Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Bryan “Shane” Jones appealed the dismissal of his Title VII sex discrimination claim against Defendant-Appellee Needham Trucking, LLC and his state law tort claim for wrongful interference with a contractual relationship against Defendant-Appellee Julie Needham. Jones completed an intake questionnaire with the EEOC. In response to questions seeking more detailed explanations, Jones wrote “[s]ee attached.” The attachment never made it to the EEOC, nor did the EEOC alert Jones that it was missing. Nevertheless, the EEOC prepared a charge form on his behalf, and issued a right-to-sue letter. Jones then filed his lawsuit, alleging sexual harassment, negligence, negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful interference with a contractual or business relationship, and violation of the Oklahoma Employment Security Act of 1980 (“OESA”). The district court held that Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for his quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, that his state law tort claim was precluded by the Oklahoma Anti-Discrimination Act (“OADA”), and that his OESA claim failed for want of a private right of action. Needham Trucking argued that the facts alleged were insufficient to put it on notice of the quid pro quo harassment claim made in Jones’s amended complaint because the facts from the attachment were not reflected in the EEOC charge form or right-to-sue letter. The Tenth Circuit concluded that though the complaint Jones filed was more detailed than his charge form, the form only needed to “describe generally” the alleged discrimination. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court with respect to the discrimination claim, but affirmed on the state law tort claims. View "Jones v. Needham" on Justia Law

Appeal of dismissal of challenge to city’s order requiring that police officers cover tattoos was rendered moot by city’s revocation of the order. Plaintiffs, military veterans employed as Chicago police officers, have tattoos relating to their military service and religion. The department issued an order without prior notice, requiring all officers on duty or otherwise “representing” the department to cover their tattoos. The announced reason was to “promote uniformity and professionalism.” Plaintiffs complained that covering their tattoos with clothing caused overheating in warm weather and that cover-up tape irritated their skin. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that the order violated theirs’ First Amendment rights, attorneys’ fees and costs, and “other legal and/or equitable relief.” Without addressing class certification and before discovery, the court dismissed the suit on the merits, finding that wearing tattoos was a “personal expression,” not an effort at communicating with the public on matters of public concern, and was not protected by the First Amendment. Meanwhile, the police union filed a grievance. An arbitrator ruled that the order violated the collective bargaining agreement. The city conceded and agreed to reimburse officers for expenses in complying with the invalidated policy. The Seventh Circuit directed that the judgment vacated as moot. View "Medici v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit directed the district court to dismiss, as moot, a lawsuit by a Chicago-area family-owned firm, challenging the “contraception mandate” under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 124 Stat. 119. Ozinga regards certain of the contraceptives covered by the mandate as potential abortifacients, the use of which is proscribed by its owners’ and managers’ religious tenets, and sued under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb, in 2013. The government had established an accommodation for certain religious employers that provided for alternate means of ensuring employee access to the contraceptive services specified by the mandate without payment or direct involvement by an objecting employer; the accommodation was not then available to for-profit employers like Ozinga. In light of Seventh Circuit precedent, the district court granted Ozinga a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court subsequently decided, in “Hobby Lobby” (2014), that the contraception mandate, as applied to closely-held private firms whose owners objected on religious grounds to contraceptives covered by the mandate, substantially burdened the exercise of religion by those owners and their companies, in view of the fines to which they were subject for noncompliance. The government then extended the accommodation to private employers, including Ozinga, rendering its suit moot. View "Ozinga v. Price" on Justia Law

The Tenth Circuit found that Terry Margheim failed to show an essential element of his malicious prosecution claim against deputy district attorney Emela Buljko to establish a constitutional violation. For that reason, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to Buljko. Margheim sued Buljko under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for malicious prosecution in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. This case arose from Margheim’s involvement in three state criminal matters - two domestic violence cases and a later drug case. His malicious prosecution claim was based on his prosecution in the drug case, but the three cases were tied together. When Buljko raised the qualified immunity defense in district court, Margheim had the burden to show a violation of clearly established federal law. (CA-D) Save Our Heritage Organization (McConnell) View "Margheim v. Buljko" on Justia Law

