Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

T-Mobile USA, Inc. (T-Mobile) appeals a judgment entered on a $5 million jury verdict in favor of former employee Stephen Colucci in a workplace retaliation case. T-Mobile primarily challenged the punitive damages award, arguing insufficient evidence was presented at trial that a T-Mobile agent engaged in retaliatory conduct, or that the agent's actions were malicious or oppressive. Alternatively, T-Mobile argued the $4 million punitive damages award was constitutionally excessive. Stephen Colucci worked for T-Mobile from 2007 until 2014 as the manager of a store in Ontario, California. A series of incidents ranging from a medical accommodation request, defamatory comments made by co-workers, and an allegation that Colucci was running a side business while on duty for his T-Mobile store. On day, complaining of back pain, Colucci was permitted to leave work for the day; while away, Robson recommended to HR that T-Mobile terminate Colucci for "cause" (conflict of interest), notwithstanding no loss prevention investigator interviewed Colucci or any co-workers about Colucci's alleged side-dealings while on T-Mobile time. In making this decision, Robson admittedly bypassed T-Mobile's progressive discipline policy, which might have included a warning or less severe consequence before resorting to termination. Information about the alleged conflict of interest had come almost entirely from the associate; at no point did anyone speak to Colucci about a purported conflict. Unaware of any pending termination, Colucci submitted a formal request to HR for a medical leave of absence. Colucci also lodged a second complaint to T-Mobile's integrity line, reporting that Robson was discriminating against him and neglecting to resolve the defamation incident. Undeterred, Robson proceeded with processing Colucci's termination. Ultimately, a jury returned a unanimous verdict in Colucci's favor on his claim of retaliation, awarding $1,020,042 in total compensatory damages for past and future economic losses, and past and future noneconomic damages and/or emotional distress. After review, the Court of Appeal reduced the punitive damages award to an amount one and one-half times the amount of compensatory damages, but otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against The Regents for gender discrimination based on a series of events that took place while she was a Professor of Medicine at UCLA. The jury found in favor of plaintiff, awarding her economic and noneconomic damages.The Court of Appeal reversed and held that the trial court committed a series of grave errors that significantly prejudiced The Regents' right to a fair trial by an impartial judge. In this case, the trial court delivered a presentation to the jury highlighting major figures in the civil rights movement, and told the jury their duty was to stand in the shoes of Dr. Martin Luther King and bend the arc of the moral universe toward justice; the trial court allowed the jury to hear about and view a long list of discrimination complaints from across the entire University of California system that were not properly connected to plaintiff's circumstances or her theory of the case; the trial court allowed the jury to learn of the contents and conclusions of the Moreno Report, which documented racial discrimination occurring throughout the entire UCLA campus; and the trial court allowed plaintiff to resurrect a retaliation claim after the close of evidence despite having summarily adjudicated that very claim prior to trial. The court held that these errors were cumulative and highly prejudicial, and were evidence of the trial court's inability to remain impartial, creating the impression that the trial court was partial to plaintiff's claims. View "Pinter-Brown v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

In 1993, Shelton was sentenced to a prison term of 19 years to life after pleading no contest to the second-degree murder of his mother-in-law and assault with a firearm on her sister-in-law. Shelton had no prior criminal history. Parole hearings in 2016 and 2018, were his fifth and sixth. Shelton’s “Comprehensive Risk Assessment,” from 2016, concluded he presented a low risk of violence. The psychologist who evaluated Shelton noted “confusion and memory loss secondary to multiple traumatic brain injuries” Shelton had suffered in the military. Shelton, 64 years old in 2019, was permanently mobility impaired and blind/vision impaired. Shelton filed a habeas corpus petition. TIn November 2019, Shelton was again denied parole.The court of appeal ordered a new hearing for consideration of all of the relevant factors. The record suggests Shelton’s cognitive condition will never allow him to demonstrate the kind of insight into his crimes that the panels have been demanding. According to the doctor, Shelton’s neurocognitive disorder was a significant contributing factor in his commission of the offense and “it is unlikely that his disorder will ever allow him to give a coherent narrative about his motivations at the time of the crime.” That lack of insight had not led to violent outcomes in prison. The panel also failed to adequately consider Shelton’s elderly status and the magnitude of his disabilities. View "In re Shelton" on Justia Law

