Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Epstein, an optometrist, entered into a VSP “Network Doctor Agreement.” VSP audited of Epstein’s claims for reimbursement, concluded he was knowingly purchasing lenses from an unapproved supplier, and terminated the provider agreement. The agreement included a two-step dispute resolution procedure: the “Fair Hearing” step provided for an internal “VSP Peer Review.” If the dispute remained unresolved, the agreement required binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), under procedures set forth in the policy. A “Fair Hearing” panel upheld the termination.Instead of invoking the arbitration provision, Epstein filed an administrative mandamus proceeding, alleging the second step of the process was contrary to California law requiring certain network provider contracts to include a procedure for prompt resolution of disputes and expressly stating arbitration “shall not be deemed” such a mechanism. (28 Cal. Code Regs 1300.71.38.) He claimed that state law was not preempted by the FAA, citing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which generally exempts from federal law, state laws enacted to regulate the business of insurance.The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of those challenges. State regulatory law requiring certain network provider agreements to include a dispute resolution process that is not arbitration pertains only to the first step of the dispute resolution process and does not foreclose the parties from agreeing to arbitration in lieu of subsequent judicial review. While the arbitration provision is procedurally unconscionable in minor respects, Epstein failed to establish that it is substantively unconscionable. View "Epstein v. Vision Service Plan" on Justia Law

In 2014, a single Riverside County, California Superior Court judge signed 602 orders authorizing wiretaps, which was approximately 17 percent of all wiretaps authorized by all the state and federal courts in the nation. In 2015, the same judge and one other authorized 640 wiretaps, approximately 15 percent of all wiretaps in the country. Plaintiff-appellant Miguel Guerrero was targeted by a wiretap that a Riverside County judge authorized in 2015. Guerrero, who had never been arrested or charged with a crime in connection with the wiretap, wanted to know why he was targeted, and he believed the sheer number of wiretaps in those years raised significant doubts about whether the wiretaps complied with constitutional requirements. Relying on California's wiretap statutes and the First Amendment, he asked a trial court to allow him to inspect the wiretap order, application and intercepted communications. The trial court denied this request. After review, the Court of Appeal determined the trial court applied the wrong standard in considering Plaintiff's application under wiretap statutes, which closely paralleled statutes under federal law. The matter was remanded so that the trial court could properly exercise its discretion, and the Court provided guidance on the appropriate standard. Given this holding on the statutory issue, the Court declined to address the contention, advanced by Guerrero and an amicus brief, that the public had a First Amendment right of access to the wiretap materials. View "Guerrero v. Hestrin" on Justia Law

Von Staich is incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison, based on 1986 second-degree murder and attempted murder convictions. In May 2020, he sought habeas corpus relief, citing the COVID-19 pandemic. Shortly thereafter, San Quentin suffered a COVID-19 outbreak that infected approximately 75 percent of the inmate population and dozens of prison staff in just weeks. Von Staich is 64 years old and suffers respiratory problems resulting from bullet fragments lodged in his lung; he claimed that he and a 65-year-old cellmate, both of whom had tested positive for COVID-19 (Van Staich was asymptomatic), were in an extremely small open cell and that there is no opportunity for social distancing.The court directed the Warden to transfer Von Staich to a suitable quarantine location, finding that the Warden and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) have acted with deliberate indifference. There is ongoing federal litigation concerning inadequate medical care due to severe overcrowding in the California correctional system and San Quentin has particular risk factors, caused by the age and architecture of the facility. The court acknowledged that the existing Eighth Amendment violation will continue until the population at San Quentin can be reduced to the 50 percent level. Unless CDCR’s existing expedited release programs are sufficient to promptly achieve this population reduction—which, the sheer numbers indicate they cannot be—CDCR will have to find additional means of releasing or transferring prisoners out of San Quentin. View "In re Von Staich" on Justia Law

McDowell and Hutchison planned and executed a burglary and an attempted armed robbery of a drug dealer. Hutchison shot and killed the drug dealer. McDowell was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole after a jury convicted him of first-degree murder and found true robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances. McDowell filed a habeas corpus petition, challenging the special circumstance findings. The California Supreme Court returned the case to the court of appeal with directions to reconsider the case in light of its 2020 Scoggins opinion.The court of appeal again concluded that the special circumstance findings are adequately supported. Under the first-degree felony-murder rule, a defendant who aided and abetted the underlying felony but was not the actual killer may only be subject to life imprisonment without parole if the prosecution proves special circumstances: either the defendant intended to kill or aided and abetted the commission of a specified felony “with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant.” McDowell helped plan the robbery, knocked on the door, and entered first, brandishing a knife to facilitate Hutchison’s entrance. McDowell’s decision to arm himself should be viewed in combination with the particularly risky crime that he planned —a home invasion robbery of a methamphetamine dealer. The potential for violence was obvious. McDowell had an opportunity to restrain Hutchison, or otherwise intervene, either when he entered the house and realized they would be outnumbered or after Hutchison fired a warning shot. View "In re McDowell" on Justia Law

