Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Thomas Eugene Creech, who has been on death row for over four decades for the 1981 murder of fellow inmate David Dale Jensen, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. Creech alleged that the Ada County Prosecutor’s Office introduced fabricated or misleading evidence at his clemency hearing. He sought to recuse U.S. District Judge Amanda K. Brailsford from presiding over his underlying § 1983 suit, arguing that Judge Brailsford and Ada County Prosecutor Jan Bennetts are close friends, which could affect the judge's impartiality.The U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho denied Creech’s motion to preliminarily enjoin his execution, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Creech continued to litigate his § 1983 claim, alleging prosecutorial misconduct. He then moved to disqualify Judge Brailsford, citing her friendship with Bennetts. Judge Brailsford denied the recusal motion, stating that although she and Bennetts were close during their clerkship, they had since lost touch and a reasonable person would not question her impartiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Creech’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the longstanding friendship between Judge Brailsford and Bennetts, combined with the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct involving Bennetts, could lead a reasonable person to question the judge’s impartiality. The court emphasized that public confidence in the judiciary requires that any appearance of bias be addressed promptly. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for a writ of mandamus and remanded the case for reassignment to a different judge. View "Creech v. United States District Court for the District of Idaho, Boise" on Justia Law

In February 2020, a police officer in Wauwatosa, Wisconsin, shot and killed a Black teenager, Alvin Cole. Following the incident, community members organized protests against police violence and racism. Anticipating unrest after the district attorney decided not to charge the officer, the mayor imposed a curfew. Plaintiffs, affected by the curfew and police conduct, filed constitutional and state law claims against the City of Wauwatosa and individual defendants.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin dismissed most claims, allowing only First Amendment and Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) claims to proceed. The court later granted summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claims, leaving only the DPPA claims for trial. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants on the DPPA claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s rulings, holding that the curfew was a permissible time, place, and manner restriction under the First Amendment. The court found that the curfew was content-neutral, served a significant government interest in public safety, was narrowly tailored, and left open ample alternative channels for communication. The court also upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against individual defendants, agreeing that the claims were inadequately pleaded and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying further amendments. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s response to a jury question regarding the definition of “personal information” under the DPPA. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa" on Justia Law

Lamonte Jackson-Gibson celebrated his birthday with friends, including his girlfriend, Toriel Dixon, in Detroit’s Greektown neighborhood. While listening to street musicians, Sergeant Reginald Beasley and other officers asked the group to move along. Jackson-Gibson questioned the order, leading to a verbal exchange and some physical pushing. Sgt. Beasley tased Jackson-Gibson in the back while he was embracing Dixon, and both were arrested. They were charged with obstructing or resisting a police officer, and Jackson-Gibson was also charged with disturbing the peace. A jury acquitted them of all charges.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reviewed the case. Sgt. Beasley moved for summary judgment on the excessive-force claims, arguing for qualified immunity, but did not move for summary judgment on the wrongful-arrest claims. The district court granted summary judgment on Dixon’s excessive-force claim but denied it for Jackson-Gibson’s excessive-force claim. Sgt. Beasley’s motion to reconsider was also denied, leading to this interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Sgt. Beasley’s challenge to the wrongful-arrest claims for lack of jurisdiction, as he did not seek qualified immunity for those claims in the lower court. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Jackson-Gibson’s excessive-force claim. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that Sgt. Beasley’s use of a taser was objectively unreasonable, as Jackson-Gibson’s alleged crimes were not severe, he did not pose an immediate threat, and he was not actively resisting arrest. The court also held that the right to be free from excessive force when not actively resisting was clearly established by 2019. View "Jackson-Gibson v. Beasley" on Justia Law

