Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued her former employer Xceed Financial Credit Union (Xceed) for wrongful termination and age discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The case was submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The arbitrator granted summary judgment in favor of Xceed on the ground Plaintiff’s claims were barred by a release in her separation agreement. The arbitrator rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that the release violated Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits pre-dispute releases of liability in some circumstances. Plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing an illegal release. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the arbitrator’s ruling for clear error. The arbitrator correctly ruled the release did not violate Civil Code section 1668. Plaintiff signed the separation agreement after she was informed of the decision to terminate her but before her last day on the job. At the time she signed, she already believed that the decision to terminate her was based on age discrimination and that she had a valid claim for wrongful termination. The alleged violation of FEHA had already occurred, even though the claim had not yet fully accrued. Accordingly, the release did not violate section 1668 because it was not a release of liability for future unknown claims. View "Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of VMSB’s restaurant. They argue that VMSB failed to meet its minimum wage and overtime pay obligations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and comparable Florida laws. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged three counts, and both sides filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs moved the district court to approve the settlement and to “direct the clerk to dismiss Count III” with prejudice. The district court ultimately adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and entered judgment for VMSB on Counts I and II. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal regarding Counts I and II.   The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. The court explained that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) provides only for the dismissal of an entire action. Any attempt to use this rule to dismiss a single claim, or anything less than the entire action, will be invalid—just like it would be under Rule 41(a)(1). Because the parties here attempted to use Rule 41(a) to dismiss a single count and not an entire lawsuit, a final judgment was never rendered. Accordingly, the court found that it lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. View "Israel Rosell, et al. v. VMSB, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of William Marsh Rice University d/b/a Rice University (hereinafter, “Rice” or “the University”) dismissing his claims under Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 (“Title IX”) as well as his state law breach-of-contract claims.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim but reversed its summary judgment in favor of the University with respect to Plaintiff’s Title IX claims and remanded. The court explained that Plaintiff has not alleged any breaches of the University’s Code or associated policies. Moreover, as the district court accurately observed in evaluating Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim, the Code expressly provides that “[t]he procedures used . . . by SJP are not those used in court cases and are not intended to create contractual rights[.]” In the absence of contractual rights and the University’s intent to be bound, the court held that it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to Plaintiff’s breach-of-contract claim. Moreover, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the University on the grounds that the record clearly indicates that material fact issues remain in dispute as to whether Plaintiff has successfully advanced a Title IX claim against the University. View "Doe v. William Marsh" on Justia Law

In 2019, Susan Christie filed suit against Wayne State University, asserting age and disability discrimination under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (the ELCRA); and the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (the PWDCRA). Christie took a medical leave of absence in February 2017 and returned to work on May 1, 2017. Plaintiff alleged that after her return to work, her supervisors questioned her about her age, asked her when she intended to retire, and had conversations with others in her presence regarding the ages of employees. Plaintiff received a negative job-performance review on September 22, 2017, allegedly the first negative review she had ever received, and defendant terminated her from her job on November 27, 2017. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that MCL 600.6431(1) of the Court of Claims Act (the COCA), required plaintiff to file either a verified complaint with the Court of Claims or notice of intent to file suit with the Court of Claims within one year of the accrual of her claim; defendant maintained plaintiff’s claim was barred by governmental immunity because she failed to do either. The court denied the motion, concluding that MCL 600.6431(1) did not preclude plaintiff from filing her claim in the circuit court because the COCA notice requirements only applied to claims litigated in the Court of Claims. Defendant appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. While the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal as a matter of right, it treated the appeal as though leave had been granted and affirmed the trial court’s order in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment. View "Christie v. Wayne State University" on Justia Law

Defendants hired Plaintiff as a nanny. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment. They hoped Plaintiff would release potential claims against them in exchange for a severance payment. Defendants asked a friend (who ran a nanny placement service and had helped hire Plaintiff) to propose this to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not sign the proposed severance agreement. Instead, she brought wage-and-hour claims against Defendants. Following discovery, Plaintiff amended her complaint to add a claim for defamation. She based her defamation claim on statements Defendants made to the intermediary during the negotiations over severance. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. They argued that the allegedly defamatory statements were made in anticipation of litigation. They moved to strike not only the new defamation allegations but also the entire complaint. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion and required the Defendants to pay some of Plaintiff’s attorney fees.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Defendants did not show that Plaintiff’s defamation claim was based on activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law. The court explained that Defendants appealed to the entire SAC. They did so even after the trial court correctly found the motion frivolous as to most of Plaintiff’s SAC. Defendants informed the trial court that “the appeal is going to be of every cause of action.” Defendants were thereby able to obtain a full stay of the action in the trial court, even though the appeal was frivolous as to most of the action. If Defendants had appealed as to only the defamation cause of action, Plaintiff might have had the opportunity to argue for permission to continue discovery. View "Nirschl v. Schiller" on Justia Law

