Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Jane Doe AW, a former criminal clerk in the Burleson County Attorney’s Office, alleged that Burleson County Judge Mike Sutherland used his power and authority as a county judge to sexually assault her on several occasions. Doe claimed that Sutherland sexually assaulted her once in his restaurant, Funky Junky, LLC (“Funky Junky”), and twice in his office. According to Doe, when she complained to Sutherland about the abuse, she was terminated from her job. The district court entered final judgment, ordering that Doe take nothing against Burleson County. Doe timely appealed the judgment. Doe raised three issues on appeal: (1) whether Sutherland, as the Burleson County Judge, was a policymaker with final decision-making authority for Burleson County with respect to Doe’s claim; (2) whether the Magistrate Judge abused her discretion when she reversed and vacated a prior order on a dispositive motion; and (3) whether the Magistrate Judge erred in indicating that she would deny a party’s challenge for cause unless the parties agreed on the challenge.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that despite his position as County Judge, Sutherland lacked the requisite policymaking authority to hold Burleson County liable for his alleged sexual misconduct. Monell requires that “the municipal official . . . possess final policymaking authority for the action in question.” The court wrote that even if the Texas constitutional provision gave Sutherland, as County Judge, broad ability to oversee operations in the county, this authority is immaterial because Doe fails to establish that Sutherland possessed the requisite authority as it relates specifically to the alleged sexual abuse. View "Doe AW v. Burleson County, TX" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Gracie Ann Forth appealed the grant of summary judgement entered in favor of Defendant-Appellee Laramie County School District Number 1 (“LCSD1”) on Forth’s claim under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”). Forth alleged that while she was a student at Johnson Junior High School (“JJHS”), a school within LCSD1, one of her seventh-grade teachers, Joseph Meza, sexually abused her over several years beginning in 2014. Forth alleged principals at JJHS had actual notice that Meza posed a substantial risk of abuse and were deliberately indifferent to these risks, thereby violating Title IX. On LCSD1’s motion, the district court concluded LCSD1 did not have actual notice Meza posed a substantial risk of abuse before it learned that Forth had reported him to the police. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded after review, that the district court erred in finding Forth failed to establish such notice by LCSD1 during the period before LCSD1 learned of her police report, and erred in concluding LCSD1 (in lacking such notice) was not deliberately indifferent during that period. The summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the district court to address in the first instance. View "Forth v. Laramie County School District" on Justia Law

This appeal arises from a protest of the Dakota Access Pipeline at the Backwater Bridge in Morton County, North Dakota. Police officers deployed water, tear gas, rubber bullets, and bean bags to disperse a crowd. Plaintiffs participated in the protest, and they were allegedly injured by the officers’ use of force. The protestors sued Morton County, the City of Mandan, Stutsman County, the law enforcement chiefs for those municipalities, and one hundred unnamed officers. The district court* granted summary judgment for Defendants.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that it was not clearly established in November 2016 that the officers’ use of force to disperse protestors violated a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the need for training and supervision on dispersal of protestors was not so obvious that it can be characterized as deliberate indifference to the protestors’ rights to be free from unreasonable seizures. Further, the court explained that as with the municipalities, there is insufficient evidence here of deliberate indifference by supervisors where the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established. View "Vanessa Dundon v. Kyle Kirchmeier" on Justia Law

Officers told Plaintiff that he could distribute his tokens in designated zones, referred to as Free Speech Zones, outside the entry gates but not inside the festival itself. Plaintiff nevertheless purchased a ticket, entered the festival, began handing out tokens, and was subsequently ejected. He brought suit alleging that the Cal Expo fairgrounds, in their entirety, constitute a traditional “public forum,” analogous to a public park, thereby entitling his speech to the most robust constitutional protections.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The panel first held that the enclosed, ticketed portion of the fairgrounds constituted a nonpublic forum under the United States Constitution and the California Speech Clause. The space did not permit free access, its boundaries were clearly delineated by a fence, and no evidence suggested that access had previously been granted as a matter of course. The panel further noted that California courts have drawn distinctions between ticketed and unticketed portions of venues, and Plaintiff pointed to no case holding that an enclosed area with a paid-entry requirement constitutes a public forum. The panel determined that it need not decide whether the area outside the fence was a public forum under the First Amendment because the California Speech Clause provided independent support for Plaintiff’s argument that it was indeed such a forum, albeit subject to reasonable restrictions on speech. The panel concluded that the Free Speech Zones in the exterior fairgrounds were a valid regulation of the time, place, and manner of Plaintiff’s speech. The guidelines on distributing literature in the enclosed area were likewise permissible. View "BURT CAMENZIND V. CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND STATE FAIR, ET AL" on Justia Law