In 1997, Frederic Sannmann pleaded guilty to felony robbery which rendered him ineligible to own firearms. In 2003, he successfully moved to set aside his conviction for most purposes: by statute, this relief did not restore Sannmann's right to own firearms. In 2011, Sannmann successfully moved, with the prosecutor's concurrence, to set aside the earlier set-aside order, to withdraw his 1997 felony guilty plea, and to instead plead guilty to misdemeanor theft nunc pro tunc to the date of his original plea. Sannmann immediately notified the California Department of Justice (DOJ) of these changes and the DOJ eventually updated its records accordingly. However, six years later, when Sannmann tried to buy a shotgun from a gun store, the DOJ blocked the purchase based on Sannmann's original 1997 felony conviction. Sannmann filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking an order directing the DOJ to release any holds on his ability to purchase firearms based on the 1997 felony conviction. The trial court believed it lacked the authority to determine the validity of the 2011 set-aside order entered by another superior court judge. Thus, finding Sannmann's record in the criminal case disclosed only a misdemeanor conviction (by virtue of the 2011 set-aside order), the court entered judgment for Sannmann and ordered the DOJ to release its hold on Sannmann's purchase. On appeal, the DOJ contended the trial court erred by awarding mandamus relief based on the 2011 set-aside order because the 2011 order was an unauthorized act in excess of the superior court's jurisdiction. The DOJ did not otherwise seek to invalidate the 2011 set-aside order. On the narrow issue before it, the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred by granting mandamus relief based on the 2011 set-aside order and reversed the judgment. View "Sannmann v. Dept. of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Ducksworth and Pollock filed suit alleging claims of race discrimination, and Pollock also alleged a sexual harassment claim.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for Scotts and Pacific, holding that the staffing agencies were not involved in Tri-Modal's decisionmaking about whom to promote. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Tri-Modal's executive vice president, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Pollock's hearsay objection to a declaration. The court also held that the trial court correctly concluded that Government Code section 12960, former subdivision (d) bars Pollock's claims because she did not file her administrative complaint within one year of March 2017, the time that those claims accrued. View "Ducksworth v. Tri-Modal Distribution Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Lunada Bay Boys, alleging that defendants, sometimes with the tacit approval of city officials who did nothing to stop them, engaged in what is known as "localism" – a practice of keeping outsiders away from the surf site through threats and violence.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant Thiel and Mowat's anti-SLAPP motions, holding that defendants failed to establish that the cause of action arose from protected activity. In this case, the causes of action against Thiel and Mowat are pursued on a theory of conspiracy – conspiracy being a doctrine of liability and not a cause of action itself. The court focused on the tortious acts in which defendants are alleged to have conspired – the harassment of non-locals, the trail-obstructing, the rock-throwing, the running over with surfboards, the punching, the theft, the vandalism, the sexual harassment, the threats, and the intimidation. The court concluded that none of the actions are protected speech or petitioning activity. View "Spencer v. Mowat" on Justia Law

The City of Redondo Beach challenged the Voter Participation Rights Act (VPRA) on the ground it improperly infringed the plenary authority conferred on charter cities by article XI, section 5, of the California Constitution to schedule their own elections for local offices. The superior court upheld the City's challenge, issued a writ of mandate barring the Secretary of State from enforcing the VPRA against the City, and declared it unconstitutional as applied to charter cities.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment to the extent it restrains the Secretary from enforcing the VPRA against the City on the ground that the Legislature failed to clearly provide the VPRA applies to charter cities. The court explained that courts have usually insisted on statutory language clearly including charter cities before engaging in the CalFed/Vista constitutional analysis, and legislative history of the VPRA does not indicate a clear intention to include charter cities. View "City of Redondo Beach v. Padilla" on Justia Law