Eberspaecher North America (“ENA”), is a company that manufactures car components with its headquarters in Novi, Michigan and six other locations across the country. An employee at one of these locations—ENA’s Northport, Alabama plant—complained to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) that he was fired for taking protected absences under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). An EEOC Commissioner charged ENA with discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act (“ADAAA”), listing only the Northport facility in the written charge. The EEOC then issued requests for information on every employee terminated for attendance-related infractions at each of ENA’s seven domestic facilities around the nation. ENA objected to the scope of those requests. The district court ordered ENA to turn over information related to the Northport, Alabama, facility but refused to enforce the subpoena as to information from other facilities. The EEOC appealed, arguing that the district court abused its discretion. In the alternative, the EEOC contends that, even if the charge were limited to the Northport facility, nationwide data is still relevant to its investigation.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order enforcing only part of the EEOC’s subpoena. The court explained the EEOC’s investigatory process is a multi-step process designed to notify employers of investigations into potentially unlawful employment practices. The court held that the EEOC charged only ENA’s Northport facility— which provided notice to ENA that the EEOC was investigating potentially unlawful employment practices only at that specific facility—and thus that the nationwide data sought by the EEOC is irrelevant to that charge. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Eberspaecher North America Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was let go from her position at Brandstar Studios shortly after her father fell ill. Following her termination, Plaintiff sued Brandstar under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted Brandstar summary judgment. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that Brandstar executives interfered with her rights under the FMLA. Second, she asserted that her termination constituted associational discrimination under the ADA. And finally, she claimed that the district court improperly weighed the evidence on summary judgment rather than construing the facts in her favor.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties agreed that Brandstar provided Plaintiff the leave she requested in her May 2 email and that she received full pay for those days. In fact, Plaintiff accidentally clocked in on her two days of requested leave, and Brandstar HR executives circled back weeks later to ensure that she corrected her timecard to reflect her requested leave. Thus, Plaintiff can’t demonstrate that she was harmed by Brandstar’s technical failure to notify her of her FMLA rights. Further, the court found that not only did Plaintiff fail to “request leave” in the May 6 email, but there’s also no indication that Brandstar “acquired knowledge” on its own that she wanted leave for an FMLA-qualifying reason. Moreover, the court found that the only evidence Plaintiff marshaled is the “temporal proximity” between her father’s acute onset decline and her termination—which isn’t enough to show pretext. View "Jessica Graves v. Brandstar Studios, Inc." on Justia Law

After being fired by his employer, Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC, Intervenor filed suit in federal district court, alleging that his termination reflected racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII. Anheuser-Busch filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration of Intervenor’s district court claims, asserting that at the time when he was hired, Intervenor had agreed to be bound by the company’s Dispute Resolution Policy. Intervenor disagreed that he was required to arbitrate his claims. After Anheuser-Busch asked the district court to compel arbitration, Intervenor filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB, arguing that Defendant’s efforts to enforce its arbitration agreement contravened the collective bargaining agreement and constituted a unilateral change to the terms of Intervenor’s employment, in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).   The Eleventh Circuit granted the petition for review of the Board’s order dismissing the complaint, vacated the decision of the Board, and remanded for consideration of whether enforcement of the Dispute Resolution Policy against Intervenor would violate the NLRA. The court held that the Board applied an erroneously narrow standard for determining whether Anheuser-Busch’s motion had an illegal objective. The court explained that on remand, the Board should instead determine whether the outcome sought by Anheuser-Busch’s motion— the compelled arbitration of Brown’s Title VII claims under the Dispute Resolution Policy—would violate the NLRA. If the Board decides that the answer to that question is “yes,” it should then order all relief that is appropriate based on Anheuser-Busch’s unlawful conduct. View "International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 947 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged (1) Officer N. used excessive force when he tased Plaintiff at the scene of an automobile wreck, (2) Officer H. failed to intervene to prevent Officer N’s excessive force, and (3) the City of Madison, Alabama admitted the officers’ actions were the result of its municipal policy. Relying on body camera footage, Defendants Officer N., Officer H., and the City moved to dismiss. The district court granted their motions to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued the district court erred by (1) considering the officers’ body camera footage when ruling on Defendants’ motions to dismiss without converting them into summary judgment motions, (2) granting qualified immunity to Officer N., (3) dismissing Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim against Officer H., and (4) dismissing his municipal liability claim against the City.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the district court properly considered the body camera footage, correctly ruled that Officer N. did not violate a constitutional right and thus Officer H. had no duty to intervene and accurately determined that Plaintiff’s claim against the City failed as a matter of law. The court explained Officer N.’s use of the taser was justified because of (1) Plaintiff’s repeated failure to comply with Officer N.’s commands, (2) Plaintiff’s unsafe driving that had just caused an automobile accident, (3) Plaintiff’s repeated efforts to get back in the vehicle, (4) Plaintiff’s physical resistance to Officer N.’s attempts to remove him from the vehicle, and (5) the tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving series of events. Thus, the court concluded that Officer N.’s single use of a taser in dart mode was objectively reasonable. View "Curtis Baker v. City of Madison, Alabama, et al." on Justia Law

The Restaurant Law Center and the Texas Restaurant Association (“Plaintiffs”) challenge a Department of Labor regulation that refines how the federal minimum wage applies to tipped employees. The district court denied Plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on the sole ground that they failed to establish irreparable harm from complying with the new rule.   The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently showed irreparable harm in unrecoverable compliance costs. The court explained that the 30-minute limitation is a new constraint on the tip credit that both requires distinct recordkeeping and affects the existing 20-percent standard. Neither the district court nor the Department explained why this new requirement would not impose new costs. To the contrary, the rule itself confirms that employers who want to continue claiming the tip credit—like Plaintiffs’ members—will “incur ongoing management costs” to ensure employees do not spend more than 30 minutes continuously performing directly supporting work. The court found that the district court abused its discretion in finding no evidence of irreparable harm View "Restaurant Law Center v. LABR" on Justia Law