Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After being passed over for a superintendent role, Plaintiff sued her employer, Pulaski County Special School District (“PCSSD”), and its board members for discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. A jury found in her favor on her Title VII and Section 1981 retaliation claims and awarded damages, including punitive damages. Defendants appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law and the punitive damages award. Plaintiff cross-appeals the district court’s denial of her request for front pay, additional back pay, and equitable relief.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the judgment. The court explained that, as a whole, the evidence demonstrates that she believed she reported the disparity in the facilities as part of her duty to oversee compliance with Plan 2000, which sought to rectify discrimination against students in public education. The court explained that it does not rule out that the disparity in the facilities could affect employees too, there is simply no evidence here that Plaintiff believed she was complaining about a discriminatory employment practice. Thus, a jury could not conclude that Plaintiff had a good faith belief that she was reporting a discriminatory employment practice. View "Janice Warren v. Mike Kemp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant appealed from a district court order granting summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees on his claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erroneously held that he lacks RICO standing to sue for his lost earnings because those losses flowed from, or were derivative of, an antecedent personal injury.   The Second Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that RICO’s civil-action provision, 18 U.S.C. Section 1964(c), authorizes a plaintiff to sue for injuries to “business or property.” While that language implies that a plaintiff cannot sue for personal injuries, that negative implication does not bar a plaintiff from suing for injuries to business or property simply because a personal injury was antecedent to those injuries. The court explained that it is simply wrong to suggest that the antecedent-personal-injury bar is necessary to ensure “genuine limitations” in Section 1964(c), or to give restrictive significance to Congress’s implicit intent to exclude some class of injuries by the phrase “business or property”’ when it enacted RICO. View "Horn v. Medical Marijuana, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants, game wardens with the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, appealed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against them.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered judgment for Defendants. The court concluded that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Defendant violated his constitutional rights. The court explained that because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants knowingly withheld relevant, material information from the grand jury, he has not shown that the independent intermediary’s deliberations or decisions were tainted. Accordingly, the independent-intermediary doctrine defeats Plaintiff’s allegations that there was no probable cause to prosecute him and insulates Defendants from liability. The court wrote that this conclusion applies with equal force to Plaintiff’s claims for both retaliatory prosecution and prosecution without probable cause. View "Trevino v. Iden" on Justia Law

The property owners (doing business as Re-Mart Investment), and St. Maron Properties— brought Section 1983 claims against the City under the Takings Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as state law tort and statutory claims. The district court dismissed the state law claims as barred by sovereign immunity. It also dismissed the Section 1983 claims under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to satisfy the requirements for municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the state law claims. But reversed the dismissal of the Section 1983 claims. The court explained that under Monell, a Section 1983 plaintiff may not proceed against a municipality unless the injury was caused by an official policy of the municipality. But here, the property owners allege that city officials violated their rights at the specific direction of the Mayor and the City Council. That is enough to establish liability under Monell. Accordingly, the court held that the property owners are entitled to proceed against the City on their federal claims. View "St. Maron v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

This False Claims Act case involves Medicare reimbursements to Stone County Hospital (SCH), a critical access hospital in Wiggins, Mississippi. At trial, the Government proved that Appellants (a corporate management company, company owner, corporate executives, and SCH) defrauded Medicare out of millions over the span of twelve years by overbilling for the owner’s and his wife’s compensation despite little or no reimbursable work. The district court’s judgment in favor of the Government included an order barring Appellants from dissipating their assets. Almost two years later, the district court issued a temporary enforcement order that specifically barred Appellants from selling a piece of real property. Appellants separately appealed the enforcement of this post-judgment injunction.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court explained that Appellants’ arguments on appeal fail to undercut the jury’s verdict. But the Government’s dilatory conduct over the protracted procedural history of this case gives pause, even if the Government largely prevails today. When Appellants interposed the statute of limitations because of the Government’s dawdling, the Government maintained its claims were timely. It does the same on appeal. But the Government’s own sealed extension request memoranda, which remains sealed to this day, demonstrate otherwise. Further, the court explained that contrary to Appellants’ frequent reference to “nonparties” in their briefing, Defendants in fact own, or control the property in question, albeit through indirect corporate entities. At the end of the day, the only ownership interests beyond Defendants in any of the relevant entities are held by trusts for Defendants’ children. View "Aldridge v. Corporate Management" on Justia Law