In 1993, Butler was convicted of raping two women and assault with intent to commit rape of a juvenile and sentenced to 18 years in prison. In 2006, before his release, the District Attorney filed a petition to commit Butler under the Sexually Violent Predators (SVP) Act, Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600. Despite Butler's numerous demands for a trial and explicit direction to the Public Defender’s office that it was not authorized to waive time, no trial was held. Butler was confined to a state hospital for 13 years awaiting trial on his SVP petition; more than 50 continuances were granted without objection or a finding of good cause.In 2019, Butler’s appointed private counsel filed a habeas corpus petition. The court found that Butler’s due process right to a timely trial had been violated and that the public defender, district attorney, and trial court all bore some responsibility for this “extraordinary” delay. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the district attorney’s argument that she had no affirmative obligation to bring a person to trial on an SVP petition. Because involuntary civil confinement involves a substantial deprivation of liberty, an alleged SVP defendant is entitled to a trial at a meaningful time. The ultimate responsibility for bringing an accused SVP detainee to trial rests with the state. Here, the blame for the delay is shared between the district attorney’s office, the public defender’s office, and the court. View "In re Butler" on Justia Law

In 1990, Johnson, who is schizophrenic, was convicted of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. He served nine years in prison before being paroled as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). In 2000, he was civilly committed to Napa State Hospital under the MDO Act. He was twice released as an outpatient (2004-2008, and 2008-2014) but was returned to the hospital each time after he went absent without leave. Following several commitment extensions, in 2019, the trial court ordered Johnson’s MDO commitment extended for one year. Johnson was 69 years old.The court of appeal reversed, finding that the order was not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court’s only rationale for finding “that by reason of [his] severe mental health disorder, [Johnson] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others,” was that “it does appear that the evidence shows that a high probability of decompression [sic] will occur which could result in a serious threat of substantial physical harm to others, harm to himself, and because of misperceptions and decompensation, he can be a substantial danger, and that he does not voluntarily follow his treatment plan.” The sole evidence of dangerousness was from decades earlier, with only friendly and nonconfrontational behavior ever since, even while Johnson was AWOL, off of his medications, and decompensating. View "People v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss a petition to have him civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA), because he was deprived of his due process right to a speedy trial.Applying the four factors in the Barker analysis, the court held that neither the length of the delay, the assertion of the right, the reasons for the delay, or prejudice is a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, the court held that they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant. In this case, the trial court engaged in that balancing process and concluded that the state had failed defendant. Whether the court reviewed this determination under the abuse of discretion standard or, as the People assert, under a de novo standard, the court found no error based on the analysis. The court also held that, under the Mathews analysis, defendant's right to be free from government restraint without due process of law has been violated. The court rejected the People's cursory contention that the case should be ordered to trial and held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition. View "People v. DeCasas" on Justia Law

Herman regularly attends Los Angeles and Pasadena city meetings and has been removed more than 100 times. Herman At a public hearing on April 17, 2019, Herman said, “Fuck" Los Angeles Deputy City Attorney Fauble and gave Fauble’s address. At an April 29 meeting, Herman, in a threatening manner, again disclosed Fauble’s Pasadena address. Herman also submitted speaker cards; one had a swastika drawn on it, another had a drawing of a Ku Klux Klan hood with figures that were either an “SS” or lightning bolts above Fauble’s name. On May 1, Herman attended another meeting and stated, “I’m going back to Pasadena and fuck with you.”The city sought a workplace violence restraining order under Code of Civil Procedure 527.8, precluding Herman from harassing, threatening, contacting, or stalking Fauble or disclosing his address, and requiring Herman to stay at least 10 yards away from Fauble while attending meetings. At a hearing, Herman explained that he made the statements because he was upset about a change in the council rules and with his own homelessness. He denied intending to threaten Fauble. The court of appeal affirmed the entry of a restraining order, rejecting a First Amendment challenge. There was substantial evidence that Herman’s threatening conduct was reasonably likely to recur and that Herman’s statements would have placed a reasonable person in fear for his safety, regardless of Herman’s subjective intent. The credible threats of violence were not constitutionally protected. View "City of Los Angeles v. Herman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Cheryl Thurston and Luis Licea (collectively Thurston) were California residents who purchased items from defendant Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC (Fairfield), a Georgia limited liability company, through the company's website. Thurston alleged Fairfield’s website was not fully accessible by the blind and the visually impaired, in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The trial court granted Fairfield’s motion to quash service of summons, ruling that California could not obtain personal jurisdiction over Fairfield, because Fairfield did not have sufficient minimum contacts with California. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the evidence showed that Fairfield made some eight to ten percent of its sales to Californians. "Hence, its website is the equivalent of a physical store in California. Moreover, this case arises out of the operation of that website." The trial court therefore could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Fairfield. View "Thurston v. Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC" on Justia Law

Cornejo died of a methamphetamine overdose at Highland Hospital after being arrested by California Highway Patrol officers during a traffic stop and observed to put in his mouth and swallow something that he insisted was gum, not drugs. Cornejo declined repeated offers of medical attention and no symptoms of drug intoxication were observed until after he was transferred to the custody of deputies at the jail.A jury ruled in favor of Cornejo’s parents in a suit for wrongful death predicated on the negligence of the officers who took Cornejo to jail rather than to the hospital, under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 52.1). The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting the defendants’ arguments that the officers had no duty to obtain a medical examination for Cornejo under the circumstances; that they fulfilled the scope of any duty they may have had by taking him to jail with on-site medical staff; that their failure to take him to the hospital was not a proximate cause of his death; and that the trial court erred in ruling the jury could not consider Cornejo’s intentional act of swallowing the methamphetamine in allocating comparative fault and in denying defendants’ motion to exclude evidence that the officers attempted to coerce an admission to possession of a controlled substance by conditioning medical treatment on Cornejo’s admitting he swallowed a controlled substance. View "Frausto v. Department of the California Highway Patrol" on Justia Law