Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Several college volleyball players accused their coach of physical, verbal, psychological, and sexual abuse. The players alleged that the coach engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment and abuse, including inappropriate touching and forcing players to engage in uncomfortable physical interactions. They also claimed that the coach's misconduct was reported to various university administrators and assistant coaches, who either witnessed or were informed of the abuse.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama dismissed the players' Title IX and § 1983 claims with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court found that the players had abandoned their breach-of-contract claims and dismissed those with prejudice. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, dismissing them without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the players failed to state a Title IX claim because only certain university administrators were "appropriate persons" to receive notice of the misconduct, and the players did not provide sufficient actual notice of sexual harassment to those individuals. The court also found that the university did not act with deliberate indifference upon receiving the notice.Regarding the § 1983 claims, the court held that the players did not show that the university employees' conduct violated clearly established substantive-due-process principles. The court concluded that the employees were entitled to qualified immunity because the players did not provide case law with indistinguishable facts, a broad statement of principle, or conduct so egregious that it clearly violated constitutional rights.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing the players' Title IX and § 1983 claims. View "DeMarcus v. University of South Alabama" on Justia Law

Jonathan and Melissa Brizendine applied to become foster parents in January 2022. After completing their application, a DHS employee conducted a home visit and asked various questions, including about their religious affiliation. The Brizendines, who are non-religious, were also asked to provide additional information on Melissa’s PTSD and medical-marijuana use. On May 19, 2022, DHS denied their foster-parent application. The Brizendines filed a complaint on June 8, 2023, alleging that their application was denied due to their atheism and medical-marijuana use, claiming violations of the Arkansas Constitution, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment.The Pulaski County Circuit Court granted the State appellees' motion to dismiss, concluding that the Brizendines' complaint failed to state a claim under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and that the State appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity. The court found that the Brizendines did not plead sufficient facts to show that the State’s actions were illegal or unconstitutional.The Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's decision. The court held that the Brizendines' complaint was speculative and did not meet the fact-pleading requirements necessary to overcome sovereign immunity. The court noted that the complaint lacked specific facts to support the claim that DHS denied the application based on religious preferences and medical-marijuana use. Additionally, the complaint did not establish any involvement of Governor Sanders or the Child Welfare Agency Review Board in the application process. Therefore, the State appellees were entitled to sovereign immunity, and the dismissal was affirmed. View "Brizendine v. Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Natasha Knox, a Black woman of Jamaican descent, worked as a customer service attendant at three Clean Rite laundromats in the Bronx from December 2018 until her termination in April 2019. She alleged that her supervisors, Cecilia Ashmeade and Kenneth Ferris, made derogatory comments about her race and national origin, and that Clean Rite failed to accommodate her disability following a thumb injury. Knox also claimed she was not paid for extra shifts worked at other locations and was wrongfully terminated after reimbursing herself for taxi fare from the cash register, which she claimed was permitted.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of Clean Rite, dismissing Knox’s claims of discriminatory and retaliatory termination, hostile work environment, refusal to accommodate her disability, and unpaid wages. The district court found that Knox had not provided sufficient evidence to support her claims. Knox’s motion to strike the defendants’ answer and request for default judgment against Ashmeade and Ferris, who had failed to appear, was denied as moot.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case de novo and found that Knox had presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on all her claims. The court noted that evidence such as Knox’s testimony and sworn affidavit could lead a reasonable jury to find in her favor. The court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on each of Knox’s claims. The claims against Ashmeade and Ferris were reinstated for the district court to reconsider Knox’s motion to strike their answer and for default judgment. View "Knox v. CRC Management Co." on Justia Law

