Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner is an alien who challenges Exxon Mobil Corporation’s hiring policy as discriminatory. Petitioner received deferred deportation and eligibility for temporary work authorization under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival program. While a student at North Carolina State University, Petitioner was recruited by ExxonMobil for an internship. Petitioner told ExxonMobil that he is not a United States citizen, but erroneously represented that he had permanent work authorization under federal law. Petitioner was hired on this basis. However, when he presented his paperwork, it showed he lacked permanent work authorization, and ExxonMobil rescinded its offer.Petitioner claims that ExxonMobil’s policy discriminates against aliens as prohibited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981. ExxonMobil filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Section 1981 only protects against intentional discrimination, and Petitioner failed to allege that ExxonMobil intentionally discriminates against aliens. While ExxonMobil’s policy requiring that applicants have permanent work authorization will only exclude aliens, discriminatory impact is not enough. And, given ExxonMobil’s policy, Petitioner did not plausibly allege that ExxonMobil intended to discriminate against aliens. View "Aldo De Leon Resendiz v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

Under Texas law, parties to municipal contracts must certify that they do not and will not boycott Israel for the duration of their contracts. The City of Houston offered A&R Engineering and Testing, Inc. a contract with an anti-boycott clause. A&R refused to sign and brought a Section 1983 suit against the City and the Texas Attorney General. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against the City and the Attorney General. The Attorney General appealed, arguing that A&R lacks standing.   The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction and dismiss the suit against the Attorney General. The court explained that t, A&R has not shown that the Attorney General could interfere with the City’s contracts. Chapter Section 2271 merely provides a list of definitions and then a list of requirements. It doesn’t expressly provide a way for the Attorney General to enforce those requirements. The statute’s “textually unenforceable language” poses a traceability problem. Second, the Attorney General hasn’t taken any action to suggest he might enforce the provision even if he has such power. Plaintiffs must assert “an injury that is the result of a statute’s actual or threatened enforcement.” Finally, the City’s conduct severs any link between A&R’s economic injury and the Attorney General. View "A & R Engineering v. Scott" on Justia Law

In an action brought by Plaintiff and her five minor children alleging federal and state law claims arising out of Plaintiff’s arrest, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants—individual police officers and the City and County of San Francisco— on Plaintiff’s federal claims based on qualified immunity; remanded to the district court Plaintiff’s state law claims for false arrest and negligence; affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the remaining state law claims; and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to recuse.   The panel first considered whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff under the three statutes cited by Defendants. The panel held that there was a jury question whether officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Some of the bases on which the defendants attempt to claim probable cause are not supported by the record. However, Plaintiff’s federal claims are still subject to qualified immunity. The court wrote that Plaintiff did not sufficiently show how her arrest violated a clearly established right to be free from an unlawful arrest when the undisputed evidence (under the probable cause analysis) presented before the district court does not show that every reasonable officer would be on notice that the actions taken by the defendants were unconstitutional. The panel vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law false arrest and negligence claims, which were premised on a finding that probable cause existed as a matter of law. View "KIRSTIN JOHNSON, ET AL V. KIERSTIE BARR, ET AL" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)(the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. The court reasoned that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that age was the but-for cause of her 2018 nonrenewal. Plaintiff was not meeting Liberty’s legitimate expectations at the time of her nonrenewal in that she repeatedly failed to develop a digital art skillset. And Plaintiff has failed to contend with the fact that the comments she characterizes as evidence of age discrimination — the retirement comments plus the resistant-to-change comment — were made subsequent to the Chair and the Dean having resolved not to renew her teaching contract for the 2018-19 school year. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

