Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a petition challenging airport screening procedures two years after the TSA deployed the screening procedures in airports nationwide. The court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Henderson v. Shinseki and another en banc decision by the Court make clear that the 60-day deadline for filing a petition in the court of appeals under 49 U.S.C. 46110(a) is not "jurisdictional," but is instead a claim-processing rule. In this case, even though petitioner's delay in filing his petition does not defeat the court's jurisdiction, his petition is nevertheless untimely because no reasonable ground excused his delay in filing. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition as untimely and, in the alternative, denied the petition on the merits where the screening procedures require only a reasonable administrative search that does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Further, the court granted a motion to seal filed by the Administration.View "Corbett v. Transportation Security Admin." on Justia Law

Kimberly Kulig and Laura Baatz worked for the Berryhill Baja Grill & Cantina on Montrose Street in Houston, a franchise-location. During their employment, the owner and operator of the restaurant sexually harassed them on numerous occasions. In this appeal, Kulig and Baatz challenged the district court's dismissal of their Title VII lawsuit against Berryhill Hot Tamales Corporation for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court concluded that parties represented by counsel may too invoke the exceptions of the named-party requirement. Because the district court granted summary judgment on the grounds that Kulig and Baatz, as represented parties, could not rely on the exceptions to the named-party requirement, the district court did not determine whether they could fit within either the Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co. or Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130 exceptions. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings.View "EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd." on Justia Law

Satkar owns Schaumburg, Illinois hotel and was mentioned in blog posts and a television news report as having made a large donation to a local politician and later won a property-tax appeal. In response, the Cook County Board of Review revoked Satkar’s property-tax reduction and opened an inquiry. Satkar sued the Board, its members and staff, the blog, the television station, and reporters, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and for defamation and false light. The district court dismissed the 1983 claims against the Board and the officials. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court separately dismissed the state-law claims against the media defendants, applying the Illinois Anti-SLAPP statute. Because the section 1983 claims were still pending, the judge entered final judgment under FRCP 54(b) to permit appeal of the SLAPP issue. Later, the judge orally invited Satkar to ask for a Rule 54(b) judgment on the SLAPP dismissal, forgetting that he had already entered final judgment. Satkar did not correct the judge, did not seek clarification, and did not file a notice of appeal. After the deadline to appeal expired, Satkar sought an extension, claiming that the judge’s comment created confusion. The judge granted the extension, relying on the defunct “unique circumstances” doctrine. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, noting that the Supreme Court has disavowed the unique circumstances doctrine and Satkar has not otherwise demonstrated excusable neglect. View "Satkar Hospitality, Inc.v. Fox Television Stations, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 two years and four months after his claims related to a traffic stop arose. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action as time barred under Iowa's two-year statute of limitations governing personal injury claims. The tolling provision plaintiff relied on comes from the Iowa Tort Claims Act, Iowa Code Ch. 669, not from the personal injury statute, and it has no application in this case. View "DeVries v. Driesen, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed a judgment in favor of his former employer and against his complaint of racial discrimination and retaliation. At issue was whether the district court erred when it entered a judgment as a matter of law based on inconsistent jury verdicts. The court held that, to determine whether to grant a judgment as a matter of law, the district court should have considered only the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the verdict, not the consistency of that verdict with another. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to reinstate the jury verdict against the employer for retaliation. The court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff's claim of discrimination against plaintiff's supervisor. View "Connelly v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Trans., et al." on Justia Law

Dr. Kiser is trained as a general dentist and as an endodontist specializing in root canal procedures. In 2009, the Ohio State Dental Board issued a warning to Kiser for practicing “outside the scope” of his declared specialty, stating, “if you wish to continue to declare yourself as a specialist in endodontics, you must advertise accordingly, and limit your practice per the ADA’s definition. If you would prefer to practice in areas outside the scope of endodontics, you may do so by no longer holding yourself out as a specialist in endodontics. You can be a general dentist, and then advertise and perform specialty services you are qualified to perform, so long as you also state you are a general dentist.” The Board took no further action and declined to answer Kiser’s 2012 inquiry about signage including the terms “endodontist” and “general dentist.” Kiser challenged the regulations as chilling his exercise of First Amendment commercial speech rights. The district court dismissed. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the Supreme Court decision, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) and finding that Kiser alleged facts demonstrating that he faces a credible threat that the regulations will be enforced against him in the future, so that he has standing to assert his pre-enforcement challenge. View "Kiser v. Reitz" on Justia Law