In September 2020, inmate Garfield Holley, proceeding pro se, sued several officers at Wallens Ridge State Prison under Section 1983. Holley alleged that the officers transported him to a dental appointment in a dog cage and subjected him to subsequent mistreatment. He claimed that this treatment was in retaliation for filing a grievance about a delayed medical procedure. Holley, who has asthma, described being chained in a padlocked dog cage in near-freezing temperatures for over six hours, leading to pneumonia and delayed medical care. He also alleged a pattern of retaliatory treatment against prisoners who complained about their conditions.The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed Holley's complaint without prejudice for failing to pay the filing fee, citing the three-strikes rule under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court found that Holley had not adequately alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury, as the incidents described occurred approximately two years before the complaint was filed. Holley's motion for reconsideration was denied, and he timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court concluded that Holley had adequately pleaded imminent danger of serious physical injury, noting the specificity of his allegations and the ongoing pattern of retaliatory treatment against prisoners at Wallens Ridge State Prison. The court found that Holley's allegations were sufficient to meet the imminent-danger exception to the three-strikes rule. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Holley v. Combs" on Justia Law

A Texas county judge, Brian Umphress, challenged the State Commission on Judicial Conduct's application of Canon 4A(1) of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires judges to conduct their extra-judicial activities in a manner that does not call into question their impartiality. Umphress, who refuses to perform same-sex marriages for religious reasons while continuing to perform opposite-sex marriages, argued that applying the Canon to his refusal is unconstitutional. This challenge arose after a similar situation involving Justice of the Peace Dianne Hensley, who was publicly warned by the Commission for her refusal to perform same-sex weddings.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Umphress's case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that he lacked standing and that his claims were not ripe. The court also noted that even if it had jurisdiction, it would have abstained under the Pullman doctrine, which allows federal courts to defer to state courts on issues of unclear state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and found that Umphress had standing and that his claims were ripe for review. The court held that Umphress had demonstrated an imminent injury in fact, as his intended conduct was arguably proscribed by Canon 4A(1) and there was a substantial threat of future enforcement by the Commission. The court also determined that the case was not moot despite the Commission's rescission of its warning against Hensley, as the Commission had not disavowed future enforcement against Umphress.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and declined to abstain under Pullman, noting that state court litigation was unlikely to resolve the crucial threshold question of Texas law. Instead, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Texas, asking whether Canon 4A(1) prohibits judges from publicly refusing to perform same-sex weddings for moral or religious reasons while continuing to perform opposite-sex weddings. View "Umphress v. Hall" on Justia Law

Gustavo Santander and his wife visited a sports bar in Fort Worth, Texas, where Jose Salazar, an off-duty police officer working as a security guard, allegedly pushed Santander without provocation, causing him to fall. When Santander confronted Salazar, Salazar allegedly punched him multiple times, leading to his arrest for public intoxication. The charge was later dismissed, and an internal review by the Fort Worth Police Department concluded that Salazar had violated departmental rules, resulting in his termination. Santander then filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed Santander’s claims with prejudice, stating that he failed to cite relevant legal authority to support his claims and did not show that Salazar violated any clearly established rights. Santander appealed the decision, arguing that the district court erred in its judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that the district court applied an incorrect pleading standard by requiring Santander to substantiate his claims with legal authority in his complaint. The appellate court held that Santander’s excessive force claim was plausible and could defeat Salazar’s qualified immunity at the pleading stage. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Santander’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, as he could not show that Salazar violated clearly established law regarding these claims.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims but reversed the dismissal of the excessive force claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Santander v. Salazar" on Justia Law

