Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against Musclewood, alleging that defendants violated his rights under the Disabled Persons Act (DPA), by allowing their guard dog to interfere with and attack plaintiff's guide dog. Plaintiff, who is blind, had been trained to use a route that passed in front of defendants' business when he traveled to the market or bus stop. Defendants' guard dog was not trained, leashed, or otherwise controlled or restrained.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred by sustaining a demurrer to his cause of action under the DPA without leave to amend where plaintiff stated a valid claim under section 54.3 of the DPA and plaintiff sufficiently alleged standing for damages. The court also reversed the trial court's order granting a motion to strike. In this case, the trial court committed reversible error by striking the first cause of action, the prayer for damages (including treble damages), and the prayer for attorney fees. View "Ruiz v. Musclewood Investment Properties" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence credited by the trial court was sufficient to support a Qawi order, which authorizes the California Department of State Hospitals-Atascadero (Hospital or ASH) to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication to treat defendant's severe mental disorder. In this case, the trial court found that appellant lacked the capacity to refuse medical treatment and issued a Qawi order authorizing the Hospital to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the finding that the order furthered a compelling government interest that outweighed any religious belief and there was no due process violation in defendant's case. View "California Department of State Hospitals v. A.H." on Justia Law

In 2014, Appellant pled guilty to felony aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of a billy club. He also admitted the allegations in the motion to revoke probation in an earlier case. Appellant was sentenced to three years’ probation and a 180-day county jail term. When he entered his pleas the court explained, and Appellant acknowledged, the possible immigration consequences of his convictions. Counsel stated he had advised Appellant accordingly. Appellant was placed in removal proceedings but was granted cancellation of the removal. In 2015, Appellant was found in possession of methamphetamine for sale, resisted arrest, and attempted to destroy evidence; he was placed on probation for five years. In the new criminal case, Appellant pleaded guilty to resisting arrest and was sentenced to 360 days in the county jail. In 2017, Appellant moved to vacate revocation of probation under Penal Code 1473.7(a)(1), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the immigration consequences of his admission and sentence. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion. Appellant, a convicted felon currently on formal probation, is not entitled to the relief under section 1473.7. He did not establish ineffective assistance; the trial court would not have tolerated any lesser sentence and it is unlikely Appellant would have gone to trial under the circumstances. View "People v. Cruz-Lopez" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment against plaintiff in an action alleging claims under state law and the United States Constitution. The Long Beach Transit Company Board of Directors allows a public speaker to speak for 3 minutes on an agenda item during meetings. Plaintiff, a frequent attendee at meetings of the Board, was not permitted to speak a second time during the same agenda item and was eventually asked to leave by a police officer.The court held that defendants' argument that the trial court determined that plaintiff's Bane Act claims were barred in their entirety because the principal purpose was a monetary recovery ignored both plaintiff's concession in the trial court and the trial court's ruling on defendants' Code of Civil Procedure section 631.8 motion.The court held that the trial court correctly concluded that there was no violation of the Bane Act where nothing the officer said to plaintiff met the test of the statute; the three minutes per public speaker rule clearly met constitutional concerns, and there was no evidence it was applied based on the content of plaintiff's stated or intended remarks; plaintiff's remaining First Amendment claims were rejected; and plaintiff's contention that the second iteration of the Board's speech rules was void was also rejected. View "Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

Certain provisions of Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) regulations, adopted to implement Proposition 57, are inconsistent with Cal. Const., art. I, 32, subd. (a)(1) and thus invalid. The Court of Appeal held that CDCR's adopted regulations impermissibly circumscribe eligibility for Proposition 57 parole by barring relief for petitioner and other similarly situated inmates serving Three Strikes sentences for nonviolent offenses. The court granted the petition for habeas relief and directed the CDCR to void and repeal certain portions of the regulations and to make further conforming changes necessary. View "In re Edwards" on Justia Law

Defendants challenged an order of the superior court partially denying their motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute in a putative class action brought by plaintiffs against defendants and others for marketing a posthumous Michael Jackson album. The Court of Appeal held that the challenged representation―that Michael Jackson was the lead singer on the three Disputed Tracks―did not simply promote sale of the album, but also stated a position on a disputed issue of public interest. In this case, the identity of the artist on the three Disputed Tracks was a controversial issue of interest to Michael Jackson fans and others who care about his musical legacy. Therefore, defendants' statements about the identity of the artist were not simply commercial speech but were subject to full First Amendment protection. Furthermore, they were outside the scope of an actionable unfair competition or consumer protection claim. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order as to this issue. View "Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's denial of a petition for a writ of administrative mandate. In this case, plaintiff sought to set aside his one-year suspension and other discipline imposed by CMC after a review committee found that he had nonconsensual sex with a student at a neighboring college. Plaintiff argued that he was deprived of a fair hearing because the student did not appear, and thus he and the committee did not have an opportunity to question her and assess her credibility.The court held that where, as here, a student was facing potentially severe consequences and the committee's decision against him turned on believing the student, the committee's procedures should have included an opportunity for the committee to assess the student's credibility by her appearing at the hearing in person or by videoconference or similar technology, and by the committee's asking her appropriate questions proposed by plaintiff or the committee itself. The court did not reach plaintiff's remaining challenges. View "Doe v. Claremont McKenna College" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed an order granting the petition of the Public Guardian of the County of San Luis Obispo for reappointment as the conservator of S.A. In this case, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that S.A. continued to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. The court held that the Public Guardian was authorized to offer S.A.'s records to prove the historical course of her mental disorder, and the manner of production and use of the records did not violate S.A.'s statutory or constitutional rights. View "Conservatorship of S.A." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment against plaintiff in an action alleging that Hughes violated the California Disabled Persons Act (DPA). Plaintiff alleged that under the DPA, the store was obliged to designate an accessible path of travel from the street to the store’s entrance that did not require wheelchair-bound patrons to travel behind parked vehicles. The court found no error in the trial court's conclusion that the 2013 CBSC standards applied to all the incidents identified in the first amended complaint; under the 2013 CBSC standards, Hughes was not required to provide an accessible route that did not pass behind parked cars for persons using wheelchairs; and the trial court did not err by determining that plaintiff failed to plead a signage-based claim. View "Baskin v. Hughes Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

In this wrongful death action, a jury found Deputy David Aviles liable for intentional battery by use of excessive force and Deputy Paul Beserra liable for negligence resulting in Darren Burley's death. The jury awarded plaintiffs $8 million in noneconomic damages and the trial court entered judgment against Aviles for the full amount of the award based on the jury's finding that he intentionally harmed Burley.The Court of Appeal agreed with defendants that Civil Code section 1431.2 mandates allocation of the noneconomic damages award in proportion to each defendant's comparative fault, notwithstanding the jury's finding of intentional misconduct. Therefore, the court directed the trial court to vacate the judgment and enter separate judgments for each of Deputies Beserra and Aviles, holding them liable for the noneconomic damages award in an amount proportionate to the jury's comparative fault determinations. The court also held that the summary adjudication order must be reversed because plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue as to whether the deputies acted intentionally in interfering with Burley's right to be free from unreasonable seizures. View "B.B. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law