Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Parker asserted that “Scheck Industries” had fired him after just a few months on the job because of his race and several complaints he made to management about workplace discrimination. The EEOC issued Parker a right-to-sue letter, explaining that the agency had investigated but was unable to confirm his allegations. The agency’s letter did not suggest that “Scheck Industries” never employed Parker or that an entity with that name did not exist. In fact, Parker’s employer apparently used that name in dealing with the EEOC, since the agency’s letter to Parker was copied to “Scheck Industries.” Parker drafted a pro se complaint. Defense counsel acknowledged receipt of service but explained that the company’s liability insurer failed to file an answer after misidentifying the complaint; that Scheck Mechanical never employed Parker; and that Parker’s claims under Title VII were untimely. The district court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, rejecting Scheck Mechanical’s position, that Parker sued only Scheck Mechanical; the complaint included multiple references to Scheck Industrial. It may not matter which company employed Parker if, as Parker asserts, the line between the companies is blurred.View "Parker v. Scheck Mech. Corp." on Justia Law

A Catholic school in Fort Wayne, Indiana, discharged a language-arts teacher because she underwent in vitro fertilization in violation of the moral teaching of the Catholic Church. She sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2; 2000e(k), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, concluding that the order was not final and that the case did not qualify for collateral order review.View "Herx v. Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend" on Justia Law

Several people interrogated by the infamous Jon Burge and other officers he trained or influenced sought damages under 42 U.S.C.1983. Between 1972 and 1991, while employed by Chicago’s police force, Burge regularly tortured people to extract statements. After the statute of limitations for prosecuting Burge about that misconduct expired, he was convicted of lying about his practices. The last interrogation about which any of the five plaintiffs complains occurred in 2004, and the statute of limitations for section 1983 actions in Illinois is two years. The last adverse event that might have been influenced by the interrogations was Freeman’s conviction in 2009, more than two years before the suit was filed and more than three years before Freeman joined the suit. The others are in prison following convictions for serious crimes; each conviction is supported by evidence independent of confessions induced by misconduct during interrogation. The district court dismissed all claims as barred by the statute of limitations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plaintiffs waited on the sidelines hoping that the acts of others would tarnish Burge’s reputation and make a suit easier to win. That is not the sort of diligence required to establish equitable tolling.View "Estate of Jones v. Burge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former Chicago police officer, is black, and claimed racially motivated harassment, and retaliation for complaining about the harassment, in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act. While that suit was pending, he was fired. He claims retaliation for the internal complaints about harassment that he had made before he filed suit. Rather than amend his state court complaint to add a charge concerning his firing, he filed a federal suit under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district judge stayed the federal suit while the state suit was pending. Brown dismissed the state case without prejudice. The district judge dismissed one count, alleging state claims, for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction and the other claims, retaliation and racial discrimination, on the merits, as barred by res judicata. The Seventh Circuit modified to place dismissal of the first claim on the district court’s supplemental state-law jurisdiction, acknowledging that it may be so similar to the state law claims as to merit dismissal, but reversed with respect to the dismissal of the due process claim in that count. The judgment was otherwise affirmed.View "Brown v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

After his termination, plaintiff, a tenured university professor at Georgia Tech, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Georgia Tech's President and others. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that plaintiff was afforded adequate procedural due process prior to revocation of his tenure and termination of his employment with Georgia Tech where the pre-termination procedures afforded plaintiff satisfied the established guidelines for minimum procedural due process. Plaintiff received prior, written notice of the charges against him, he presented argument and evidence on his own behalf, he had a right to appeal his termination to the Board of Regents, and he submitted a written appeal to the Board of Regents. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Laskar, Ph.D. v. Peterson, et al." on Justia Law

Shelby, Mississippi police officers alleged that they were fired, not for deficient performance, but because they brought to light criminal activities of an alderman. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting their due process claims for failure to invoke 42 U. S. C. 1983. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed. Federal pleading rules call for “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2); they do not contemplate dismissal for imperfect statement of the legal theory asserted. No heightened pleading rule requires plaintiffs seeking damages for violations of constitutional rights to invoke section 1983 expressly in order to state a claim. No qualified immunity analysis was implicated here, as the officers asserted a constitutional claim against the city only, not against any municipal officer. The complaint was not deficient in informing the city of the factual basis for the lawsuit.View "Johnson v. City of Shelby" on Justia Law

Thompson filed a complaint, alleging that he operates a business and pays property taxes in Petaluma, seeking to enjoin the police from using taxpayer funds to order 30-day impoundment of vehicles pursuant to Vehicle Code 14602.6 when the driver has operated the vehicle without a valid driver’s license, but with consent of the vehicle’s owner. He alleged that section 14602.6’s notice provisions are insufficient to provide the owner with the factual grounds for the traffic stop or impound, the statutory basis for the driver’s license suspension or revocation, and the grounds for releasing the vehicle. The trial dismissed, finding that Thompson lacked standing because a taxpayer has no standing under section 526a in a matter that involves the city’s exercise of executive discretion. The court also rejected claims that the use of police officers to enforce sectionc14602.6 results in illegal government action or waste of taxpayer funds and that procedures implementing the statute violate procedural due process. The court of appeal remanded with directions to allow Thompson leave to amend his complaint. Assuming Thompson can allege facts showing the city’s actions violate the law, there is a reasonable possibility that the defects in his complaint can be cured by amendment.View "Thompson v. Petaluma Police Dep't" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first degree sexual assault and sentenced to three to five years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the district court did not err in (1) failing to allow Defendant to inquire on redirect examination into the nature of his witness’ felony conviction after he was impeached by the State; (2) not granting the parties’ joint motion for mistrial; and (3) admitting certain hearsay statements under the excited utterances exception. The Court further held that because the record was incomplete, the Court could not reach Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.View "State v. Castillo-Zamora" on Justia Law

A jury awarded $3 million in compensatory damages to Plaintiff after finding that Defendant, Plaintiff's employer, retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff failed to show that his supervisor knew of his protected activity before she took adverse action against him. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, reinstated the jury verdict, and remanded, holding that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence from which the jury could infer that the supervisor knew that Plaintiff had filed a discrimination lawsuit when she engaged in retaliatory conduct against Plaintiff.View "Ferguson v. Middle Tenn. State Univ." on Justia Law

Lance, 53 years old, has spent much of his adult life incarcerated or institutionalized. After being paroled in 1997, he was admitted to mental health facilities 15 times before the involuntary admission at issue. In 2008 after serving a sentence for parole violations, he was involuntarily admitted to Chester Mental Health Center (CMHC). A 2011 petition included a certificate by a CMHC staff psychiatrist that described threats, violent acts, resisting treatment, and inappropriate behaviors. At the commitment hearing a CMHC social worker, testified that he had interviewed Lance and those treating him, had reviewed the clinical file, that Lance has “an Axis I diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, paraphilia NOS, history of noncompliance with the medications, and an Axis II diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder,” that Lance displayed “delusional thought content which is grandiose, paranoid, and persecutory in nature,” that he had periodic inappropriate sexual conduct, that he engaged in acts of verbal and physical aggression, and that he was noncompliant with medication. Lance appealed his involuntary admission, arguing the court violated the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, 405 ILCS 5/1-100, by disregarding his request, in testimony, to be voluntarily admitted. The appellate court ruled more than nine months after the term of commitment ended and reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court ruling, The Mental Health Code does not require a ruling for or against voluntary admission, based on an in-court request for voluntary admission during a hearing for involuntary admission, nor does it require a court to sua sponte continue a proceeding for involuntary admission upon such a request.View "In re Lance H." on Justia Law