This appeal presents the issue of whether Deputy John Allen and Sheriff Louis Roberts are entitled to qualified and state-agent immunity from Plaintiff’s complaint that he was arrested pursuant to a warrant based on a false affidavit. After Plaintiff drove a methamphetamine trafficker to an undercover drug sting, Allen obtained a warrant from a magistrate judge and arrested him. Florida charged Plaintiff with aiding and abetting drug trafficking and detained him for over six months before dismissing the charges. Plaintiff sued Allen and Roberts under federal and state law, alleging that Allen illegally arrested, detained, and prosecuted him and that Roberts was deliberately indifferent to and negligently caused Allen’s misconduct. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Allen’s warrant affidavit—excluding any false statements—supplied probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest. The court explained that Plaintiff’s argument that Allen conspired to violate his constitutional rights fails. The court wrote that Plaintiff cannot identify an underlying constitutional violation. “A plaintiff may state a Section 1983 claim for conspiracy to violate constitutional rights by showing a conspiracy existed that resulted in the actual denial of some underlying constitutional right.” Accordingly, in the absence of a constitutional violation, Plaintiff cannot prove a derivative-conspiracy claim. View "Tyler Land v. Sheriff of Jackson County Florida, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court against Judge Goldston and others present at the search. Plaintiff claimed that the warrantless search and seizure of his property violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, that the restrictions on recording the incident violated the First Amendment, and that Judge Goldston’s practice of conducting “home visits” violated the Equal Protection Clause by disadvantaging pro se litigants like himself. He sought compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, as well as attorney’s fees and injunctive and declaratory relief. Judge Goldston moved for summary judgment, claiming she was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. The district court denied her motion. At issue on appeal is whether Judge Goldston is entitled to judicial immunity.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that judicial immunity protects only judicial acts. It does not shield the conduct of judges who step outside their judicial role, as Judge Goldston did when searching Plaintiff’s home. The court explained that while Judge Goldston might have had the authority to order a search, the proper authority to conduct the operation was the local sheriff’s department or some other appropriate law enforcement agency. The court explained that just as “judges do not do double duty as jailers,” so too they do not do double duty as sheriffs. View "Matthew Gibson v. Louise Goldston" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are individual physicians based in Arizona, joined by several Arizona medical and advocacy groups. The named Defendants are Arizona Attorney General Kristin Mayes, all Arizona County Attorneys, and various state enforcement agencies. The Attorney General declined to defend this lawsuit, and the district court allowed Warren Petersen, President of the Arizona Senate, and Ben Toma, Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives, to intervene. This suit by Arizona physicians, medical associations, and advocacy groups claims that an Arizona law criminalizing the performance of certain abortions is unconstitutionally vague. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded. The panel held that the physician plaintiffs had demonstrated both actual and imminent injuries sufficient for standing. Plaintiffs suffered an actual injury—economic losses— because they lost money by complying with the laws, which forbade them from providing medical services they would otherwise provide, and these economic losses were fairly traceable to the statute. A favorable decision would relieve plaintiffs of compliance with the laws and restore the revenue generated by the prohibited procedures. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged two imminent future injuries that affected interests protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: (1) a liberty interest that was imperiled because violating the statute could result in imprisonment; and (2) a property interest that was threatened because a statutory violation could result in revocation of plaintiffs’ licenses, loss of revenue, and monetary damages. Finally, plaintiffs satisfied the causation and redressability requirements with respect to their imminent future injury. View "PAUL ISAACSON, ET AL V. KRISTIN MAYES, ET AL" on Justia Law

Artists (collectively “plaintiffs”) appealed the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the City of Miami Beach on their First Amendment claim brought against the City under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The City contracted with the artists to create and curate a series of artworks that the City would own. The district court entered summary judgment after finding that the City’s removal of one piece of Plaintiffs’ artwork constituted government speech and was immune from First Amendment scrutiny.   The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiffs argued that “artistic expression” is the type of speech at issue here and concede that it “has sometimes been used to convey government speech.” However, they suggest that the history factor requires the majority of the historical use of a type of speech to have been by the government, as opposed to by private individuals. The court wrote that even assuming, as Plaintiffs contend, that artistic expression has historically been used for private speech more often than government speech, this does not negate the government’s own long historical use of artistic expression to convey messages. The history factor does not require the government to show that it historically commissioned more artwork than private individuals and institutions. The court concluded that just as “governments are not obliged under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to permit the presence of a rebellious army’s battle flag in the pro-veterans parades that they fund and organize,” they are not obliged to display any particular artwork in the art exhibitions that they fund, organize, and promote. View "Jared McGriff, et al. v. City of Miami Beach" on Justia Law

The court awarded Plaintiff fees after he prevailed on one of his six causes of action against his former employer ExakTime Innovations, Inc., on his complaint for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and related causes of action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $130,088 in damages on his claim ExakTime failed to engage in a good faith interactive process with him. Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s order awarding him $686,795.62 in attorney fees after the court applied a .4 negative multiplier to its $1,144,659.36 adjusted lodestar calculation “to account for [p]laintiff’s counsel’s . . . lack of civility throughout the entire course of this litigation.” Plaintiff contends the $457,863 reduction in attorney fees based on his counsel’s incivility must be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that it may consider an attorney’s pervasive incivility in determining the reasonableness of the requested fees. A court may apply, in its discretion, a positive or negative multiplier to adjust the lodestar calculation—a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours—to account for various factors, including attorney skill. The court explained that the record amply supports the trial court’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel was repeatedly, and apparently intentionally, uncivil to defense counsel—and to the court— throughout the litigation. View "Snoeck v. ExakTime Innovations" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Labor brought the underlying lawsuit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, alleging that Appellants Brian Bowers and Dexter Kubota sold their company to an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) at an allegedly inflated value. The government’s case hinged on a single valuation expert, who opined that the plan overpaid for that company. The district court rejected the opinion, and the government lost a bench trial. The district court denied Appellants’ request for attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs under EAJA, finding that the government’s litigation position was “substantially justified” and that it did not act in bad faith.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the government’s position at trial was substantially justified, and in denying attorneys’ fees and nontaxable costs under EAJA. The panel noted that the government could not rely on red flags alone, such as the “suspicious” circumstances of the ESOP transaction, to defend its litigation position as “substantially justified.” The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the award of taxable costs because it relied on a clearly erroneous finding of fact in reducing the magistrate judge’s recommended award of taxable costs. View "JULIE SU V. BRIAN BOWERS, ET AL" on Justia Law