Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
by
In 2014, Lopez became the manager at La Casa’s domestic violence shelter. In 2016, Lopez gave birth and experienced complications. She provided La Casa with certifications relating to her condition. Lopez alleged La Casa sent harassing communications, failed to engage in an interactive process to determine if Lopez’s disability could be accommodated, and refused to provide “modest” accommodations suggested by Lopez’s doctor. Lopez alleged that her efforts to return to work were “rebuffed,” so she was forced out of her job, and that she was denied a job elsewhere because La Casa misrepresented the reasons for her termination.The court of appeal affirmed a judgment in favor of La Casa. A claim under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Government Code 12945(a)(3)(A), requires proof that the plaintiff had a condition related to pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition; the plaintiff requested accommodation of this condition, with the advice of her health care provider; the plaintiff’s employer refused to provide a reasonable accommodation; and with the reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of the job. The trial court correctly applied those elements, properly placing the burden on Lopez to prove that she had a condition related to pregnancy and that she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommodation. View "Lopez v. La Casa de Las Madres" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed sexual harassment, failure to prevent sexual harassment, wrongful constructive termination, discrimination, and retaliation actions against her former employer, Rite Aid Corporation and Thrifty Payless, Inc., dba Rite Aid. Plaintiff’s lawsuit stemmed from an offsite and after-hours text exchange she had with a Rite Aid district manager in which the latter sent lewd photographs to her. Plaintiff and the district manager knew each other and were friends from a time before Plaintiff started working at Rite Aid. The Rite Aid defendants brought a summary judgment motion. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Rite Aid defendants as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of material fact with respect to the required showing that her manager was acting in the capacity of a supervisor in the text exchange in which he sent the inappropriate texts. Rather, as the trial court found, Plaintiff and the manager had “an extensive texting relationship,” and their January 4, 2019, late-night text exchange, which “occurred outside the workplace and outside of work hours,” was “spawned from a personal exchange that arose from a friendship between [them].” Summary judgment is, therefore, proper as to Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims. Further, the court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that “as opposed to a constructive termination, the evidence shows that Plaintiff resigned her position.” View "Atalla v. Rite Aid Corporation" on Justia Law

by
This writ proceeding involves a statutory challenge for cause filed against a trial court judge presiding over a wrongful termination lawsuit. The parties are Plaintiff and his former employer, Defendant Bassett Unified School District. Following a multimillion-dollar jury verdict in favor of Plaintiff, the trial judge in this action, Honorable Stephanie Bowick, received a text message from another judge on the court, Honorable Rupert Byrdsong. According to Judge Bowick, Judge Byrdsong had previously informed Judge Bowick that attorneys from his former firm were trying the case. Pointing to Judge Byrdsong’s apparent support for Plaintiff and the resulting verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, the school district sought Judge Bowick’s disqualification, asserting that a person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial. The disqualification motion was assigned to Orange County Superior Court Judge Maria D. Hernandez. The assigned judge denied the disqualification motion. Defendant sought review by petition for writ of mandate   The Second Appellate District denied the petition. The court held that the disqualification motion was properly denied. The court reasoned that there is no adverse inference arising from Judge Bowick’s final ruling on the evidentiary issue. Further, the court found that the facts Judge Bowick disclosed do not require disqualification. Moreover, the court wrote, the timing of Judge Bowick’s disclosure does not suggest an appearance of bias. View "Bassett Unified School Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