Petitioner Christynne Lili Wrene Wood contacted the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) to report alleged gender discrimination by her Crunch fitness club, which was owned and operated by CFG Jamacha, LLC and John Romeo (collectively, Crunch). After an investigation, DFEH filed a lawsuit against Crunch alleging unlawful discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression (Wood intervened as a plaintiff in the lawsuit). During discovery, Crunch requested that Wood produce all communications with DFEH relating to Crunch. As relevant here, Wood refused to produce one such communication, a prelitigation email she sent to DFEH lawyers regarding her DFEH complaint, on the grounds of attorney-client privilege. Crunch moved to compel production of the email, and the trial court granted the motion. Wood petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate, arguing the trial court erred by overruling her objection based on the attorney-client privilege and compelling production of the email. The Court summarily denied the petition. The California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter back to the appellate court with directions "to vacate [our] order denying mandate and to issue an order directing the superior court to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted." The Court of Appeal issued the order to show cause as directed, and these proceedings followed. After further review, the Court concluded Wood did not show the attorney-client privilege applied to the email at issue. "DFEH lawyers have an attorney-client relationship with the State of California. Wood has not shown DFEH lawyers formed an attorney-client relationship with her. As such, any communications between Wood and DFEH lawyers were not made in the course of an attorney-client relationship and were not privileged." Therefore, the petition for mandamus relief was denied. View "Wood v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Surveillance video from a neighbor’s house showed two individuals walking from a truck to a burglarized house and then walking away, carrying sacks. Deputy Willett contacted Delrio and told him that a vehicle registered to him had been involved in a burglary. Delrio completed paperwork to report the vehicle stolen. Willett viewed the video and concluded that one of the individuals resembled Delrio, who was on parole. Sergeant Acosta went to Delrio’s house to conduct a parole search; officers located Delrio's cell phone. Acosta believed Delrio’s parole obligations required him to surrender his password; he stated, “you’re on parole. I need the passcode,” Delrio complied. A detective downloaded the contents of the phone before returning it. Minutes after the officers left his house, Delrio called and asked Acosta to return to the house, where Delrio showed Acosta a photograph from his cell phone in which Delrio was holding $100 bills and said the money was the proceeds from selling the stolen jewelry. Delrio told Acosta about his involvement in the burglary. Delrio unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence. The court of appeal affirmed. Any expectation of privacy he may have had did not outweigh the government’s interest in conducting the search because the officers had specific reasons to suspect he was involved in a residential burglary. View "People v. Delrio" on Justia Law

E.B. has been diagnosed with schizophrenia. The Contra Costa County public guardian sought the appointment of a conservator. The court denied E.B.’s objection to compelled testimony. At a trial, E.B. was called as one of three witnesses. He appealed from an order appointing the Public Guardian as his conservator and determining that his current placement in a mental health rehabilitation facility was the least restrictive and most appropriate placement. (Welf. & Inst. Code 5350, 5358(c)(1)). E.B. argued that he had a right to refuse to testify under the equal protection clause, because that right has been statutorily granted in proceedings to extend the commitment of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, and he is entitled to the same protection.The court of appeal affirmed. LPS conservatees are similarly situated with NGI’s and with individuals subject to other involuntary civil commitments for purposes of the right against compelled testimony but the error was harmless. Even if the jurors had not observed E.B.’s demeanor on the stand, they would have known his diagnosis; that he was on three medications for his mental illness, one of which required white blood cell count monitoring; that he had been recently hospitalized for his mental illness; that when living on his own he had engaged in aberrant behavior; and that he resisted treatment and had limited insight into his mental health condition. View "Conservatorship of E.B." on Justia Law