This case comes to us for a second time to determine if the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) was exempted from the jurisdiction of the City of Philadelphia (the City) via the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations (Philadelphia Commission) and the provisions of the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (FPO). This case originated in seven administrative proceedings against SEPTA that individuals instituted with the Philadelphia Commission from July 2007 through April 2009, alleging violations of the FPO. At least two of the administrative complaints included claims of types of discrimination against which the FPO offers protection, but that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) did not cover. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court previously remanded this case to the Commonwealth Court to ascertain the legislative intent regarding this issue by employing the analysis set forth in “Dep‘t of Gen. Serv. v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass‘n,” (483 A.2d 448 (Pa. 1984)). On remand, the Commonwealth Court determined that, applying the Ogontz test, the language and statutory scheme of the relevant statutes revealed the legislature‘s intent to exempt SEPTA from actions brought under the FPO. The Supreme Court found the Commonwealth Court did not err in its determination that, under the first prong of the Ogontz analysis, the statutory language and legislative scheme of the enabling legislation disclosed the legislature‘s intent to exclude SEPTA from the jurisdiction of the FPO. The order of the Commonwealth Court was therefore affirmed. View "SEPTA v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Smego, a civilly committed sex offender at Rushville, sued his treatment team, alleging that another resident sexually assaulted him and that defendants forced Smego to continue group therapy with his alleged assailant and retaliated against Smego. After the Seventh Circuit held that Smego was entitled to a jury trial, Smego was represented by University of Illinois law students. Before trial, Smego appeared by video conference or telephone at hearings. For trial, Smego appeared in person. During an off‐the‐record break after closing arguments, the judge removed Smego for transport back to Rushville. The court did not address this removal on the record and issued no cautionary jury instruction regarding Smego’s absence, but instructed the jury that its verdict must be unanimous. Smego was not presemt when the jury found in favor of defendants. The judge asked whether the students wanted the jury polled, and a student, without consulting Smego, responded in the negative. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There is no evidence that the jury had questions during deliberation or had any reason to know that Smego was not present during deliberations. Failing to poll the jury when it is clear that the verdict was unanimous, was a “minor matter.” View "Smego v. Payne" on Justia Law

Kent Duty filed suit against BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”), after he applied to work there as a locomotive electrician. Duty had an impairment that limits his grip strength in his right hand. Fearing that Duty would fall from ladders, BNSF revoked his offer for employment. Duty and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the “Commission”) sued BNSF for employment discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). The ADA limits its protection by recognizing that not all impairments are disabilities. Applying the ADA’s definition of “disability,” the district court found that Kent Duty was not disabled and granted summary judgment to BNSF. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "EEOC v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

VR Acquisitions, LLC (VRA) owned a roughly 6,700-acre property in Utah’s Jordanelle Basin. VRA brought this action in 2015, asserting three federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and five state-law claims. All claims rested, to some degree, on VRA’s assertion that an invalid assessment lien was recorded against the property three years before VRA bought the property. The district court dismissed all eight claims with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and VRA appealed. Because the district court properly dismissed VRA’s section 1983 claims for lack of prudential standing, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of those claims with prejudice. But because the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over VRA’s state-law claims, the Tenth Circuit reversed its dismissal with prejudice of those claims and remanded with directions for the district court to dismiss those claims without prejudice. View "VR Acquisitions v. Wasatch County" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs suffered from disabilities, for which each was prescribed an emotional support animal. Each woman obtained a dog. This violated the “no dogs” rule of their condominium association. Plaintiffs each sought an accommodation for an emotional support animal by filing paperwork, with a doctor’s letter prescribing an emotional support animal, and a dog certification. Other residents became upset about the presence of the dogs. The condominium board voted to impose a fine. When a new Board President took office, the Board granted the accommodation requests and waived the accrued fines. Plaintffs filed suit under the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the association denied their reasonable requests for accommodation (42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(B)) and interfered with the exercise of their fair housing rights (42 U.S.C. 3617). Plaintiff Walters committed suicide while her case was pending. The district court dismissed Walters’ Fair Housing Act claims entirely due to her death and rejected Kromenhoek’s claims on the merits. The Third Circuit reversed. The survival of claims under the Fair Housing Act is not governed by Section 1988(a), but by federal common law, under which a claim survives the death of a party. There were genuine issues of material fact regarding the merits of the claims. View "Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association" on Justia Law

Whitfield's 2002, 2003, and 2007 prison disciplinary proceedings resulted in the revocation of 16 months of good-conduct credit Whitfield had earned. Whitfield diligently, but unsuccessfully, filed administrative grievances regarding all three actions. In 2003-2004, Whitfield filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the 2002 and 2003 proceedings, claiming retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district courts dismissed. Whitfield also, unsuccessfully, sought mandamus relief in Illinois state court alleging due process violations. In 2009, Whitfield attempted to challenge all three revocations of good-conduct credit through a state-law habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed without prejudice. An appeal was dismissed because Whitfield was unable to obtain the record. In March 2011, Whitfield filed a federal habeas petition. The state argued that Whitfield’s petition would be rendered moot in July 2011, when he was scheduled for release, and failure to exhaust state remedies. The district court dismissed the action as moot when Whitfield was released. Whitfield filed the present section 1983 action. Upon preliminary review (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)) the district court found that Whitfield stated claims for due process violations and for retaliation but granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Whitfield’s suit was barred by precedent requiring a plaintiff to pursue timely collateral relief while in custody. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Whitfield did his best to obtain timely relief while in custody; precedent requires no more. View "Whitfield v. Howard" on Justia Law