by
In May 2020, the state transferred 194 inmates from CIM to San Quentin. The transferees were at risk of developing serious symptoms of COVID-19 (persons over the age of 65 and/or with underlying medical conditions); although they had tested negative two weeks prior, several had COVID-19 at the time of the transfer. Some exhibited symptoms before exiting the transfer bus. San Quentin then had no COVID-19 cases among its prisoner population. A month later, at least 1,400 inmates, including Malear, were diagnosed with COVID-19. Several inmates have died from it. Malear filed a putative class action, alleging failure to take reasonable action to summon medical care for prisoners who were in immediate need. The trial court dismissed, holding that Malear had not complied with the Government Claims Act, having filed suit before the rejection of his government claim.The court of appeal reversed, Although Malear filed suit before the denial of his government claim, he filed an amended complaint as of right after the denial and before the defendants were served with the original complaint or appeared in the action. The amended complaint alleged denial of his claim. Malear has established substantial compliance with the statutory requirement. Assuming the truth of the material allegations in the amended complaint, Malear has stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; the complaint does not disclose the existence of a statutory immunity defense as a matter of law. View "Malear v. State of California" on Justia Law

by
Over the objection of 12-year-old M.M.’s mother (“mother”), the juvenile court authorized the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services or the congregate care facility where M.M. was placed to vaccinate the child against the SARS-CoV-2 virus once his pediatrician approved. Several weeks later mother asked the court to rescind its order, explaining in greater detail her religious objection to M.M. receiving the COVID-19 vaccine. After an evidentiary hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition, finding insufficient evidence it was in the child’s best interest not to be vaccinated.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record at the section 388 hearing amply justified the court’s conclusion it would not be in M.M.’s best interest to revoke the vaccination order despite mother’s unsupported concerns about possible adverse side effects. As established by the Department’s response to mother’s petition, COVID-19 was one of the ten leading causes of death for children as of October 2021, COVID-19 infections were then increasing, M.M. was in contact with multiple individuals at his placement and his school, the Pfizer vaccine had been found safe for children his age and M.M.’s pediatrician had determined there were no known contraindications to M.M. receiving the vaccine. Moreover, as discussed, M.M. was not averse to receiving the vaccination, leaving it to the court to decide. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude its authorization to vaccinate M.M. should stand. View "In re Matthew M." on Justia Law

by
In consolidated proceedings, Petitioners each sought a writ requiring the Superior Court to dismiss their cases for violating their speedy trial rights under Penal Code section 1382.2. Petitioners argued there was no good cause to continue their cases past the statutory deadline because the Superior Court can no longer rely on the “exceptional circumstances” resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.The court of appeal denied the petitions. The pandemic and its adverse impacts on the courts did not end when the courts reopened; courts had to address both the backlog that had developed during the closure of the courts and new cases. Although the courts reopened, the pandemic continued to wreak havoc, with 36 judicial officers, court staff, sheriff’s deputies, attorneys, defendants, and jurors contracting COVID-19, being required to quarantine due to exposure, or having to care for family members. The persistence of a backlog during the period at issue was principally the result of continuing consequences of the pandemic. Not only the pandemic, itself, but its length, seriousness, and continuing effects were unexpected and unanticipated and resulted in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances. The Superior Court did not, in these cases, abuse its discretion in concluding that exceptional circumstances justified the continuance of Petitioners’ trials past their statutory last days. View "Estrada v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, respondent Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Kaiser). The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment. The court explained that as part of a round of employee layoffs, Kaiser planned, at least tentatively, to terminate Plaintiff before Plaintiff became disabled. Kaiser’s plan to terminate Plaintiff before she became disabled, by itself, was not discrimination against Plaintiff because of a disability. But Kaiser did not complete its layoff plans—or, a reasonable jury could find, make its final determination to terminate Plaintiff—until after Plaintiff had become disabled. On the record here, there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Kaiser’s ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff was motivated, at least in substantial part, by concerns Kaiser had about Plaintiff’s disability. That allows Plaintiff’s complaint to survive summary judgment. View "Lin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

