Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The case involves Dianne Hensley, a justice of the peace in Texas, who announced that due to her religious beliefs, she would not perform weddings for same-sex couples but would refer them to others who would. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct issued her a public warning for casting doubt on her capacity to act impartially due to the person's sexual orientation, in violation of Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct. Hensley did not appeal this warning to a Special Court of Review (SCR) but instead sued the Commission and its members and officers for violating the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act (TRFRA) and her right to freedom of speech under Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution. The trial court dismissed her claims for lack of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed.The Supreme Court of Texas held that Hensley's suit was not barred by her decision not to appeal the Commission’s Public Warning or by sovereign immunity. The court affirmed the part of the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing one of Hensley's declaratory requests for lack of jurisdiction, reversed the remainder of the judgment, and remanded to the court of appeals to address the remaining issues on appeal. The court found that the SCR could not have finally decided whether Hensley is entitled to the relief sought in this case or awarded the relief TRFRA provides to successful claimants. View "HENSLEY v. STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT" on Justia Law

The case involves Joseph Askew, Charlie Gordon Wade III, and Curtis Washington, who sued the City of Kinston, North Carolina, alleging that the city's condemnation and demolition of their properties violated their rights under the state constitution. The plaintiffs, who are African American, claimed that the city targeted properties owned by African Americans or located in predominantly African American neighborhoods, while ignoring similarly dilapidated properties owned by Caucasians or located in predominantly Caucasian neighborhoods.The Superior Court of Lenoir County granted summary judgment in favor of the city, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated the lower court's decision, ruling that the plaintiffs had to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing a direct action under the state constitution. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court of North Carolina.The Supreme Court of North Carolina vacated the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that exhaustion of administrative remedies does not dictate jurisdiction over direct actions under the state constitution. The court explained that the authority to hear such claims flows from the constitution itself. The court also found that the Court of Appeals had erred by treating the plaintiffs' separate constitutional claims as the same. The court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for a standard de novo review of the merits of the trial court's summary judgment order. View "Askew v. City of Kinston" on Justia Law

The case involves a § 1983 excessive-force action brought by Marta Sanchez, the Estate of Stephanie Lopez, and Dominic Martinez against officers from the Littleton and Englewood Police Departments in Colorado. The plaintiffs alleged that the officers fired 66 bullets into their motionless vehicle while they were attempting to surrender, resulting in the death of Stephanie Lopez, severe injuries to Dominic Martinez, and rendering Marta Sanchez a paraplegic. The defendants, however, described a high-speed car chase following an armed carjacking, during which the plaintiffs allegedly used their vehicle as a weapon and endangered the public.The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden on the clearly established law issue. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide a record-based factual universe upon which the court could conduct a clearly established law analysis. The court held that the plaintiffs effectively waived their review of their challenge to the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to the defendants. The court concluded that without a record-based factual universe reflecting the plaintiffs' version of events, it could not opine on whether the district court committed reversible error in concluding that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the clearly established law prong of the qualified-immunity test. View "Sanchez v. Guzman" on Justia Law

Minosa Echols, a civil detainee in an Illinois facility, was seriously injured when another resident attacked him. Echols filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that three security officers present during the assault violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by failing to protect him. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defense. Echols appealed, arguing that the district court committed a legal error in its jury instruction.The district court had instructed the jury that to succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, Echols needed to show that the officer in question was subjectively aware that the other resident presented a risk of harm to Echols. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the jury instruction was erroneous. The court stated that Echols did not need to prove subjective awareness of the risk of harm to establish liability. Instead, the jury should have been instructed to determine whether a reasonable officer in the defendant’s position would have appreciated that the conditions within the dayroom put Echols at risk of harm, and whether the defendant acted in an objectively unreasonable way in addressing that risk.However, to prevail on appeal, Echols also needed to show that the error prejudiced him. The court found that Echols failed to do so. The court concluded that the attack was so unexpected that no reasonable officer, in the circumstances before them, would have anticipated the surprise attack or taken different measures to protect Echols. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Echols v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case involves Shannon Blick, a former principal of an elementary school in the Ann Arbor Public School District. In 2019, Blick was placed on paid leave while the school district investigated her role in a custodian's over-billing scheme. The leave lasted two years, and the school district eventually terminated Blick's contract. Blick filed a lawsuit while still on leave, alleging that various officials violated her freedoms of speech and association under the First Amendment. She also brought race-discrimination, due-process, and conspiracy claims against these officials. The district court rejected Blick's First Amendment claims at the summary-judgment stage and dismissed the other claims on the pleadings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that Blick failed to show a reversible error. She argued that the school district violated the First Amendment by imposing a prior restraint that barred her from speaking during her leave and by taking harmful actions against her in retaliation for her speech. However, the court found that Blick's lawyers did not provide sufficient information about what she wanted to say or what she did say. The court also found that Blick's opening brief did not preserve her challenges to much of the district court's motion-to-dismiss decision. As a result, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Blick v. Ann Arbor Public School District" on Justia Law

