Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint charging Apple Nevada with sexual harassment and discrimination, as well as an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court dismissed the complaint based on untimeliness. The court held that the filing date of a complaint is the date it is delivered to the clerk, whether it is submitted with or without an IFP application; if an IFP application is submitted with the complaint in lieu of the filing fee, and the application is thereafter denied, the district court will be free to dismiss the complaint if the fee is not paid within a reasonable time following the denial; and the filing date will be the date on which the complaint was originally delivered to the clerk’s office along with the IFP application. The court also held that it is an abuse of discretion to deny an IFP application based upon a spouse’s financial resources, unless there is a reasonable inquiry into (a) whether the spouse’s resources are actually available to the would-be plaintiff and (b) whether the spouse in fact has sufficient funds, given his or her own expenses, to assist in paying the fee. In this case, plaintiff's complaint was filed for purposes of the statute of limitations when she delivered it to the clerk's office along with her IFP application. The complaint was filed on time and the denial of the IFP application lacked adequate foundation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Escobedo v. Apple American Grp." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a challenge to the constitutionality of the Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP statute). Anti-SLAPP statutes punish those who file lawsuits (labeled strategic lawsuits against public participation or SLAPPs) that abuse the judicial process in order to silence an individual's free expression or petitioning activity. Plaintiffs and supporting amici curiae contended the anti-SLAPP statute's burden of proof, stay of discovery, and statutory penalties are unconstitutional on several grounds. They contended some or all of these provisions violated the right of trial by jury under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution; the Washington separation of powers doctrine under "Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, PS"(216 P.3d 374 (2009)); the Washington right of access to courts under Putman; the petition clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; and the vagueness doctrine under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Washington Supreme Court held that the anti-SLAPP statute violated the right of trial by jury, but did not resolve how these other constitutional limits may have applied to the anti-SLAPP statute's provisions: "The legislature may enact anti-SLAPP laws to prevent vexatious litigants from abusing the judicial process by filing frivolous lawsuits for improper purposes. But the constitutional conundrum that RCW 4.24.525 creates is that it seeks to protect one group of citizen's constitutional rights of expression and petition-by cutting off another group's constitutional rights of petition and jury trial. This the legislature cannot do." View "Davis v. Cox" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a warrant to search Appellant’s home, vehicle, and workplace, the police seized a computer, hard drive, and compact disc that were found to contain sexually explicit images and videos depicting minors. Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of possession of child pornography. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, asserting that the officer who applied for the search warrant had deliberately or recklessly omitted material information from her affidavit. The district court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that an officer seeking to obtain a search warrant has no duty as a matter of law to inquire further in order to dispel serious doubts about either the credibility of an informant upon whom the officer relies or the veracity of the allegations underlying the attempted showing of probable cause. The First Circuit remanded the case, holding that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that an affiant never has a duty to make further inquiry before presenting a warrant application to a magistrate. View "United States v. Tanguay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Polish man of Jewish descent, filed suit against his employer, Mangia, and other individuals, alleging discrimination on the basis of religion and national origin, retaliation, conspiracy, wrongful termination, and violation of various New York State and City laws. A jury found Mangia liable and awarded nominal damages of $1 and punitive damages in the amount of $900,000. After the verdict, plaintiff applied for an award of attorneys' fees and costs and Mangia moved for remittitur of the punitive damages award. The district court vacated the jury's liability verdict, conditionally granted Mangia's motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages, and denied plaintiff's application for fees and costs. The court reversed the district court's ruling insofar as it vacates the liability verdict and award of nominal damages in the amount of $1 where, inter alia, the district court's rejection of the jury's conclusion that plaintiff was subject to a hostile work environment was essentially grounded in the type of evidence weighing and credibility determinations that are not permitted by Rule 50(b). The court affirmed the district court's ruling to the extent it vacated the award of punitive damages where no reasonable jury could conclude that Mangia's conduct was driven by an evil motive or intent, or that it involved a reckless or callous indifference to plaintiff's federally protected rights. The court remanded to the district court to determine what fees and costs, if any, plaintiff may recover given the highly unusual facts of this case. View "Wiercinski v. Mangia 57, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12102 et seq., discrimination suit in which a jury returned a verdict finding that plaintiff, a diabetic, was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA. In this case, the district court correctly concluded that there was evidence presented at trial that plaintiff could control his diabetes by eating three meals a day, plus snacks, and taking his medication. The court concluded that there is no good reason to assume that the jury was misled by the Sutton v. United States Air Lines, Inc. instruction given by the district court where the jury had before it sufficient evidence to determine that plaintiff was allowed to eat his regular meals and snacks, and thus conclude that he did not have a disability under the ADA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Lee v. Government of D.C." on Justia Law

