Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Labor Code section 244, which does not require a litigant to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a civil action, applies only to claims before the Labor Commissioner. The Court of Appeal explained that section 244 has no effect on Campbell v. Regents of University of California, (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, which held that public employees must pursue appropriate internal administrative remedies before filing a civil action against their employer. In this case, plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, the County, in a wrongful termination action. The court held that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies on her claims that the County terminated her job to discriminate against her; there were no triable issues of fact on plaintiff's claim that she was terminated because of her sexual orientation; and the trial court erred by awarding the County costs on the Fair Employment and Housing Act cause of action. View "Terris v. County of Santa Barbara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit one behalf of himself and a putative class of California consumers who were over 30 years old when they subscribed to Tinder Plus, alleging age discrimination in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the higher price Tinder charged its customers who were over 30 years old for the Tinder Plus service was discriminatory. The Court of Appeal held that the discriminatory pricing model, as alleged, violated the Unruh Act and the UCL to the extent it employed an arbitrary, class-based, generalization about older users' incomes as a basis for charging them more than younger users. The trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer where nothing in the complaint suggested that there was a strong public policy that justified the alleged discriminatory pricing. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Candelore v. Tinder, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant William Bustos sued his former employers, defendants-respondents Global P.E.T., Inc. and Global Plastics, Inc. (collectively, Global) for discrimination. A jury found that Bustos’s physical condition or perceived physical condition was “a substantial motivating reason” for his termination, but nevertheless returned defense verdicts on each of his claims. After trial, Bustos sought an award of attorney fees under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, citing the holding of Harris v. City of Santa Monica, 56 Cal.4th 203 (2013) that “a plaintiff subject to an adverse employment decision in which discrimination was a substantial motivating factor may be eligible for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs expended for the purpose of redressing, preventing, or deterring that discrimination,” even if the discrimination did not “result in compensable injury” for that particular plaintiff. In this appeal, Bustos challenges the trial court’s ruling denying his motion for attorney fees. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, finding the record did not support Bustos’ contention that the trial court ignored “Harris:” the trial court explicitly acknowledged Harris in its remarks regarding its tentative ruling. The trial court correctly recognized, moreover, that even under Harris, the award of attorney fees pursuant to Government Code section 12695 was discretionary, and it appropriately exercised that discretion. View "Bustos v. Global P.E.T" on Justia Law

In an action alleging age and disability discrimination, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on plaintiff's constructive termination claim and defendant's motion for a new trial on all damages. The court held that the evidence showed only plaintiff's personal, subjective reactions to defendant's use of standard disciplinary procedures, all performed with no breach of confidentiality and with no harassment or other mistreatment of plaintiff. The court reasoned that, although the evidence allowed the inference of age or disability discrimination, nothing reflected any unusually aggravated working conditions or a continuous pattern of mistreatment necessary for constructive discharge. The court rejected plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Simers v. LA Times Communications" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant, J. Brent Arave, brought several claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) against his former employers, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill Lynch), Bank of America (BoA), his supervisor Joseph Holsinger, and a human resources supervisor, Katherine Anderson (collectively, defendants). He sought to recover damages caused by discrimination, harassment, and retaliation based on his membership in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. He also sought damages for nonpayment of wages, and whistleblower retaliation. A jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants on all counts that had survived summary judgment and dismissal. The trial court denied Arave’s post-trial motions and awarded defendants, as prevailing parties, costs, expert witness fees, and attorney fees incurred defending against Arave’s wage claim. Arave appealed, alleging numerous alleged evidentiary errors, issues with the trial court’s jury instructions, counsel misconduct, and related claims that he maintained, warranted reversal of the outcome against him. Defendants cross-appealed, contending the trial court abused its discretion when it determined Arave’s FEHA claims were not frivolous and denied them attorney fees on those claims. After careful consideration, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court in all respects but two. The Court concluded the trial court erred by awarding $83,642.68 in costs and expert witness fees though it found Arave’s FEHA claims were nonfrivolous, and therefore reversed the order making the award. However, because a portion of the award could be attributable to Arave’s wage claim, and the trial court erred by awarding $97,500 in attorney fees on the wage claim without determining whether that claim was frivolous, the matter was remanded for the trial court to make those apportionments, as appropriate. View "Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, etc." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with misdemeanor criminal contempt for allegedly violating a permanent anti-gang injunction. Defendant argued that he was not an active gang member covered by the injunction and that enforcement of the injunction against him violated his right to procedural due process. The trial court determined that the injunction burdened defendant's constitutionally-protected liberty interests, whereby defendant was entitled to some adequate predeprivation process to determine whether he was an active gang member covered by the injunction. Because no predeprivation process was available to defendant to challenge the determination that he was covered by the injunction, the trial court held that enforcement of the injunction against him violated his right to procedural due process. The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of the misdemeanor criminal contempt charge predicated on the application of the injunction to defendant. View "People v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Optional filed suit against DAS and its counsel, Akin and Parker, for conversion and fraudulent transfer. Akin and Parker filed special anti-SLAPP motions to strike all claims asserted against them. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motions, holding that Optional v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1388, was not the "law of the case" for purposes of this appeal; defendants made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's claims arose from defendants' constitutionally protected petition rights where the gravamen of plaintiff's claims was protected activity, namely defendants' representation of DAS in litigation; and plaintiff did not show a probability of prevailing on its claims where the litigation privilege defeated plaintiff's claims. View "Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit asserting its right to an administrative hearing to determine whether its chemicals constitute hazardous waste. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the divisions' anti-SLAPP motion to strike the petition and complaint. The court held that the division made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's cause of action arose from an act in furtherance of its right of free speech in connection with a public issue. In this case, plaintiff claimed that the division's decision and notice that Petromax was hazardous waste, by themselves, were causing plaintiff harm even without an enforcement action. The court also held that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claim. View "Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit asserting its right to an administrative hearing to determine whether its chemicals constitute hazardous waste. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of the divisions' anti-SLAPP motion to strike the petition and complaint. The court held that the division made a prima facie showing that plaintiff's cause of action arose from an act in furtherance of its right of free speech in connection with a public issue. In this case, plaintiff claimed that the division's decision and notice that Petromax was hazardous waste, by themselves, were causing plaintiff harm even without an enforcement action. The court also held that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of establishing a probability of prevailing on its claim. View "Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division" on Justia Law

The same standard applies to an individual defendant's request for attorney fees under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) as applies to an employer defendant, and thus a fee award is only available in the discretion of a trial court when the court finds that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous. In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for attorney fees because plaintiff's FEHA claim was not frivolous. The court noted that individual employee defendants who prevailed on a FEHA harassment suit were not left without a means of recovering attorney fees and costs they may have incurred to defend themselves. The court also denied defendant's request for judicial notice. View "Lopez v. Routt" on Justia Law