William Maxwell, a federal prisoner, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking transfer to a halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018. He argued that the district court erred in determining that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas dismissed Maxwell's petition, concluding that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Maxwell appealed this decision, contending that the district court's determination was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that Maxwell's request for transfer to a halfway house or home confinement did not entitle him to accelerated release. According to the court's precedent in Melot v. Bergami, such relief should be sought through a civil rights suit rather than a habeas petition. Consequently, the court did not address whether Maxwell had exhausted his administrative remedies, as the proper vehicle for his claim was a civil rights suit, not a habeas petition. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Maxwell's petition. View "Maxwell v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Jacques Rivera, after being released from over 20 years in prison for a wrongful murder conviction, sued the City of Chicago and several police officers under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for civil rights violations. A jury awarded him over $17 million, and his attorneys sought more than $6 million in fees and costs. The case was settled for $18.75 million, including at least $3.75 million for attorneys' fees and costs. Chicago, which had an insurance policy with Starstone Insurance SE covering liabilities between $15 and $20 million, sought indemnity for the $3.75 million. Starstone refused, claiming their policy only covered damages, not attorneys' fees and costs, and filed for a declaratory judgment.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled in favor of Chicago, determining that the insurance policy covered the entire $18.75 million settlement as an "ultimate net loss" that Chicago was legally obligated to pay. Starstone appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether Starstone, a Societas Europaea (SE) based in Liechtenstein, qualified as a "corporation" under 28 U.S.C. §1332 for diversity jurisdiction purposes and concluded that it did. On the merits, the court found that the insurance policy's language covered the entire settlement amount, including attorneys' fees and costs, as part of the "ultimate net loss" Chicago was legally obligated to pay. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the policy's terms included indemnity for attorneys' fees and costs awarded under statutory provisions. View "Starstone Insurance SE v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Marina Debity brought claims against the Monroe County Board of Education for sex discrimination and retaliation under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). Debity alleged that the Board offered her a lower salary than it had paid a male predecessor, Matthew Ancel, for the same job and retaliated by withdrawing her job offer when she requested equal pay.A jury found that the Board offered Debity less money for legitimate reasons unrelated to her sex and did not retaliate against her. Despite these findings, the jury awarded Debity over $195,000 in damages, likely due to poor instructions on the verdict form. The magistrate judge noticed the inconsistency but dismissed the jury without allowing objections. The magistrate judge later denied Debity's motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, classifying the verdicts as special verdicts and reconciling the inconsistency by entering judgment based on the jury's answers to the interrogatories.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the magistrate judge presented the jury with a general verdict on the retaliation claims and a general verdict with interrogatories on the discrimination claims. The jury's answers to the interrogatories on the discrimination claims were consistent with each other but inconsistent with the general verdict. The court affirmed the magistrate judge's decision to enter judgment based on the interrogatories.Regarding the Board's affirmative defense to the discrimination claims, the court held that budget constraints and market forces of supply and demand each provided an independent basis to uphold the jury's verdict. Both reasons were legitimate business explanations for offering Debity a lower salary than Ancel. Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the Board on all claims. View "Debity v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought damages from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), alleging religious discrimination during child protection proceedings that led to the termination of his parental rights. The trial court dismissed most of the plaintiff’s claims as time-barred but allowed some timely allegations related to the termination trial to proceed. DCF’s motion to reargue, asserting that the litigation privilege barred the remaining claims, was denied by the trial court.DCF appealed to the Appellate Court, which concluded that the litigation privilege did indeed bar the plaintiff’s remaining timely allegations and directed the trial court to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The trial court complied, dismissing the entire complaint before the plaintiff could seek further appellate review.The plaintiff and the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities argued that the Appellate Court erred in applying the litigation privilege to bar the discrimination claims. They contended that the privilege should not apply to DCF, a governmental entity, and that the legislature intended to abrogate the privilege in discrimination cases.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege barred the plaintiff’s timely allegations related to DCF’s conduct during the termination trial. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s claims were akin to defamation, to which the privilege applies, and not to vexatious litigation, which challenges the purpose of the underlying action. The court also found that other remedies were available to address DCF’s conduct and declined to adopt a rule precluding nonpersons from invoking the privilege.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment to the extent that it directed the trial court to dismiss the entire complaint, as this hindered the plaintiff’s ability to appeal the dismissal of his untimely claims. The case was remanded to the Appellate Court to vacate the trial court’s judgment and to remand the case for a new judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff to appeal the timeliness ruling. View "Ammar I. v. Dept. of Children & Families" on Justia Law