A federal litigant who is too poor to pay court fees may proceed in forma pauperis and commence a civil action without prepaying fees or paying certain expenses, 28 U.S.C. 1915(a), but a “three strikes” provision prevents a court from granting in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . . , brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” A state prisoner filed three federal lawsuits that were dismissed on grounds enumerated in section 1915(g). While the third dismissal was pending on appeal, he filed four additional federal lawsuits, moving to proceed in forma pauperis in each. The district court denied the motion. The Sixth Circuit and a unanimous Supreme Court affirmed. A prior dismissal on statutorily enumerated grounds is a strike, even if the dismissal is the subject of an ongoing appeal. Section 1915 describes dismissal as an action by a single court, not as a sequence of events involving multiple courts. The Court noted that a judgment normally takes effect, and its preclusive effect is immediate, despite a pending appeall. The “three strikes” provision was “designed to filter out the bad claims and facilitate consideration of the good.” To refuse to count a prior dismissal because of a pending appeal would produce a leaky filter. View "Coleman v. Tollefson" on Justia Law

Convent filed suit in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County, Arkansas, seeking to appeal a resolution that the North Little Rock City Council passed declaring Convent's property a nuisance and condemning the property. In the same complaint, Convent asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, Ark. Code 16-123-101, and a common law claim of trespass. The defendants removed the case to federal district court based on the federal claims and then moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court did not grant the motion, but found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Convent's claims based on Convent's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies; the court remanded the case to state court. Convent sought costs, fees, and expenses incurred due to “improper removal." The district court rejected the motion. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The defendants had an objectively reasonable basis for removal of this action to federal court. View "Convent Corp. v. City of North Little Rock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Connie Anderson alleged that deputies from the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department, Steve Geist and Daniel Shelton, unlawfully entered her residence on two occasions, attempting to arrest her daughter pursuant to a bench warrant that had been recalled, and in the process made defamatory statements about her and her family to her neighbors. The deputies appealed the trial court's denial of their special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP motion), arguing that they met their burden of showing plaintiff's causes of action arose from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Furthermore, the deputies argued that plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing a probability she would prevail on the merits. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was one of first impression: whether a peace officer's execution of a warrant is protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. The Court answered that question in the negative, at least under the circumstances of this case. The Court therefore agreed with the trial court that the deputies did not meet their burden on the first part of the anti-SLAPP analysis, and affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Anderson v. Geist" on Justia Law

Thirteen inmates in custody throughout the Arizona prison system brought a class action suit against senior officials in the Arizona Department of Corrections alleging that they were subjected to systemic Eighth Amendment violations. The district court certified a class consisting of 33,000 prisoners incarcerated in the Arizona prison system, concluding that the putative class and subclass of inmates satisfied the requirements of class certification set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23(a)(2). The panel subsequently voted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc. Judge Ikuta filed a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc concurrently with this order, arguing that all members of this diverse class of prisoners did not have an Eighth Amendment claim, alone a common claim, and therefore the certification ran afoul of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, Lewis v. Casey, and the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. View "Parsons v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Standley went to a D.C. public library to complete her homework and study for upcoming college exams. She sat in an area of the library reserved for children. Officer Edmonds-Leach asked Standley to move. Finding no seats in the adult area, Standley relocated to the young-adult area, although she was too old to sit there. The officer again asked Standley to move. Aan altercation ensued. The officer arrested Standley. Standley sued Officer Leach and the District of Columbia for the unconstitutional use of excessive force and common law torts. At trial, Standley and Officer Leach disputed the specifics of their encounter. Other than an inconclusive video, the only evidence was provided by Kellar, a librarian. The court allowed the defense to call Kellar for impeachment, although Kellar had not been identified before trial in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) and the defense had agreed not to call undisclosed witnesses. The D. C. Circuit reversed, finding that Kellar’s testimony was not confined to impeachment; that the outcome of the trial turned on the jury’s assessment of the credibility of Standley and Officer Edmonds-Leach; and that the testimony of the relatively disinterested witness likely influenced that outcome. View "Standley v. Edmonds-Leach" on Justia Law