On August 31, 2012, in San Bernardino County Superior Court, Appellant entered a no-contest plea to one count of assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. He was placed on three years formal probation. Shortly after being placed on probation, Appellant was deported. He later illegally reentered the country. In 2014, his probation was reinstated, and on June 25, 2015, the sentencing court transferred probation supervision and jurisdiction from San Bernardino County to Los Angeles County, where Appellant permanently resided, pursuant to section 1203.9. On April 6, 2021, Appellant filed a motion in Los Angeles County Superior Court to vacate his plea pursuant to section 1473.7. By then, he had already completed his probationary sentence. On August 23, 2021, the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s motion and directed him to refile the motion in San Bernardino County Superior Court.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Appellant should have filed his motion to withdraw his plea in the county where he was prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced. The question was whether the phrase “full jurisdiction” is meant to remove the authority of the original sentencing court from everything associated with the case or whether “full jurisdiction” refers only to matters relating to the probationary sentence. The court held that section 1203.9 was enacted solely to effectuate more streamlined and effective supervision of probationers statewide by ensuring that the court of their county of residence is empowered to supervise and adjudicate issues arising as a result of the probationary grant. View "P. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Project Veritas sued the Oregon Attorney General, Ellen Rosenblum, and the District Attorney of Multnomah County, Oregon, Michael Schmidt (collectively, Oregon), challenging section 165.540 as an unconstitutional restriction of protected speech. Oregon moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court partially granted the motion, and the parties agreed to dismiss the remaining claims with prejudice. Project Veritas appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The law provides two exceptions relevant to this appeal: (1) section 165.540(1)(c) does not apply to a person who records a conversation during a felony that endangers human life, and (2) section 165.540(1)(c) allows a person to record a conversation in which a law enforcement officer is a participant if the recording is made while the officer is performing official duties and meets other criteria. Applying Animal Legal Def. Fund. v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2018), the panel held that section 165.540(1)(c) regulates protected speech (unannounced audiovisual recording) and is content-based because it distinguishes between particular topics by restricting some subject matters (e.g., a state executive officer’s official activities) and not others (e.g., a police officer’s official activities). The panel further determined that section 165.540(1)(c) burdens more speech than is necessary to achieve its stated interest, and there were other ways for Oregon to achieve its interests of protecting conversational privacy. Because section 165.540(1)(c) is not a valid time, place, or manner restriction, it cannot be saved by striking the two exceptions at issue here. View "PROJECT VERITAS, ET AL V. MICHAEL SCHMIDT, ET AL" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff twice lost out on a promotion, she sued Union Pacific for discrimination. The question is whether a dispute over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement required dismissal. Union Pacific to sought dismissal under the Railway Labor Act, see 45 U.S.C. Section 151, et seq., which requires disputes over the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement to go to arbitration. The district court granted the motion to dismiss.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the parties agree that this case does not involve an attempt to “form” or “secure” a collective-bargaining agreement, so it does not fall into the major-dispute category. In a failure-to-promote case like this one, Plaintiff must establish that (1) she “was a member of a protected group; (2) she was qualified and applied for a promotion to a position for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) she was not promoted; and (4) similarly situated employees, not part of the protected group, were promoted instead.” The sticking point is whether she actually applied for either promotion: she says she did, but Union Pacific disagreed. Whether faxed resumes count as applications under the collective-bargaining agreement is something she will have to prove to establish her prima-facie case. Perhaps the best evidence of its importance was the prominent role it played at trial, especially in the questioning by Plaintiff’s attorney. In these circumstances, the issue is one for the National Railroad Adjustment Board to decide. View "Nancy Avina v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

While Respondent was employed as a truck driver at Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC (“Greatwide”), he witnessed certain drivers receive additional driving assignments in violation of 49 C.F.R. Section 395.3, which regulates the maximum driving time for property-carrying vehicles. After collecting evidence related to the violations, Respondent submitted anonymous letters to management reporting his findings. Soon thereafter, Respondent revealed to management personnel that he was the author of the letters. The following month, Respondent was assigned to deliver two trailers filled with merchandise to two Nordstrom store locations in Manhattan, New York and Paramus, New Jersey. However, when Respondent returned from this assignment, he was suspended for—what Greatwide claimed to be—violations of company policy. Greatwide subsequently terminated and dismissed Respondent without a more explicit explanation. Respondent promptly filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). Following several lengthy delays, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) ruled in Respondent’s favor, ordering Greatwide to pay both back pay and emotional distress damages. The Administrative Review Board (“ARB”) affirmed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the ARB’s conclusion that Respondent engaged in protected activity, that his activity was a contributing factor in his termination, and that Greatwide failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent would have been terminated absent his protected conduct. Nor was Greatwide prejudiced by the proceeding’s delays. Finally, the court declined to enforce the alleged settlement agreement because the company failed to challenge the ALJ’s decision before the ARB. View "Greatwide Dedicated Transport II, LLC v. United States Department of Labor" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Plaintiff challenged the district court’s award of summary judgment to defendant Liberty University, Inc. (“Liberty”) on Palmer’s claim of age discrimination, pursued under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”)  (the “Statutory Ruling”). On the other hand, Liberty, by cross-appeal, challenged an earlier award of summary judgment that was made to Plaintiff, in which the court ruled that Plaintiff was not a “minister” for purposes of the First Amendment’s so-called “ministerial exception” (the “Constitutional Ruling”).   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Statutory Ruling, dismissed Liberty’s cross-appeal, and vacated the Constitutional Ruling. The court explained that it agreed with the district court that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-based discrimination to overcome Liberty’s summary judgment motion on that issue. Accordingly, the court was satisfied to affirm the Statutory Ruling in favor of Liberty. Moreover, in light of that disposition — and pursuant to the constitutional avoidance doctrine — the court refrained from resolving whether Plaintiff was a minister for purposes of the First Amendment’s ministerial exception. As a result, the court wrote it was obliged to dismiss Liberty’s cross-appeal and vacate the Constitutional Ruling. View "Eva Palmer v. Liberty University, Incorporated" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging that Isanti County, Minnesota (the “County”) violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it unlawfully prosecuted him under the County’s solid waste ordinance (the “Solid Waste Ordinance”). Plaintiff also asserted Minnesota state law claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings as to the federal claims in favor of the County and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on the remaining state law claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while Plaintiff’s opening brief lists 21 cases, which Plaintiff contends constitute proof the County used the Solid Waste Ordinance to wrongly prosecute property owners, none of these cases are properly before the court as they were not included in the complaint. Plaintiff’s complaint contains insufficient factual allegations to sustain a municipal liability claim. Accordingly, the court held that without a constitutional violation, there can be no Section 1983 liability. View "Keith Kiefer v. Isanti County" on Justia Law