuit agreed with her challenge on the failure-to-accommodate claim. "On this claim, a reasonable factfinder could find that the Postal Service had failed to accommodate Ms. Wise’s need to avoid handling heavy items." But the Court agreed with the grant of summary judgment on the retaliation claim because: (1) the Postal Service presented a neutral, nonretaliatory explanation for the firing; and (2) Wise lacked evidence of pretext. View "Wise v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a convicted sexually violent predator, was held in the Lubbock County Detention Center as a pre-trial detainee for approximately one month from December 2017 to January 2018. Soon after his arrival, he was placed in administrative segregation away from the facility’s general population, where he was held for most of the remainder of his time there. He subsequently brought suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against Lubbock County and several law enforcement officials, asserting a series of claims regarding his alleged mistreatment there. The district court entered an order dismissing the claims against the county and all but one of the officials, which he now appeals in the first of the consolidated cases. Plaintiff challenged the process by which he was placed and remained in administrative segregation. After the district court subsequently dismissed the remaining named official, Plaintiff moved to reconsider that dismissal and the dismissal of several of his other claims. The district court rejected both motions for lack of new evidence, which Plaintiff appealed in the second of the consolidated cases. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding no reversible errors. View "Welsh v. Lubbock County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a lieutenant in the Kankakee Fire Department (“KFD”)—was attacked by another firefighter while responding to a fire at a senior living facility. The City suspended the other firefighter for twenty-four hours without pay, ordered him to complete an anger management course, and directed him to avoid working on the same shift as Plaintiff for three months. Plaintiff experienced ongoing physical and mental injuries from the incident, causing her to take leave from work and apply for workers’ compensation. She returned to work six months later but permanently left her position shortly after. She then filed a lawsuit, alleging that Defendants, among other things, retaliated against her for certain protected activities under Title VII and condoned aggressive and inappropriate behaviors as part of a “code of silence” that resulted in her attack. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, and this appeal followed.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that on the merits, Plaintiff’s claim fails because none of her evidence, separately or taken together, creates a genuine dispute regarding whether Defendants had a practice of condoning aggressive behavior, resulting in a constitutional injury. Further the court wrote that the record does not support Plaintiff’s contention that there was such a high risk of constitutional injury from the other firefighter that the “single incident” theory of municipal liability applies here. The court held Plaintiff failed to create a genuine dispute of material fact precluding summary judgment regarding her Fourth Amendment Monell claim and her Title VII retaliation claim. The district court, therefore, properly granted summary judgment to Defendants. View "Michelle Giese v. City of Kankakee" on Justia Law

Not long after getting a new boss at the Priority Automotive Honda dealership, Plaintiffs effectively resigned from their jobs. They then sued, alleging racial discrimination—claiming that the new boss and the company fostered a hostile work environment and demoted them because they are Black—along with various state torts. Plaintiffs lost at summary judgment and appealed.   The Fourth Circuit largely affirmed but remand their state-law conversion claims for further proceedings. First, the court explained that a reasonable person might conclude that the employee’s alleged “white side” was race-based harassment. But the statement, on its own, does not create a severe or pervasive hostile work environment. Next, the court held that, since Plaintiff failed to support a reasonable inference of unlawful intentional discrimination, the magistrate judge rightfully rejected his disparate-treatment claim. Further, the court held that no reasonable jury could find that Defendants’ alleged conduct “rises to the level of ‘outrageous and extreme’ as the term has been interpreted and applied” in North Carolina. The court reasoned that courts do not weigh the evidence when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. So when both parties raise facts sufficient for a reasonable jury to find for them at trial, the claim must survive. But discrimination claims need more than neutral facts, an adverse action, and speculation about discriminatory motives to make it past this stage. As such, on the current record, a reasonable juror could find for Plaintiffs on their conversion claim. View "Kenneth Robinson v. Priority Automotive Huntersville, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Carrington Mortgage Services on behalf of the United States for alleged violations of the False Claims Act. Calderon is a former employee of Carrington. She alleged that Carrington made false representations to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in the course of certifying residential mortgage loans for insurance coverage from the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Carrington moved for summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff did not meet her evidentiary burden on two elements of False Claims Act liability. The district court sided with Carrington on both elements and granted summary judgment, disposing of Plaintiff’s lawsuit.   The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff does have sufficient proof of materiality. However, the court agreed that she has not met her burden of proof on the element of causation. The court explained that on the present record, it is not clear how a factfinder would even spot the alleged false statement in each loan file, let alone evaluate its seriousness and scope. And though Plaintiff asserted that the misrepresentations, in this case, are of the type identified in Spicer, the court did not see much in the record to support that point other than Plaintiff’s assertions. Without more evidence from which a jury could conclude that Carrington’s alleged misrepresentations in each loan caused the subsequent defaults, the nature of those misrepresentations is not enough to get past summary judgment. View "Michelle Calderon v. Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant, a fired employee, sued his former employer, alleging a pattern or practice of race discrimination against non-South Asians in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The employee had previously attempted to join another class action against the company, but after that case was stayed, he filed this suit – years after his termination. The employer moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) as untimely. In response, the employee conceded that the relevant statutes of limitations had expired, and instead, he resorted to two forms of tolling: wrong-forum and American Pipe. The district court concluded that American Pipe tolling did not allow the employee to commence a successive class action, and the employee does not contest that ruling. But the district court dismissed the complaint without considering the applicability of wrong-forum tolling.   The Third Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for the district court to consider whether wrong-forum tolling applies and/or whether Appellant has plausibly pleaded a prima facie pattern-or-practice claim. The court explained a class plaintiff’s burden in making out a prima facie case of discrimination is different from that of an individual plaintiff “in that the former need not initially show discrimination against any particular present or prospective employee,” including himself. As a result, Appellant was not required to plead but for causation on an individual basis to avoid dismissal, given the availability of the pattern-or-practice method of proof at later stages of the case. View "Lee Williams v. Tech Mahindra Americas Inc" on Justia Law

Student H.P.-B. resides with her adult cousin Q.T. within the geographical boundaries of Pottsgrove. H.P.-B. enrolled in Pottsgrove during the 2014–2015 school year. Q.T. does not have legal custody of H.P.-B—an August 2008 order grants primary physical and legal custody to H.P.-B.’s grandmother, E.E. Q.T. filed an IDEA due process complaint on H.P.-B’s behalf. The district court held that a straightforward application of C.F.R. 34 Section 300.30 (b)(2) “dictates that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s ‘parent’ for purposes of the IDEA.” Q.T., E.E., and F.P. appealed the district court’s order. Appellants argued that the district court erred by holding that Q.T. does not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent for purposes of the IDEA and, thus that Q.T. is unable to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf.   The Third Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained the district court erred in finding that Q.T. did not qualify as H.P.-B.’s parent and thus lacked standing to file a due process complaint on H.P.-B.’s behalf. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded with instructions to vacate the hearing officer’s order dismissing Q.T.’s due process complaint. The court explained there is ample evidence in the record that Q.T. was acting in the place of H.P.-B.’s natural parent, satisfying the third definition of “parent.” The record shows Q.T. affirmed that she was supporting H.P.- B. assumed all personal obligations related to school requirements for H.P.-B. and intended to keep and support H.P.-B. continuously, and not merely through the school year. View "Q. T. v. Pottsgrove School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an O’Fallon City, Missouri council member, sued the City of O’Fallon (City), its mayor, Bill Hennessy, and the O’Fallon City Council (City Council) based on their alleged violation of her civil rights. The district court initially stayed Plaintiff’s suit because impeachment proceedings initiated by Defendants were underway. Plaintiff was eventually impeached by the City Council but declined to pursue any available state remedies. The district court subsequently lifted the stay. Defendants moved for dismissal on abstention grounds as well as claim preclusion. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s case under claim preclusion principles based on her failure to pursue judicial review in the state courts. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court’s abstention under Younger was improper because an exception to Younger abstention should have been applied to enable the court to act before her impeachment proceedings concluded.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to challenge the dismissal below and failed to challenge it on appeal until her reply brief. Appellate courts “do not generally review arguments first raised in a reply brief.” The court held that Plaintiff’s contention that she did, in fact, raise the issue in her initial brief is belied by the brief itself. She only mentions that the district court dismissed the case on claim preclusion grounds for her failure to seek judicial review in state court in her recounting of the procedural history of her case. This is insufficient for the court to consider the challenge to be “meaningfully argued.” View "Katie Gatewood v. City of O'Fallon, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her employer Houston Independent School District (“HISD”), for retaliation and age discrimination. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failing to state a claim. Her amended complaint was also dismissed. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. To begin, the court explained that by applying amended Rule 3(c), it concludes that it has jurisdiction to review the final judgment. Under the new rule, a notice of appeal “encompasses the final judgment” if it designates “an order described in Rule 4(a)(4)(A).” Further, the court found that the district court applied the correct standard when assessing whether Plaintiff adequately pled sufficient facts to establish all the elements of her claims. Moreover, Plaintiff’s amended complaint brings three categories of claims. The first is a retaliation claim pursuant to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and Section 21.055 of the Texas Labor Code. To state a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) she was engaged in a protected activity; (2) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and adverse employment action.” Here, the court found that Plaintiff’s complaint is hard to understand, and parts of it fail even to establish the adverse action prong. For example, the complaint offers no specifics about the “forms of retaliation, harassment, taunting, and badgering” to which Plaintiff was allegedly subjected. It also provides little to nothing about what the positions actually were and what the ages and qualifications were of those who were given promotions. View "Norsworthy v. Houston Indep Sch Dist" on Justia Law