Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of various counts of kidnapping, robbery, and rape against five women. During the trial, the trial court modified pattern jury instruction CALCRIM No. 1191, which explains to a jury that it may consider a defendant's uncharged sexual offense as evidence of his or her propensity to commit a charged sexual offense, to permit to the jury to consider the defendant's charged sexual offenses as evidence of his propensity to commit the other charged sexual offenses. On appeal, Defendant challenged a modified pattern jury instruction based on People v. Quintanilla, which held that charged offenses could not be considered as propensity evidence under a similar provision and its corresponding jury instruction. The court of appeal rejected Defendant's challenges to the modified instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the facts of this case, the trial court did not err in giving the modified instruction.

Defendant was an adult who was diagnosed with mental retardation and other mental disorders. Because of her increasingly violent behavior, the People sought to civilly commit Defendant pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6500. After a nonjury trial, the court ordered Defendant committed for one year. The court of appeal affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether Defendant's jury trial was validly waived if, as Defendant alleged, the court did not obtain Defendant's personal waiver of a jury. The Supreme Court affirmed after acknowledging that an individual facing commitment has cognitive and intellectual impairments that would prevent him or her from making a meaningful decision whether to invoke, or waive, the right to a jury trial, holding (1) Defendant was not denied due process and equal protection of the law insofar as the record did not reveal the circumstances under which Defendant was tried by the court, rather than by a jury, as (2) an individual facing commitment in section 6500 proceedings is protected by the state's statutory obligation to provide counsel, and (3) it is counsel who must make the tactical decision whether to seek or waive a jury in section 6500 proceedings.

An amended information charged Defendant Richard Tully with the 1986 murder of Shirley Olsson and assault with intent to commit rape. The information also alleged a special circumstance that the murder was committed in the commission of a burglary and, as to both counts, that Defendant used a dangerous and deadly weapon: a knife. A jury convicted Defendant as charged and found true the special circumstance and weapon allegations. It then returned a verdict of death, which the trial court declined to modify. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in its entirety, holding, among other things, that California's death penalty statute was constitutional.

A jury convicted Defendant Keith Thomas of the first degree murder of Francia Young, of kidnapping her for the purpose of robbery, of forcibly raping her, and of forcibly sodomizing her. The jury also convicted Defendant of robbing Sebrena Flennaugh, assaulting two peace officers with an assault weapon, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The jury returned a verdict of death for the murder of Young. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death, imposed a concurrent sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the kidnapping of Young, and stayed imposition of sentence on the remaining counts. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in its entirety, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment.

Burglary is committed when a person enters a building with the intent of committing larceny or any felony. In People v. Valencia, the Supreme Court held that a building is entered when the building's "outer boundary" is crossed. An "unenclosed balcony," Valencia noted in a footnote, was not part of a building's outer boundary. Defendant in this case was charged with residential burglary after climbing onto a second-story apartment's private balcony, which was surrounded by a metal railing four feet in height and accessible only through the single bedroom's sliding glass door. The trial court instructed the jury that such a balcony was within the apartment's outer boundary, and the jury convicted Defendant. The court of appeal reversed, relying on Valencia. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a second floor apartment's balcony is part of the apartment when the balcony is designed to be entered from and offers an extension of the apartment's living space; (2) this holding was not fully reflected in the trial court's jury instruction, as the instruction's language was overbroad; but (3) Defendant was not prejudiced by this error.

Defendant pled no contest to one count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. Based on a negotiated disposition, the trial court sentenced Defendant to two years' incarceration. The question arose whether Defendant's prior conviction for burglary, which the trial court had stricken, nevertheless disqualified him from receiving day-for-day presentence conduct credits under Cal. Penal Code former 4019. Former section 4019 allowed prisoners in local custody to earn conduct credits against their term of confinement for work and good behavior. The possibility of early release, however, was withheld from prisoners who had a prior conviction for a serious or violent felony. The court concluded it had no power to disregard the prior conviction for purposes of credits and award 116 days of conduct credits rather than the 232 to which Defendant would otherwise have been entitled. The court of appeal reversed the judgment as to credits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cal. Penal Code 1385, which permits a court in furtherance of justice to order an action to be dismissed, does not authorize a court to disregard the historical facts that disqualify a local prisoner from earning day-for-day conduct credits under former section 4019.

A jury found Defendant John Alexander Riccardi guilty of the first degree murders of Connie Navarro and Sue Jory by use of a firearm. The jury also found true the special circumstance allegations of multiple murder and that Defendant committed Connie's murder while engaged in the commission of a burglary. Subsequently, the jury fixed the penalty at death. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of death because of the erroneous excusal of a prospective juror during jury selection; (2) reversed the burglary special circumstance and one of the two multiple-murder special-circumstance findings; and (3) affirmed in all other respects.

A jury found Defendant guilty of robbery, as an aider and abetter, and attempted murder, on the theory that the nontarget offenses of attempted murder were a natural and probable consequence of the target offenses of robbery, which Defendant had aided and abetted. The jury further found that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated under Cal. Penal Code 664(a), which increases the punishment for attempted murder beyond the maximum otherwise prescribed when those findings are found true by the trier of fact. At issue on appeal was whether, as to the premeditation allegation under section 664(a), the jury needs to be instructed that a premeditated attempt to murder, not just attempted murder, must have been a natural and probable consequence of the target crime of robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal, holding (1) under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, there is no requirement that an aider and abettor reasonably foresee an attempted murder as the natural and probable consequence of the target offense; and (2) it is sufficient that attempted murder is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime aided and abetted, and the attempted murder itself was committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.

Defendant, a prison inmate, was charged with escape from custody. However, Defendant only broke out of his cell and breached interior security barriers. The jury found Defendant guilty of escape from prison without force or violence. The court of appeal reversed, finding insufficient evidence of escape and concluding that the term "escape" under the relevant statute required an actual escape beyond the outer boundary of the prison facility having custody of that prisoner. The court refused to modify the escape conviction to attempt to escape. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeal correctly determined it could not modify the escape conviction to an attempt to escape, as the record contained evidence that could lead a rational jury to find the element of specific intent lacking.

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, burglary, and robbery. The trial court sentenced Defendant to death. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting Defendant to represent himself during proceedings to determine whether he was mentally competent to stand trial. To remedy the error, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings to allow the trial court to determine whether a retrospective evaluation of Defendant's competence to stand trial was feasible and, if it was, to hold such a hearing. If the trial court determined that such a hearing was not feasible or Defendant was incompetent, Defendant was entitled to a new trial.