Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the appointment of a conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act after a jury found M.M. to be gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. M.M. contended that the trial court denied his right to begin a jury trial within 25 days of his jury trial demand; his trial began 61 days after his demand; and thus his conservatorship expires 36 days earlier than the date the trial court ordered.The court held that M.M. has forfeited the contention because the delay in beginning trial was mostly due to his own counsel's requests for a confidential expert report and to continue the trial to accommodate counsel's schedule. View "Conservatorship of M.M." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the appointment of a conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act after a jury found D.C. to be gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. The court held that D.C.'s failure to timely appeal from the trial court's order granting the letters of conservatorship barred appellate review of the merits of that order. The court also held that ample evidence supported the order for involuntary medication and the order after the jury trial continuing that order. In this case, the medical expert testified that D.C. lacked insight about her mental condition, is unable to voluntarily accept meaningful treatment, and required medications to treat her schizophrenia. Although the trial court did not state in its order the specific factors it relied upon in finding by clear and convincing evidence that D.C. was incompetent to give or withhold informed consent, the court found no reversible error. View "Conservatorship of D.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of their claims brought against the state level defendants. Plaintiffs' claims stemmed from their allegations that KHSD adopted and implemented a district-wide disciplinary program that was biased toward minority students, students who speak limited English, and others similarly situated.The Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of most of plaintiffs' claims against the state level defendants, either because such claims did not state a cause of action or because they were brought against the local level defendants but not the state level defendants. However, the court ultimately found that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under the equal protection clause of the California Constitution and they have properly petitioned for a writ of mandate based on the state level defendants' ministerial duty to monitor the practices of local school districts for violations of federal law. Therefore, the court held that the trial court wrongly sustained the state level defendants' demurrer as to those claims, as well as plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief on the same issues. In a related conclusion, the court held that plaintiffs' complaint had sufficient allegations to demonstrate associational standing for one of the community organizations to pursue these claims against the state level defendants. View "Collins v. Thurmond" on Justia Law

K.P. appealed from a judgment entered following a jury trial on the petition by the public guardian for reappointment as K.P.'s conservator under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPSA). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury as to the definition of "gravely disabled" in CACI No. 4000. Furthermore, even if the trial court had committed error in its instructions to the jury, any error would be harmless as a matter of law in this case because the evidence was overwhelming that K.P. was unwilling or unable to accept treatment. View "Conservatorship of K.P." on Justia Law

Taeb’s attorney, Trigger, failed to appear for trial in Taeb’s dissolution case. The court entered a Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 sanctions order. The court of appeal reversed as to Taeb and affirmed as to Trigger, abrogating a 2016 holding that an objective standard applied when determining whether a party’s or an attorney’s conduct is sanctionable under section 128.5, as it did under section 128.7 and that section 128.5 did not incorporate the safe harbor provisions of section 128.7. Section 128.5 has since been amended to specifically overrule the decision on those points. The law concerning the kind of conduct sanctionable under sections 128.5 and 128.7 has largely returned to its previous state; a more stringent standard requiring subjective bad faith applies to section 128.5, and a lesser standard, requiring only objective bad faith, applies to section 128.7. The conduct for which Trigger was sanctioned can support the requisite finding of bad faith. Taab, however, did appear on the scheduled trial date and only relayed what Trigger told him. There is no evidence Taab was even aware Trigger had misrepresented her readiness for trial or that she made no effort to correct what she had told the court. View "In re: Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb" on Justia Law

After prison officials found Rigsby guilty of possessing contraband, they imposed disciplinary actions which resulted in a 30-day loss of inmate privileges and early release credits. The superior court granted Rigsby habeas corpus relief and the Warden appealed.The Court of Appeal reversed the order granting habeas relief and held that the superior court's analysis conflicted with In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1498. In this case, Rigsby and another inmate jointly occupied a prison cell that was six feet by eleven feet in size; during a search of the cell, prison officials discovered a prohibited item located in a common area accessible to both men; and these facts were not materially distinguishable from those in Zepeda and thus permit an inference that Rigsby was in possession of the contraband. View "In re Rigsby" on Justia Law

After S.M was adjudicated a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) and committed for treatment to the Department of State Hospitals, he appealed from an order that he be involuntarily administered antipsychotic medication by the Department. The involuntary medication order is due to expire, and is a renewal of a prior order that expired in 2018, which the court affirmed.The Court of Appeal held that the Department had standing to petition to renew the involuntary medication order; even if the trial court abused its discretion by denying S.M.'s motion to represent himself, it was not reasonably probable that he would have received a better result had he been allowed to represent himself; S.M. waived his discovery objection and, because he did not accept the trial court's offer to grant a continuance, he could not establish prejudice; and, even if the trial court did erred by admitting the opinion of a non-testifying psychiatrist, the error was not prejudicial. View "People ex rel. California Department of State Hospitals v. S.M." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from Janice Dickinson's public allegations that William Cosby drugged and raped her in 1982. On remand, Cosby filed a second anti-SLAPP motion seeking to strike claims newly asserted in Dickinson's first amended complaint, and the trial court granted the motion in part, refusing to strike Dickinson's claims premised on two allegedly defamatory statements appearing in press releases issued by Cosby's attorney.The Court of Appeal declined to consider Cosby's arguments related to the November 18 demand letter and November 19 press release, because this court previously determined that issue in Dickinson's favor and Cosby was improperly seeking a second bite at the apple by challenging those claims in his latest anti-SLAPP motion. The court also held that the trial court properly denied Cosby's anti-SLAPP motion, because there was sufficient evidence showing Cosby was directly liable for the alleged defamatory statements contained in the November 20 and 21 press releases; Dickinson produced sufficient evidence showing the November 20 and 21 press release were of and concerning her; and Dickinson produced sufficient evidence showing the November 20 and 21 press releases contained actionable assertions of fact. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dickinson v. Cosby" on Justia Law

In 1999, Bontilao was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced by the Santa Clara County Superior Court to 15 years to life in prison. In 2018, Bontilao filed a habeas corpus petition, challenging a 2017 decision by the Board of Parole Hearings denying him parole, Bontilao sent a letter, requesting the identity of the judge assigned to adjudicate his habeas petition. The court notified Bontilao that the petition had been assigned to Judge Weinstein but later notified Bontilao that Judge Weinstein was unavailable, and the matter was reassigned to Judge Zecher “for all purposes.” The order was mailed to Bontilao on June 29, 2018. The court extended the time for the order on Bontilao’s petition. Bontilao received the order on July 3. On July 23, Bontilao delivered for mailing a challenge against Judge Zecher under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. On August 16, Judge Zecher struck the challenge as untimely under the all-purpose assignment rule. Bontilao's mandamus petition was summarily denied. The California Supreme Court transferred the matter back. The court of appeal issued an order to show cause, appointed counsel for Bontilao, provided the Board the opportunity to file a return, and gave Bontilao the opportunity to file a reply. The court of appeal then concluded that the order naming the assigned judged constituted an all-purpose assignment under section 170(a)(2) and that Bontilao’s challenge was not timely. View "Bontilao v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of a petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside plaintiff's expulsion from Occidental College after an outside adjudicator found he had sexually assaulted and engaged in non-consensual sexual contact with another student. The court held that there was no violation of the school policy's notice requirements; there was no procedural unfairness where plaintiff was not prejudice when the policy's 60 day guideline for hearings was exceeded, he had access to all of the evidence against him, and he forfeited his contention that the adjudicator was biased; and there was no abuse of discretion in finding that plaintiff violated the policy by having nonconsensual sexual contact with the student View "Doe v. Occidental College" on Justia Law