by
Casandra Murrey, a single, 46-year-old female, worked for General Electric Company (GE) as a product sales specialist for ultrasound equipment. The complaint alleged GE hired Murrey in early 2018 and she was a “top performer.” In 2019, GE hired Joseph Gorczyca, III. In January 2020, he became Murrey’s direct supervisor, and he engaged in continuous sexual harassment in the workplace with Murrey and others. She alleged GE “never properly completed an immediate [n]or appropriate investigation or took any . . . corrective action. Instead, [GE] later informed [her] that Gorczyca was ‘no longer with the company.’” Thereafter, GE “commenced an illegal pattern of retaliatory behavior against Murrey because [she] engage[ed] in protective activity” that included “denying appropriate support for [her] sales position” and refusing to promote her. Eight months after Murrey filed the complaint, GE moved to compel arbitration. GE sent all new hires a “welcome e-mail” to the new hire’s personal e-mail address that contained a link to GE’s electronic onboarding system/portal. Each document was assigned a separate task and the new hire signed employment-related agreements using his or her electronic signature. Based on this process and GE’s other security measures, GE’s lead HR specialist Michelle Thayer concluded Murrey’s electronic signature on an Acknowledgment was made by Murrey that Murrey assented to an included arbitration in the onboarding materials. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, concluding:(1) GE met its burden of showing the arbitration agreement covered Murrey’s claims; (2) all of Murrey’s causes of action arose out of or were connected with her employment; and (3) Murrey met her burden showing procedural unconscionability because it was a contract of adhesion; but (5) Murrey failed to show a sufficient degree of substantive unconscionability to render the agreement unenforceable. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the arbitration agreement in this case contained a high degree of procedural unconscionability. "When we consider the procedural and substantively unconscionable provisions together, they indicate a concerted effort to impose on an employee a forum with distinct advantages for the employer." The Court issued a writ of mandate on the trial court to vacate the order compelling arbitration, and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Murrey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

by
Defendant is a resident of the City of Oxnard (the City). Defendant gathered signatures for a number of initiatives, including Measures M and N. The City’s voters passed both initiatives. The City brought the instant action to have the measures declared void as administrative rather than legislative in nature. Defendant responded with an anti-SLAPP motion requesting that the trial court dismissed the City’s action. Defendant claimed that the City is not a proper party to bring the action, that he is not a proper defendant, and that the City cannot prevail on the merits. The court denied the motion on all three grounds.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment as to Measure M and affirmed as to Measure N. The court explained that the City argued that Measure M is invalid under the exclusive delegation rule. The City contends that the initiative intrudes into a subject exclusively delegated by statute to the City council. Thus, standards that allow greater access are purely a municipal affair. The provisions of Measure M are intended to allow for greater access. Measure M is not invalid under the exclusive delegation rule. Further, the manifest purpose of Measure N is to ensure that Measure O revenue is expended for road repair. Measure N tells the City how it must administer general tax revenue, even setting precise dates for the completion of the work. Measure N is clearly administrative in nature. View "City of Oxnard v. Starr" on Justia Law

by
Jail personnel search inmate mail for contraband. To preserve confidentiality, mail from an inmate to an attorney is opened in front of the inmate; the contents are visually inspected but not read. An officer noticed an envelope from Cortez addressed to his attorney; with a “bulk in the center.” It smelled of feces. Suspecting the envelope contained contraband, he opened it but not in front of Cortez. The envelope contained another envelope fashioned from the lined yellow paper, marked “do not read.” The officer opened it and found multiple "kites," each made from different colored paper and with different writing. Kites are clandestine notes, written by inmates on small pieces of paper in very small print, then rolled up to minimize their size and facilitate concealment. The officer informed his supervisor.A magistrate conducted an in-camera examination and concluded: The messages have “the teeny tiny writing ... indicative of a gang-related kite…. I did not read the substance … none of them were addressed to [Cortez’s attorney]. None of them ... appeared to even be written by Cortez…. I do not find the attorney-client privilege applies.” The court of appeal agreed. The magistrate’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Even if the jail violated the regulation requiring legal mail to be opened in the inmate’s presence, the remedy would not automatically render everything inside the envelope—including communications intended for people other than an attorney—subject to attorney-client privilege. View "People v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County" on Justia Law