The Satanic Temple and one of its members sued the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (“THHSC”), its Executive Commissioner, and the Planned Parenthood Center for Choice, Inc., seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against several Texas abortion laws.Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction against the Commissioner; the district court denied the motion. The Satanic Temple appealed.While the appeal was pending, the litigation continued in district court. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the suit without prejudice but without leave to replead.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had jurisdiction to proceed on the merits of the case. An appeal from a grant or denial of a preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction or restrain it from taking other steps in the litigation. The district court, therefore, had jurisdiction to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims despite the pending appeal. Thus, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Satanic Temple v. TX Hlth and Human" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants County of Suffolk, Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office Division Chief Edward Heilig, and Suffolk County District Attorney’s Office Special Investigations Bureau Chief Joseph Carroll. Plaintiff was a Clerk Typist in the District Attorney’s Office from 2008 until her employment in the Special Investigations Bureau was terminated in 2015. She alleged that defendants discriminated against her based on her disability and retaliated against her for seeking an accommodation for that disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law Section 296, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims.   The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim and vacated the district court’s judgment with respect to the reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims. The court agreed with Plaintiff that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her reasonable accommodation and retaliation claims. The court explained that construing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff, a rational jury could find that archiving was not an essential function of Plaintiff’s position and that defendants failed to provide a reasonable workplace accommodation for her disability. The court similarly concluded that disputed issues of material fact preclude summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claim. View "Tafolla v. Heilig" on Justia Law

Plaintiff painted two large murals directly onto the walls inside a building on the campus of Defendant-Appellee Vermont Law School, Inc. The work stirred controversy, which eventually prompted the law school to erect a wall of acoustic panels around the murals to permanently conceal them from public view. Kerson brought suit against the law school, alleging that obscuring his work behind a permanent barrier violated his rights under the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 (“VARA”), which creates a cause of action for artists to prevent the modification and, in certain instances, destruction of works of visual art.   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court held that merely ensconcing a work of art behind a barrier neither modifies nor destroys the work, as contemplated by VARA, and thus does not implicate VARA’s protections. The court explained that this case presents weighty concerns that pin an artist’s moral right to maintain the integrity of an artwork against a private entity’s control over the art in its possession. On the facts presented here, the court resolved this tension by hewing to the statutory text, which reflects Congress’s conscientious balancing of the competing interests at stake.  Because mere concealment of the Murals neither “modifies” nor “destroys” them, the Law School has not violated any of VARA’s prohibitions. As such, VARA does not entitle Plaintiff to an order directing the Law School to take the barrier down and continue to display the Murals. View "Kerson v. Vermont Law School, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2022, New Jersey passed a law, N.J. Stat. 2C:58-33(a), that empowers only the state’s Attorney General to sue gun-industry members whose “unlawful … or unreasonable” conduct “contribute[s] to a public nuisance in [New Jersey] through the sale, manufacturing, distribution, importing, or marketing of a gun-related product.” It requires industry members to “establish, implement, and enforce reasonable controls” on these activities. The Attorney General has not attempted to enforce the law. Four months after the law was passed, the Foundation, a trade group of gun makers, retailers, and other industry members, filed suit, claiming that the law is preempted by the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. 7901–7903, and violates due process, the First and Second Amendments, and the dormant Commerce Clause. The Foundation moved for a preliminary injunction, attaching declarations that gunmakers “will continually be at risk of litigation and potential liability unless [they] cease[] doing business.” They gave no factual detail.The Third Circuit held that the challenges must be dismissed. “Pre-enforcement challenges are unusual,” the plaintiff must show that the stakes are high and close at hand. This suit “falls far short of even the “normal” pre-enforcement challenge.” A brand-new civil tort statute, without more, does not justify a federal court’s intervention. View "National Shooting Sports Foundation v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Chief Financial Officer of the Cypress Bayou Casino. The Casino is owned by the Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana. The Chitimacha Tribe is one of four federally recognized Indian tribes in Louisiana. According to the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint, the Chitimacha tribal council authorized Spivey (as CFO of the Casino) to make a $3,900 bonus payment to the then-newly elected chairman of the tribal council. Plaintiff claimed that several members of the tribal council turned around and reported the bonus payment to federal and state law enforcement. Plaintiff initially sued the Tribe, the Casino, and four tribal council members in federal court under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1983 and 1985 and Louisiana tort law. The district court, over Plaintiff’s objections, again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations, denied Plaintiff’s remand motion, and dismissed all Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to state court. The court first wrote that when a district court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand. The court held, in accordance with the statute’s plain text and the great weight of authority from across the country, that Section 1447(c) means what it says, admits of no exceptions, and requires remand even when the district court thinks it futile. Moreover, the court held that such a dismissal should be made without prejudice. View "Spivey v. Chitimacha Tribe" on Justia Law