Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that two sheriff deputies unlawfully entered his home. The deputies claim Armstrong’s then-wife invited them in. But although they disagree on whether the deputies’ conduct was reasonable, they do not dispute the historical facts as to what happened. Plaintiff filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The deputies moved for summary judgment on the merits claiming that, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, their conduct was objectively reasonable. Alternatively, the deputies claimed they should be granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court agreed with the deputies on the merits, finding the deputies reasonably believed that Roadcap had the authority to consent to the deputies’ entry.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the deputies did, as the district court concluded, briefly detain Plaintiff. But the court agreed with the district court that the deputies acted reasonably as a matter of law because they were responding to a domestic situation, there were guns in the house, and Plaintiff was argumentative. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the seizure of person claim as well. Moreover, the court wrote that, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the deputies exercised some care. Thus, the district court properly dismissed the gross negligence claim. Last, as to the conversion claim, the district court properly explained that there is no evidence in the record that the deputies possessed, touched or exercised any authority over Plaintiff’s personal property. View "Adam Armstrong v. Bryan Hutcheson" on Justia Law

The Verona Police Department twice arrested L.B. for his connection to violent shootings. Both times, however, he was released while his charges were pending. Just five months after his second arrest, L.B. drove to Annie Walton’s house and opened fire—killing Annie Walton and injuring her grandson, Aliven Walton. Annie Walton’s wrongful death beneficiaries (collectively, Plaintiffs ) believe the City of Verona and the Verona Chief of Police, J.B. Long, are responsible for the shooting at Annie Walton’s home, so they sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. At summary judgment, the district court initially dismissed all claims. But Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, and the district court reversed course—finding the City of Verona was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs and the City of Verona subsequently filed interlocutory appeals.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction and reversed the district court’s finding against the City regarding sovereign immunity. The court explained that Long had no special duty to protect Plaintiffs besides his general duty to keep the public safe as the City’s Chief of Police. The court explained that the only evidence that demonstrates Long had knowledge of any connection between L.B. and Plaintiffs comes from Long’s investigative file, where there is a copy of a trespassing complaint that Annie filed against L.B. in 2016. Accordingly, the court held Long did not owe a duty to protect Plaintiffs from L.B.’s drive-by shooting. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their negligence claims or their MTCA claims against the City. View "Walton v. City of Verona" on Justia Law

For five months when C.V. was a pre-kindergarten student in the Waterford Township School District, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Alfred Dean, the seventy-six-year-old bus aide who was supposed to be ensuring her safety. C.V.’s parents only discovered the abuse when C.V. came home without her underwear one day. C.V. and her parents sued the Waterford Township Board of Education and Waterford Township School District (collectively, Waterford) alleging, among other things, discrimination in a “place of public accommodation” “on account of . . . sex” in violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Waterford and dismissed plaintiffs’ LAD claims. The court found plaintiffs could not, as a matter of law, prove to a jury that Dean’s conduct occurred because of C.V.’s sex, or that it would not have occurred but for C.V.’s sex. According to the trial court, “the but for element can’t be satisfied . . . where you have a compulsive sexual predator, a pedophile,” especially one who testified at his deposition “that he is a compulsive sexual abuser of children, boys and girls.” The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the LAD did not apply “to a sexual predator’s assault of a student on a school bus where there is no evidence his actions were based solely on the victim’s status as a member of a protected group.” The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment because it conflicted with Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587 (1993) and L.W. v. Toms River Regional Schools Board of Education, 189 N.J. 381 (2007). The Court reiterated that under Lehman, sexual touching of areas of the body linked to sexuality happens, by definition, because of sex. The Court affirmed the denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint and to obtain certain records, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "C.V. v. Waterford Township Board of Education" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee Gary Waetzig filed an age discrimination lawsuit against his former employer, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. Because he was contractually bound to arbitrate his claim, he voluntarily dismissed his suit without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) and filed for arbitration. The arbitrator sided with Halliburton. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Waetzig returned to federal court. But instead of filing a new lawsuit challenging arbitration, he moved to reopen his age discrimination case and vacate the arbitration award. Relying on Rule 60(b), the district court concluded it had jurisdiction to consider Waetzig’s motion, reopened the case, and vacated the award. The Tenth Circuit found the district court erred: the district court could not reopen the case under Rule 60(b) after it had been voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a) and 60(b), a court cannot set aside a voluntary dismissal without prejudice because it is not a final judgment, order, or proceeding. View "Waetzig v. Halliburton Energy Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the Chief Meteorologist at CBS46, an Atlanta news station. But during his tenure, female colleagues raised repeated complaints that he engaged in inappropriate conduct and sexual harassment—including “compliments” about appearance, sexually charged language, requests for nude photos, and more. Plaintiff, who is white, alleges that he was terminated because of his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. The sexual harassment justification, he says, was just a pretext. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that the ultimate question in any discrimination case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on race. Here, Plaintiff failed to show that a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant terminated his employment because he was white.   The court explained that Plaintiff notes that the station’s new meteorologist is a Hispanic woman. However, Plaintiff mostly argued that the existence of race data on the corporate form meant that he was fired because he was white. The court explained Plaintiff lacked direct evidence of discrimination, he lacked evidence that Defendant treated his race as a factor favoring his termination, and he lacked evidence that Defendant treated similarly situated non-white employees more favorably. On the other hand, Defendant has produced extensive evidence of Plaintiff’s sexual harassment, which is a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination. The court explained that on this record, no reasonable jury could infer that Defendant’s justification was pretext for race discrimination. View "Paul Ossmann v. Meredith Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a patrol sergeant in the Alamo, Texas police department, brought a Section 1983 action against the City of Alamo (the “City”), former chief of police, and several other officers in connection with an alleged scheme to have Plaintiff fired and arrested on bogus charges. The district court dismissed the City and the other officers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), then dismissed the chief of police under 12(c). Plaintiff appealed the dismissals of the chief of police and the City.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's false arrest complaint against the chief of police and affirmed the dismissal of the City. The court explained that Plaintiff’s complaint presents Defendant as the sole moving force behind a deliberate, long-term conspiracy to create and file affidavits Defendant knew to be false, with the purpose of exploiting the criminal justice system to arrest, detain, and torment Plaintiff for crimes Defendant knew he did not commit. Defendant, moreover, ordered the sham investigations that served as the basis for the false affidavits and pushed the investigations forward despite knowing Plaintiff was innocent. The court wrote that Terwilliger v. Reyna controls here. As such, the court held that Defendant’s alleged actions are relevant, like Reyna’s, for purposes of evaluating his potential Franks liability at the Rule 12 stage. Defendant was the “driving force” behind the conspiracy, and he was “continuously updated” as to the status of the investigations he had ordered, including the fact the investigations revealed no criminality or impropriety. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against Defendant. View "Guerra v. Castillo" on Justia Law

