Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant and, as a condition of employment, was required to get a flu vaccine. Plaintiff sought an exemption based on a medically recognized contraindication, presenting a doctor's note that recommended she avoid the vaccine based on her history of cancer and general allergies. However, neither of these was a medically recognized contraindication, and Defendant terminated her employment.Plaintiff filed suit under the FEHA for disability discrimination. The trial court granted summary judgment in Defendnat's favor, plaintiff appealed.The Second Appellate District affirmed, finding that Defendant did not engage in disability discrimination and that Defendant's reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment was legitimate and lacked pretext. Further, the court rejected Plaintifff's retaliation claim. View "Hodges v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her former employer Xceed Financial Credit Union (Xceed) for wrongful termination and age discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The case was submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The arbitrator granted summary judgment in favor of Xceed on the ground Plaintiff’s claims were barred by a release in her separation agreement. The arbitrator rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that the release violated Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits pre-dispute releases of liability in some circumstances. Plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing an illegal release. The trial court denied the motion to vacate and entered judgment confirming the arbitration award.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the arbitrator’s ruling for clear error. The arbitrator correctly ruled the release did not violate Civil Code section 1668. Plaintiff signed the separation agreement after she was informed of the decision to terminate her but before her last day on the job. At the time she signed, she already believed that the decision to terminate her was based on age discrimination and that she had a valid claim for wrongful termination. The alleged violation of FEHA had already occurred, even though the claim had not yet fully accrued. Accordingly, the release did not violate section 1668 because it was not a release of liability for future unknown claims. View "Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union" on Justia Law

Defendants hired Plaintiff as a nanny. Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment. They hoped Plaintiff would release potential claims against them in exchange for a severance payment. Defendants asked a friend (who ran a nanny placement service and had helped hire Plaintiff) to propose this to Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not sign the proposed severance agreement. Instead, she brought wage-and-hour claims against Defendants. Following discovery, Plaintiff amended her complaint to add a claim for defamation. She based her defamation claim on statements Defendants made to the intermediary during the negotiations over severance. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion. They argued that the allegedly defamatory statements were made in anticipation of litigation. They moved to strike not only the new defamation allegations but also the entire complaint. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion and required the Defendants to pay some of Plaintiff’s attorney fees.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Defendants did not show that Plaintiff’s defamation claim was based on activity protected by the anti-SLAPP law. The court explained that Defendants appealed to the entire SAC. They did so even after the trial court correctly found the motion frivolous as to most of Plaintiff’s SAC. Defendants informed the trial court that “the appeal is going to be of every cause of action.” Defendants were thereby able to obtain a full stay of the action in the trial court, even though the appeal was frivolous as to most of the action. If Defendants had appealed as to only the defamation cause of action, Plaintiff might have had the opportunity to argue for permission to continue discovery. View "Nirschl v. Schiller" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a long-term employee of Defendant St. Cecilia Catholic School. In her final year of employment, Defendant worked part-time as an art teacher and office administrator. Following her discharge, Defendant filed this action against St. Cecilia for age discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) The trial court granted St. Cecilia’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff’s suit was barred by the ministerial exception, a constitutional doctrine that precludes certain employment claims brought against a religious institution by its ministers.   The Second Appellate District reversed the judgment in favor of St. Cecilia and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies in this case. Further, the court wrote that St. Cecilia did not waive the ministerial exception by failing to assert the defense in its answer. The evidence that Plaintiff promoted “Christ-like” behavior in her class does not establish, as a matter of law, that she performed vital religious duties for St. Cecilia or otherwise qualified as a minister. Because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether the ministerial exception applies to Plaintiff’s former job position as an art teacher and an office administrator, St. Cecilia was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s age discrimination suit. View "Atkins v. St. Cecilia Catholic School" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment dismissing their lawsuit against Defendant following Defendant’s successful motion for judgment on the pleadings on the sole claim in the operative complaint, malicious prosecution. The operative complaint alleges that Defendant falsely reported to law enforcement that Plaintiffs had attacked her. It further alleges that Defendant’s false reports led to a law enforcement investigation, at the conclusion of which the district attorney declined to press charges. The trial court concluded that the operative complaint does not sufficiently allege a malicious prosecution claim because such a claim requires an adjudicative proceeding. The court further denied Plaintiffs’ leave to amend. On appeal, Plaintiffs challenge the court’s reliance on Van Audenhove v. Perry (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 915 (Van Audenhove).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiffs have standing to appeal. To the merits, the court agreed with Van Audenhove and agreed with the court below that, under Van Audenhove, the operative complaint is fatally defective. The proposed factual allegations Plaintiffs proffer they could allege if given leave to amend, would not address the deficiency in the only cause of action alleged in the complaint. Further, Plaintiffs are not entitled to amend their complaint to add causes of action they had voluntarily dismissed earlier in the litigation because Plaintiffs offered no explanation for their yearslong delay in seeking to do so. Nor are Plaintiffs entitled to add an abuse of process claim they had not previously alleged because this claim is time-barred and does not relate back to the sole cause of action in the operative complaint. View "Bidari v. Kelk" on Justia Law