Legina and Todd Thomas, parents of M.T., a twelve-year-old girl at the time of the events at issue in this case, placed M.T. in the University of New Mexico Children's Psychiatric Center after she revealed suicidal tendencies during a police investigation of a potential sexual assault. Doctors diagnosed her as exhibiting several serious psychiatric problems and recommended a prescription of psychotropic drugs. The Thomases resisted the doctors' diagnoses and recommendations. M.T. was evaluated for several weeks until Mrs. Thomas decided to remove her from the hospital. Concerned about her safety, M.T.'s doctors and therapist placed M.T. on a medical hold and pursued an involuntary residential treatment petition in state court. After a seven-day hold, M.T. was released before the involuntary commitment proceedings began. The Thomases claimed the doctors and the hospital violated their constitutional right to direct M.T.'s medical care and their right to familial association when they placed a medical hold on M.T. and when they filed the petition for involuntary residential treatment in state court. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting absolute and qualified immunity. The district court granted the motion on qualified immunity grounds, and the Thomases appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed with the district court that the Thomases did not stated a claim for a violation of their right to direct M.T.'s medical care. But the Court held that the Thomases stated a claim for a violation of the right to familial association for the defendants' placing a medical hold on M.T. and seeking an order for involuntary residential treatment in state court. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Thomas, et al v. Kaven, et al" on Justia Law

Former employees of an Indiana city sued the mayor and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the mayor had fired them because of their political affiliations, in violation of their First Amendment rights. The mayor responded that political affiliation was a permissible qualification for their jobs. The district judge granted summary judgment in favor of the mayor with respect to nine of the 11 plaintiffs, on the ground that his argument concerning political qualification for their jobs was sufficiently arguable to entitle him to qualified immunity, but declined to certify interlocutory appeal with respect to the other two plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit stayed proceedings pending interlocutory appeal of the issue of qualified immunity, reasoning that whether a job is one for which political affiliation is a permissible criterion presents a question of law. Qualified immunity is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation. The privilege is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; like an absolute immunity, it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. View "Allman v. Smith" on Justia Law

King was in custody awaiting a probable cause determination in 2007. After being rapidly tapered off psychotropic medication by jail medical staff, complaining of seizure-like symptoms, and being placed in an isolated cell for seven hours, King was found dead. His estate sued La Crosse County and individual employees. After a remand, six weeks before the trial date, King’s counsel asserted in a letter to the defendants that the correct standard for jury instructions was one of objective reasonableness, not the deliberate indifference standard that had been used by both parties in the pleadings, the summary judgment briefing, the subsequent appeal, and post-remand pretrial preparations. The assertion was correct, but defendants moved that King be precluded from arguing the applicability of the objective reasonableness standard because of her tardiness in asserting the argument. The district court ordered that the case be tried as scheduled under the deliberate indifference standard. The Seventh Circuit reversed, acknowledging that King’s long, unexplained delay in asserting the correct standard was puzzling and problematic, but stating that the district court failed to provide a sufficient explanation of how the defendants would suffer prejudice as a result of the delay. The court subsequently clarified that the reversal applied only to the individual defendants, not the county. View "King v. Kramer" on Justia Law

Davis retained Fenton to represent her in a home foreclosure proceeding. Davis later sued Fenton for malpractice. Davis claimed that, although she paid Fenton several thousand dollars, he did virtually nothing to help her and that he targeted her for inferior service based on her race, in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601. That case is stayed pending arbitration. Fenton brought his own lawsuit in state court, against Davis’s lawyers: Dudley and Sidea, alleging that they intentionally spread false information about him to clients and business associates. Fenton also alleged that Sidea, who had previously worked at Fenton’s law office, had improperly obtained confidential information about Fenton’s clients and shared it with Dudley. The complaint claimed conversion, tortious interference with a business relationship, and defamation. Dudley and Sidea filed a notice of removal in federal court, citing the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1441, and the civil rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1443. Days later, despite the ongoing removal proceedings, the Cook County Court entered an ex parte preliminary injunction against Dudley and Sidea. The district court found that the case did not meet the removal requirements under either 28 U.S.C. 1441 or 1443 and remanded, The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Fenton v. Dudley" on Justia Law