The State of New York, through its Attorney General, sued the Niagara-Wheatfield Central School District, alleging that school officials failed to address repeated complaints of student-on-student sexual assault, harassment, and gender-based violence and bullying. The complaint detailed incidents involving four students who suffered from such misconduct and claimed that the school district ignored at least thirty similar incidents. The State argued that the school district's inaction affected not only the victims but also the broader school community, creating an unsafe environment.The United States District Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the case, concluding that the State lacked parens patriae standing. The court reasoned that the incidents were factually distinct and did not demonstrate a broader policy or practice of discrimination by the school district. Without such a policy or practice, the court held that the State could not show that the school district's conduct affected a substantial segment of the population, which is required for parens patriae standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that showing an injurious policy or practice is not necessary to satisfy the substantial-segment prong of the parens patriae standard. The court concluded that the State of New York had met its burden of pleading parens patriae standing at this stage of the litigation. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "New York v. Niagara-Wheatfield Central School District" on Justia Law

Joe Baltas, a Connecticut state prisoner, was transferred to the Virginia Department of Corrections (VADOC) under the Interstate Corrections Compact. While at Red Onion State Prison (ROSP) in Virginia, Baltas alleges he was threatened by VADOC officials for filing a grievance and was later attacked by inmates, resulting in his placement in restrictive housing. He also claims that Connecticut Department of Corrections (CTDOC) officials failed to review his administrative segregation (Ad Seg) status as required, violating his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, he alleges violations of his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights due to his treatment at ROSP.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The court found that CTDOC had adequately reviewed Baltas’s Ad Seg classification and dismissed his due process claim. It also dismissed his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims, concluding that Baltas failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the District Court’s ruling that CTDOC’s periodic reviews of Baltas’s Ad Seg classification satisfied due process requirements. However, it found that a genuine dispute of fact existed regarding whether VADOC’s administrative remedies were available to Baltas, making summary judgment inappropriate for his First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment claims. The court vacated the summary judgment on these claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Baltas’s remaining claims in a concurrently issued summary order. View "Baltas v. Maiga" on Justia Law

Brothers Albert Ian Schweitzer and Shawn Schweitzer sought compensation for wrongful imprisonment under Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) Chapter 661B, which requires proving "actual innocence." They requested investigative materials from the Hawai‘i County Police Department (HPD) and the County of Hawai‘i Office of the Prosecuting Attorney (CHOPA) to support their claim. HPD and CHOPA refused, citing an ongoing investigation.In 2023, Ian Schweitzer filed a Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 40 petition to vacate his conviction based on new DNA evidence pointing to another individual. The Circuit Court of the Third Circuit granted the petition, vacating Ian's conviction. Shawn Schweitzer subsequently moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which the court also granted. Both brothers then sought monetary compensation under HRS Chapter 661B, but the Attorney General stated that a finding of "actual innocence" was required.The Schweitzers filed a "Joint Petition for Relief Pursuant to HRS Chapter 661B" in their criminal proceedings, seeking a finding of actual innocence. The Circuit Court instructed them to file a motion to compel HPD to produce the investigative materials. The court granted the motion and directed the Schweitzers to prepare a subpoena. HPD filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which the court denied, leading HPD to file a writ of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Hawai‘i.The Supreme Court of Hawai‘i held that the Circuit Court had no discretion to act on the civil claims in the post-conviction proceeding and should have transferred the claims to a new civil case under HRPP Rule 40(c)(3). The court ordered the Circuit Court to quash the subpoena and transfer the Schweitzers' joint petition to a new civil proceeding, following the procedures prescribed by HRCP Rule 26 and HRS § 661B-2. The court clarified that Brady and UIPA do not apply to civil discovery and that there is no qualified law enforcement investigatory privilege in Hawai‘i. View "Hawai'i Police Department v. Kubota" on Justia Law

Autumn Scardina requested a cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop to celebrate her gender transition. The shop, owned by Jack Phillips, refused to make the cake, citing the message as the reason. Scardina filed a discrimination claim with the Colorado Civil Rights Division, which found probable cause of discrimination. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission took jurisdiction but later dismissed the case as part of a confidential settlement in a federal lawsuit filed by Phillips, without Scardina's participation.The district court took up Scardina's case after the Commission's dismissal and found that Phillips had violated Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), imposing a fine. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. Phillips then appealed to the Supreme Court of Colorado.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the district court should not have heard Scardina's case. The court concluded that Scardina did not exhaust her administrative remedies as required by CADA. Specifically, the court found that Scardina should have appealed the Commission's decision to close the administrative adjudication without issuing the required order. The court vacated the lower courts' decisions and dismissed the case, stating that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. View "In re Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc." on Justia Law