This case involves the City of Clovis’s (City) housing element and related zoning ordinances and whether they comply with specific statutory requirements designed to assure affordable housing opportunities to lower-income families in California. These requirements for a municipality’s housing element have statewide importance because the housing elements of all cities and counties must include compliant zoning that accommodates the municipality’s need for lower-income housing. Adequacy of Housing Element. Plaintiff, a Clovis resident, sued the City, alleging its housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period, including amendments and zoning changes adopted in March 2019, did not substantially comply with the Housing Element Law. The trial court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor.The Fifth Appellate District reversed the judgment issuing the peremptory writ of mandate to the extent the writ is based on the trial court’s finding the amended housing element does not satisfy the requirements of section 65583.2, subdivision (g) because it does not include the required analysis for sites within the P-F Zone. The court otherwise  affirmed the trial court’s issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the City to (1) adopt “a housing element for the 2015-2023 planning period that substantially complies with Government Code section 65754”; and (2) implement Program 4 “by zoning or rezoning an adequate number of sites, compliant with Government Code Section 65583.2(h), to accommodate the City’s unmet share of the RHNA from the 2008-2013 planning period, pursuant to Government Code section 65584.09.” View "Martinez v. City of Clovis" on Justia Law

In 2015, Nijmeddin was sentenced to an indeterminate life term, consecutive to a determinate term, for murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of narcotics. In 2023, the Department of Corrections recommended that the court recall Nijmeddin’s sentence under the new compassionate release provisions, Penal Code 1172.2, that apply to defendants who have “serious and advanced illness with an end-of-life trajectory,” creating a “presumption favoring recall and resentencing . . . which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”Nijmeddin has advanced incurable pancreatic cancer, biliary adenocarcinoma, and other medical conditions. Nijmeddin is foregoing chemotherapy treatment. Nijmeddin, 65 years old, has committed prison rules violations, including fighting and violent threats. Nijmeddin’s doctor testified Nijmeddin “is barely able to get out of" his wheelchair and estimated Nijmeddin has three-six months to live. Nijmeddin’s brother, an attorney, is willing to be Nijmeddin’s caregiver. The court observed, “Nijmeddin looks quite good. … the doctors may say that he is terminally ill, he is not on that far end.” The court characterized Nijmeddin as “able to use his mental capacity to commit offenses” and declined to recall Nijmeddin’s sentence, finding that he poses an unreasonable risk to public safety.The Attorney General conceded that the court erred and that Nijmeddin is entitled to relief. The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to immediately enter an order recalling Nijmeddin’s sentence. View "Nijmeddin v. Superior Court of Monterey County" on Justia Law

Moss Gropen brought suit against, among other defendants, Cyrus Shabrang and Michael Noud (together, Real Parties in Interest) arising out of Gropen’s treatment at a hospital. Gropen appeared at the noticed deposition with his wife Laura Gropen. Defense counsel objected to Laura’s presence at the deposition because she was a percipient witness in the action and could be deposed in the future. Gropen’s deposition did not proceed beyond the parties stating their objections on the record. Real Parties in Interest subsequently filed a motion for protective order and sanctions, asking the court to exclude Laura from Gropen’s deposition. At the hearing on the motion, for the first time, Gropen’s counsel explicitly requested under California Rules of Court, rule 1.100, that accommodations be provided to Gropen because he was suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), a recognized disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). The court acknowledged that PTSD fell under the ADA but found Gropen’s request for an accommodation untimely. It thus granted the protective order and sanctioned Gropen. Gropen petitioned for a writ of mandate, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion in granting the protective order and erred by not considering the evidence that Gropen was diagnosed with PTSD. Gropen also maintained that his request that Laura attend his deposition was a reasonable accommodation. The Court of Appeal concluded Gropen’s request for accommodation was timely, the district court abused its discretion by failing to remand the matter to the superior court with instructions to deny the motion for a protective order and sanctions, and to properly consider Gropen’s request under Rule 1.100. View "Gropen v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In 1988, Kerins was convicted of sodomy with a person under 18, a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) qualifying offense. In 1998, Kerins pleaded guilty to two counts of annoying or molesting a child under 18. The trial court sentenced him to 13 years in prison. Before Kerins’s scheduled release date in 2006, two psychologists concluded Kerins met the SVP criteria, Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(a). After his probable cause hearing there were multiple continuances, reevaluations, and substitutions of attorney. In November 2020. Kerins filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the People did not bring him to trial in a timely manner and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.The trial court denied the petition in November 2021, describing the delay as “considerable,” but finding that the “overwhelming reason” for the delay was that Kerins’s counsel sought “continuance after continuance.” The court further observed that Kerins did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 2019 and that nothing indicated Kerins’s defense had been impaired. The court of appeal upheld the decision. The court’s findings about the reasons for the delays and concerning prejudice were supported by substantial evidence. Kerins offered no evidence to rebut the presumption that his attorneys provided reasonable assistance. View "In re Kerins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the State of California, and Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra in their capacities as the current and former Attorney General after a federally licensed firearms dealer refused to complete Plaintiff’s purchase of an antique shotgun. Plaintiff alleged the dealer had received a letter from the Department pursuant to section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), advising it that the Department had been unable within the statutory period to ascertain Plaintiff’s eligibility to purchase the firearm. Although the Department’s letter, in accordance with section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), authorized the immediate transfer of the firearm to Plaintiff at the dealer’s discretion, the dealer elected not to do so, telling Plaintiff it was unwilling to “take the risk.” In his operative second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged a federal civil rights claim and requested declaratory relief.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained Plaintiff’s causes of action are premised on the contention that section 28220, subdivision (f)(4), violates the Second Amendment or is preempted by federal law. Both arguments are wrong as a matter of law. Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated how his complaint could be amended to state viable claims, the trial court did not err in sustaining the State’s demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend. View "Regina v. State of California" on Justia Law