Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a federal district court granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus triggering plaintiff's release from prison, he filed a claim with the Board, seeking compensation as a wrongfully convicted person. The Board denied the claim and plaintiff sought mandamus relief in the trial court, which upheld the board's determination.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court should have granted the mandamus petition because the federal court's Schlup finding and the later grant of habeas relief that resulted in plaintiff's release from prison without retrial by the state amount to a finding of factual innocence that the Legislature intended to be binding, and to preclude holding a Board hearing. In determining otherwise, the court concluded that the Board did not accord the Schlup finding the significance it deserves and the Board construed Penal Code section 1485.55, subdivision (a) in a manner that undermines the Legislature's intent and effectively renders the statutory provision inoperative in practice. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a new judgment reversing the Board's order denying plaintiff's compensation claim and directing the Board to recommend, pursuant to section 4904, that an appropriation be made and petitioner's claim paid. View "Larsen v. California Victim Compensation Board" on Justia Law

A Milpitas Fire Department captain responded to Nunes’s house one afternoon based on a report of a “whole structure fire.” He saw no fire and no smoke. Neighbors standing outside stated they had recently seen smoke coming from the backyard. A police officer “pounded” on the house’s door. No one answered. The fire captain opened a gate and entered the backyard, where he smelled smoke in the air. He found no active fire but saw test tubes, chemistry equipment, and a homemade toy rocket that looked burned on the ground. The captain noticed a closed shed. No smoke was coming from it, nor did the smell of smoke seem to originate there. He opened the shed “to make sure everything is clear,” and saw a metal cabinet. The captain admitted there was nothing specific about the cabinet that made him think he should look inside: He opened the cabinet, saw unfamiliar bottled chemicals, and called the hazardous materials team.The police ultimately obtained a search warrant, based in part on those chemicals. After the search warrant was executed, Nunes was charged with numerous offenses for possessing explosives and explosive materials. Denying Nunes's motion to suppress evidence, the trial court concluded that the search was valid under the exigent circumstances exception. The court of appeal reversed. Opening the cabinet inside the shed, however prudent and well-intentioned, was not an action necessary to prevent imminent danger. View "People v. Nunes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven adults claiming that they were molested by a priest when they were children, filed suit against the Archdiocese, alleging that it was vicariously liable for ratifying the molestation and directly liable for its own negligence in failing to supervise the priest. The Archdiocese moved to strike the operative complaint under the anti-SLAPP law, Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the Archdiocese's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the gravamen of the suit against the Archdiocese is not speech – it is the molestation and failure to supervise. The court concluded that the Archdiocese mischaracterizes the complaint by arguing that it has established that the child sexual abuse cause of action arises from protected activity because it is based on the Archdiocese's conduct in the Roe litigation and sheriff’s investigation. The court explained that, because the Archdiocese chooses to ignore the bulk of the allegations of the complaint against it, it makes no attempt to argue that these actual allegations are protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law. The court further explained that the focus must be on the alleged acts of sexual abuse and battery that form the basis of the tort cause of action, not the acts of the Archdiocese by which it is alleged to be vicariously liable for those acts. The court concluded that those underlying tortious acts are not protected activity. The court also concluded that a similar analysis defeats the Archdiocese's argument that the negligence cause of action is based on protected speech. Finally, the court concluded that the ruling on demurrer is not before it, and the ruling on the demurrer did not affect, and could not have affected, the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Ratcliff v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting the school district's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint for discrimination and retaliation in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Plaintiff's complaint stemmed from his removal from his school and placement on reassignment due to an unspecified allegation of misconduct. Plaintiff remained on paid suspension for more than three years, during which time he was told to stay home and not allowed to teach or pursue continuing education or professional development.As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that plaintiff's appeal of the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute) order is properly before the court. On the merits, the trial court erred by granting the school district's special motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint does not arise from the school district's protected activity. The court explained that the school district's decisions to place plaintiff on leave and terminate his employment are not protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), even if those decisions were made in conjunction with an official investigation. Furthermore, the school district's participation in, or preparation for, the statutorily defined procedures for dismissal or suspension, without more, does not constitute conduct in furtherance of the school district's own right to petition. View "Verceles v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying Federal's special motion to strike a civil complaint for fraud as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, as well as the trial court's order overruling its evidentiary objections. In the underlying action, plaintiffs filed lawsuits against Moldex, alleging Moldex manufactured defective air respirators and masks that failed to protect them. This litigation ensued between Truck, Federal, and First State over coverage and the extent to which Truck was obligated to reimburse Federal and First State for payments made for Moldex's defense and indemnity, plus interest. Federal argued that Truck's complaint for fraud is based on Federal's "acts in furtherance of its right to petition" and are thus protected speech pursuant to section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on Federal's evidentiary objections and concluded that the first amended complaint is not relevant to the court's review of the anti-SLAPP motion. The court also affirmed Federal's special motion to strike Truck's complaint for fraud, concluding that Federal met its burden of showing that Truck's complaint for fraud arises from Federal's protected activity, and that the trial court correctly found that Truck met its burden to establish a probability of success on the merits of its fraud cause of action.In this case, a factfinder considering all the circumstances could reasonably conclude that when Truck signed the July 2013 settlement agreeing to pay nearly $5 million to Federal and to dismiss its pending appeal of the February 2013 judgment, it did so in reasonable reliance on Federal's course of conduct and Federal's stated position that it had a duty to defend Moldex pursuant to its policy. Furthermore, Truck agreed to file a request for dismissal of its pending appeal, with prejudice, when it entered the settlement agreement, which further supports a finding of extrinsic fraud by Federal. Finally, Federal is mistaken in its belief that Truck "released the claim for which it now seeks damages" by signing the July 2013 settlement agreement. View "Truck Insurance Exchange v. Federal Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, Murray was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first-degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. In 2020, Murray unsuccessfully sought a Franklin hearing, contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. The court cited section 3051(h), “people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed when they were at least 18 years of age but no more than ‘25 years of age or younger are not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.” The court of appeal affirmed.Meanwhile, Murray sought habeas corpus relief, asserting an equal protection violation, arguing that section 3051(h) violates his right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders (those under 18 at the time of their offense) a youth offender parole hearing while denying youthful LWOP offenders (those 18-25 years old at the time of their offense) a hearing. The court of appeal denied relief. There is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders; children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. The court joined “others in encouraging the Legislature to revisit where it has drawn the line.” View "In re Murray" on Justia Law