The case involves Holston Banks, a convicted prisoner, who sued John Spence for excessive use of force in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. The incident occurred in 2017, and Banks filed his lawsuit in October 2019. In April 2022, Spence moved to extend the deadline for filing an amended pleading, which was initially set for May 2, 2022. The court denied the motion but later extended the deadline to May 25, 2022, after a joint motion for an agreed amended scheduling order. On May 24, Spence filed an amended answer to Banks's complaint.Spence moved for judgment on the pleadings in September, arguing that Banks's Fourteenth Amendment claim was not applicable to convicted prisoners. He also claimed that Banks failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Banks's counsel became aware of the Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment distinction in August. On October 6, 134 days after the deadline and 38 days after Banks's counsel became aware of the issue, Banks moved to amend his claim to assert an Eighth Amendment claim. The district court denied the motion and granted judgment on the pleadings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court applied the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), which requires the party seeking relief to show that the deadlines could not reasonably be met despite their diligence. The court found that Banks's counsel's failure to understand the applicable law until after the deadline had passed was not an adequate explanation for the delay in amending the claim. The court cited previous cases where a lack of explanation for delay was sufficient to deny amendment. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of Banks's motion to amend. View "Banks v. Spence" on Justia Law

Raynard Jackson, a prisoner at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF), was placed in a cell without running water for five days. He alleged that Lieutenant Dane Esser, among other WSPF staff, knew that he did not have water and yet failed to turn the water on. After Jackson showed another staff member that he did not have water, the water was promptly turned on; however, he claimed Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff failed to provide him with medical care for his dehydration. Jackson filed grievances pertaining to these issues. After he exhausted his administrative remedies within the WSPF, he sued Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The district court, only considering the processed grievances, and without holding an evidentiary hearing, found that Jackson had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to certain claims and defendants. Additional defendants, Nurse Beth Edge and Captain Dale Flannery, were dismissed at summary judgment, leaving only the claims against Lt. Esser for trial. The jury found for Lt. Esser on both claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Jackson that the district court should not have disregarded his allegedly unprocessed grievances without holding an evidentiary hearing. However, the court found no error in the district court’s conclusion that Jackson’s processed grievances did not exhaust remedies as to all his claims. The court also found no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nurse Edge or its evidentiary rulings before trial. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a hearing on the allegedly unprocessed grievances. View "Jackson v. Esser" on Justia Law

The case involves a group of plaintiffs who filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Independent School District 194 and its superintendent. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their First Amendment rights by discriminating against their political viewpoints. The controversy arose when the school district allowed the display of Black Lives Matter (BLM) posters in classrooms but rejected requests to display "All Lives Matter" and "Blue Lives Matter" posters and shirts. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims and denied the unnamed plaintiffs' motion to proceed under pseudonyms.The district court ruled that the unnamed plaintiffs had not sufficiently established a threat of a hostile public reaction to their lawsuit that would warrant anonymity. It also concluded that the BLM posters constituted government speech that is not subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. The plaintiffs appealed both orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to proceed under pseudonyms, finding that the unnamed plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence of a compelling fear of retaliation. However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to allow a court to draw the plausible inference that the BLM posters are expressions of private persons, not government speech. The court also found that the district had engaged in viewpoint discrimination by allowing the display of BLM posters but rejecting "All Lives Matter" and "Blue Lives Matter" posters and shirts. View "Cajune v. Independent School District 194" on Justia Law

A defamation lawsuit was filed by Dana Cheng, a New York resident and political commentator, against Dan Neumann and Beacon, a Maine news outlet, for characterizing Cheng as "far-right" and a "conspiracy theorist" in an article. Neumann and Beacon sought dismissal of the case under both federal law and a New York anti-SLAPP law, which applies to meritless defamation lawsuits. The district court conducted a choice-of-law analysis, decided that New York law applied, and granted the motion to dismiss under New York's anti-SLAPP statute.The district court's decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The appellate court agreed with the district court's ruling but for a different reason: it decided that Cheng's lawsuit had to be dismissed under binding First Amendment principles protecting free speech by the press. Back at the district court, Neumann requested attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provision of New York's anti-SLAPP law. The district court denied Neumann's request after determining that Maine, not New York, law applied to the specific issue of attorneys' fees.Neumann appealed again, arguing that the district court erred in its choice-of-law analysis. The appellate court, noting the lack of clear controlling precedent on the issue, certified to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine the question of which state's law applies to the attorneys' fees issue. View "Cheng v. Neumann" on Justia Law

The case involves Xingfei Luo, who twice sought a restraining order against Professor Eugene Volokh under the Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Luo wanted to prevent Volokh from identifying her in his writings. After the trial court dismissed the first petition, Luo moved to "strike" exhibits she filed in support of that failed petition. The trial court denied that motion and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude her from proceeding pseudonymously in that case. Luo appealed these orders. The second case involves Luo’s second petition for a restraining order where the trial court granted Volokh’s anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion and dismissed Luo’s second petition. Luo also appealed from a subsequent order granting Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in her second petition.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Luo's first petition for a restraining order, concluding that the alleged harmful conduct was "likely protected free speech." The court also found that the alleged facts did not comprise acts of violence, threats of violence, or a course of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed the petitioner and caused substantial emotional distress. Luo did not appeal from the order discharging that petition. However, Luo filed an "ex parte application for an order to strike and withdraw improperly filed exhibits." The trial court denied Luo’s ex parte motion to “strike” her exhibits because Luo had not completed the proper forms for submitting an ex parte motion. Luo filed a new motion and Volokh again opposed it, and also filed a separate motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously in that case. The trial court denied Luo’s motion to strike her exhibits and granted Volokh’s motion to preclude Luo from proceeding pseudonymously.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division One, the court affirmed the order granting Volokh’s anti-SLAPP motion and dismissing Luo’s second petition. The court dismissed Luo’s appeals as to the trial court’s ruling on her motion to strike exhibits in her first petition and the court’s granting of Volokh’s motions in both cases to use her actual name. The court concluded that these rulings are based on nonappealable orders. View "Luo v. Volokh" on Justia Law