A 17-year-old, M.L., challenged a civil harassment restraining order issued to protect E.G., a former romantic partner of M.L.’s mother. E.G. sought the order after M.L. posted E.G.’s personal information on social media, alleging E.G. supported M.L.’s mother in abusive conduct against M.L. and her younger brother. The restraining order prohibited M.L. from publishing E.G.’s contact information online and from defaming or harassing her. M.L. contended there was no clear and convincing evidence of harassment and argued that the trial court failed to consider circumstances making future harassment unlikely.The Santa Cruz County Superior Court issued a temporary restraining order and later a three-year civil harassment restraining order against M.L. The court found that M.L.’s social media posts, which included E.G.’s contact information and accusations of supporting child abuse, constituted harassment. The court concluded that E.G. had met her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence and that the harassment was likely to continue without a restraining order.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the restraining order, including M.L.’s repeated social media posts and the resulting threats and harassment E.G. received from third parties. The court concluded that M.L.’s conduct was not for a legitimate purpose and was not constitutionally protected. However, the court modified the restraining order to expire on M.L.’s 18th birthday, reasoning that the circumstances leading to the harassment were tied to M.L.’s status as a minor and her parents' custody dispute. The order was affirmed as modified. View "E.G. v. M.L." on Justia Law

Timothy Hall participated in a protest in Detroit, where he was tackled and injured by a City of Detroit officer. Later, another officer ticketed him for disorderly conduct. Hall filed two lawsuits: one against the City of Detroit and another against the officers, claiming retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court consolidated the suits, denied Hall’s request to extend the discovery period, granted summary judgment to the City, but denied the ticketing officer’s claim of qualified immunity.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Detroit, dismissing Hall’s claims against the City. However, the court denied the ticketing officer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity, allowing Hall’s First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed. Hall appealed the denial of his motion to extend the discovery period and the summary judgment in favor of the City, while the ticketing officer appealed the denial of qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Hall’s motion to extend the discovery period and the grant of summary judgment to the City. However, the appellate court reversed the district court’s decision denying the ticketing officer’s motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The court held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that issuing a ticket under the circumstances violated Hall’s First Amendment rights. The court emphasized that the officer acted on plausible instructions from a superior and had no reason to doubt the legitimacy of the order. View "Hall v. Navarre" on Justia Law

In 1991, an individual was convicted of multiple felonies related to a home invasion and rape, receiving a thirty-five-year prison sentence. In 2011, the conviction was vacated based on newly discovered DNA evidence that excluded the individual as the contributor of DNA found at the crime scene. The prosecution subsequently moved to dismiss the case with prejudice, which the court granted. In 2016, the individual filed a civil petition for compensation under Hawai‘i’s wrongful conviction compensation statute, HRS chapter 661B.The Circuit Court of the Second Circuit held that the individual failed to allege an actionable claim because the order vacating the conviction did not explicitly state that he was “actually innocent.” The court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the individual did not meet the statutory requirements for compensation.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case. It held that HRS § 661B-1 does not require the exact words “actually innocent” to be present in the vacatur order. Instead, the order must state facts supporting the petitioner’s actual innocence. The court found that the vacatur order, which was based on exculpatory DNA evidence, met this standard. Therefore, the individual presented an actionable claim for relief under HRS chapter 661B.The Supreme Court vacated the Circuit Court’s grant of summary judgment to the State and remanded the case for a trial to determine whether the individual is actually innocent and entitled to compensation under the statute. The court emphasized that the trial should follow the procedures outlined in HRS § 661B-2 and HRS § 661B-3. View "Jardine v. State" on Justia Law