After an employee brought a wage and hour class action against her employer and prior to certification, the parties settled. The employer paid a sum to the employee and she dismissed the class claims without prejudice, with court approval. Then the employer brought a malicious prosecution action against the employee and her counsel. The employee and her counsel each moved to strike the action under the anti-SLAPP law, which the trial court denied on the basis that the employer established a prima facie showing of prevailing on its malicious prosecution cause of action.The Court of Appeal concluded that, because the prior action resolved by settlement, the employer is unable to establish that the action terminated in its favor as a matter of law. The court explained that the class claims are not severable from the individual claims for the purposes of the favorable termination analysis. Furthermore, the entire action terminated by settlement – a termination which was not favorable to the employer as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for determination of one unadjudicated anti-SLAPP issue, and whether the employee and her counsel are entitled to an award of attorney fees. View "Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit in federal court against the City and three police officers for arresting and strip searching her, a federal jury unanimously found that the police acted reasonably and the verdict defeated plaintiff's federal claims. The state law claims were also later dismissed by a United States District Judge. Plaintiff then filed a second lawsuit in state court against the City and the three officers, alleging negligence and other state law claims based on the strip search.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, which barred civil rights plaintiffs who lost in federal court from pursuing equivalent state law claims in a second suit in state court, is controlling in this case. The court explained that, although Hernandez involves a fatal shooting rather than a strip search, the difference between Hernandez and this case is nominal. Therefore, plaintiff cannot sue a second time because her first suit definitively settled her dispute: she lost and cannot now try to prove defendants acted unreasonably. View "Shuler v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality Coast, alleging that the company's decision not to hire him was the result of race and gender discrimination and a violation of the Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act (DJOA). A jury returned a defense verdict on the discrimination claims and the trial court found that plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the DJOA because he was a supervisory employee.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff is a supervisory employee for DJOA purposes; there was no error in giving the modified business judgment rule instruction at trial; and the trial court's costs award is not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Jones v. Quality Coast, Inc." on Justia Law

The 1993 National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 20501(b)(1), requires states to register voters for federal elections, including “by application in person” at designated state offices. Each state must designate all offices that provide public assistance, all offices that provide state-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities, and “other offices. ” Each designated agency must offer certain voter registration services and, in California, must assign an employee to be responsible for the agency’s compliance (Elec. Code, 2406.) California’s Secretary of State coordinates the state’s responsibilities under the Act.The plaintiffs sought additional designations. The Secretary committed to designating as voter registration agencies programs for students with disabilities at community colleges, certain county welfare departments, and the Office of Services to the Blind. The trial court held, and the court of appeal affirmed, that the Secretary had a mandatory duty to designate as voter registration agencies state offices that administer General Assistance or General Relief programs and California Student Aid Commission Financial Aid Programs, as well as all private entities under contract to provide services on behalf of a voter registration agency. The court found that no mandatory designation duty existed as to offices administering the California Department of Education Nutrition Programs, special education offices, and Area Agencies on Aging. View "Senior Disability Action v. Weber" on Justia Law