A nine-year-old girl took her own life after a classmate repeatedly delivered racist insults to her. The girl's mother and grandmother sought to hold the school system and several school officials accountable for her death. The family filed a lawsuit asserting claims arising under federal and state law against the school system and the school officials. The district court granted summary judgment to the school system and its officials, concluding that the family failed to satisfy various elements of their federal statutory claims and that qualified immunity barred at least one of the claims. The court concluded that the state law claims failed on immunity grounds. The family appealed.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Although the response of the school system and its officials was "truly discouraging," the standard for relief in cases of student-on-student harassment was not met. The court explained that a reasonable jury could not find that DCS acted with deliberate indifference, that it intentionally discriminated against the girl, or that Defendants' actions were arbitrary or conscience-shocking. Thus, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants on the family's Title IX, Title VI, equal protection, and substantive due process claims. View "Jasmine Adams, et al v. Demopolis City Schools, et al" on Justia Law

Due to a settlement in a civil matter, Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in Gatesville, Texas had an inmate trust fund worth nearly $100,000.00. In December of 2019, Plaintiff made a suspicious withdrawal, and Appellee, a former senior warden, notified her that she was under investigation for trafficking. Shortly after, Plaintiff was found guilty of the lowest level of rule violation. Plaintiff now asserts that she has submitted approximately three or four separate withdrawal requests to TDCJ, which were all denied without notice or an opportunity to be heard in violation of her procedural due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to all Appellees and entered a final judgment. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) and a Rule 15(a) motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which the district court denied.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and reversed the district court’s ruling denying Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion. The court explained that the Ex Parte Young exception applies to this case. The court explained that any of Plaintiff’s claims seeking declaratory relief based on purported constitutional violations occurring in the past, as well as any requests for monetary damages, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, her claims to enjoin a future action that might violate her constitutional rights may proceed. Further, the court held that Plaintiff provided evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated, which precludes summary judgment. Finally, the court found that the court erred in not vacating the judgment and granting Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings. View "Calhoun v. Collier" on Justia Law

Two police officers were dispatched to a gym after a man reportedly threatened gym patrons and assaulted a security guard. The suspect then violently attacked the officers and refused to stop after they repeatedly deployed their tasers. One officer eventually resorted to lethal force to end the aggression. Plaintiff, the man’s mother, filed this lawsuit against Defendant and the City of Los Angeles. She claimed a violation of Section 1983 based on the officer’s allegedly unreasonable use of deadly force. She also sought to hold the City liable under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services. Plaintiff further brought wrongful death actions against the officer and the City under California law. The court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s state law claims for similar reasons. Defendant appealed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel held that because Defendant did not challenge the district court’s determination that a reasonable juror could conclude that Defendant violated the man’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, this appeal turned solely on the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. The panel held that Defendant’s use of deadly force, including his failure to give a warning that he would be using such force, did not violate clearly established law given the specific circumstances he encountered. The court wrote that there was no basis to conclude that Defendant’s use of force here was obviously constitutionally excessive. View "PAULETTE SMITH V. EDWARD AGDEPPA, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an adjunct professor of economics at SUNY Albany, alleged that his failure to advance within his department to his colleagues’ unfavorable view of the methodology he employs in his scholarship. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants, two of Plaintiff’s colleagues who were involved in the hiring decisions at issue. Plaintiff asserted three causes of action: (1) a claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 ; (2) a claim pursuant to Section 1983 for injunctive relief against SUNY Albany President in the form of a court order to “prevent ongoing discrimination against Keynesian economists” in violation of the First Amendment; and (3) an age discrimination claim under New York State’s Human Rights Law. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that while it disagrees with much of the district court’s reasoning, it nonetheless agrees with its ultimate disposition. The court held that Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), does not apply to speech related to academic scholarship or teaching and that Plaintiff’s speech addressed matters of public concern, but that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim nonetheless fails because under Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), a public university’s interest in deciding for itself what skills, expertise, and academic perspectives it wishes to prioritize in its hiring and staffing decisions outweighs Plaintiff's asserted interest in competing for academic positions unencumbered by university decisionmakers’ assessment of his academic speech. View "Heim v. Daniel" on Justia Law