Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Holiman was found in possession of illegal drugs and a handgun during a traffic stop initiated after he made a right-hand turn at a stop sign, while the arresting officer’s patrol car was stopped directly behind him. Holiman did signal the turn, but the basis for the traffic stop was that he did not turn on his signal blinker early enough: for the 100 feet he drove before coming to a stop. The arresting officer cited him for violation of Vehicle Code section 22108. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence, following which he pled guilty to two felony drug charges.The court of appeal reversed. The warrantless seizure of the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment because the police lacked objectively reasonable suspicion. Holiman’s turn did not violate the Vehicle Code, and no reasonable police officer could think that it did. The statute refers to “the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” The prosecution presented no evidence that the turn could have affected any vehicle, including the officer’s patrol car. View "People v. Holiman" on Justia Law

In 1984, Friend robbed an Oakland bar and fatally stabbed Pierucci. Convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a special circumstance, Friend was sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and denied Friend’s state habeas corpus petition.Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, requires that capital habeas corpus petitions generally be presented to the sentencing court and that a successive habeas corpus petition be dismissed unless the court finds that the petitioner makes a showing of actual innocence or ineligibility for the death penalty. A petitioner may appeal the denial of a successive petition only if the sentencing court or the court of appeal grants a certificate of appealability (COA). The sentencing court denied Friend’s second habeas petition and his request for a COA. The court of appeal denied a COA. The California Supreme Court remanded with directions to analyze whether Friend made a substantial showing that the claims in his second habeas corpus petition are not successive.On remand, the court of appeal again denied relief. Friend essentially acknowledged that all the claims in his second petition were either known or could and should have been discovered earlier and he failed to allege specific facts showing the omission of some claims from the initial petition reflects incompetence of prior habeas counsel. Friend failed to show a substantial claim that he is either actually innocent or ineligible for the death sentence. View "In re Friend" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the predominant relationship between a medical resident and a hospital residency program is an employee-employer relationship, and so the rule of academic deference does not apply to the jury's determination whether the resident was terminated for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons. In this case, plaintiff presented credible evidence of gender discrimination and retaliation by SMMC, and there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the erroneous jury instruction, she would have obtained a more favorable verdict. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Khoiny v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency in response to the global outbreak of COVID-19, On March 16, the San Francisco Health Officer issued a shelter-in-place order. On March 23, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued an emergency statewide order suspending jury trials and continuing them for 60 days, extending by 60 days the speedy trial time period provided for in Penal Code section 1382 for holding a criminal trial. The order was later extended an additional 30 days. In December, in response to the surge in COVID-19 cases, the San Francisco health officer issued another stay-at-home order. After trials resumed, there were backlogs and trials were continued beyond the statutory deadlines. Defendants alleged violations of their speedy trial rightsThe court of appeal declined to order dismissal of their cases. The continuances were supported by good cause. In making a determination of good cause based on reasons of court congestion or backlog, the critical inquiry is whether the congestion or backlog is attributable to chronic conditions as opposed to exceptional circumstances considering all of the relevant circumstances. The District Attorney adequately showed exceptional circumstances connected to the COVID-19 pandemic, not chronic conditions in the court. View "Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit to enjoin a renovation and expansion project under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The Court of Appeal held, in light of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 519, that a disparate impact claim based on a gentrification theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. In the published portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's gentrification-based claims under the FHA and FEHA. View "Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 2019, Lopez was charged with seven felonies, including forcible rape against Amalia, the mother of his minor children. At his September 2020 trial, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Los Angeles Superior Courts were operating under the safety protocols in General Order No. 021, which mandated that all persons entering any courthouse wear a face mask covering the nose and mouth at all times. After a jury trial in which all persons in the courtroom were masked, including witnesses, Lopez was convicted on six charges. The court imposed a 16-year prison sentence and a 10-year protective order prohibiting Lopez from contact with Amalia and both children.The court of appeal rejected Lopez’s argument the court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by denying his pretrial motion to remain unmasked during the trial and to have all witnesses testify without a face mask. Supreme Court precedent establishes the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” The masking procedure fairly balanced Lopez's speedy trial rights with the need to reduce the substantial risk of infection to everyone in the courtroom. The court remanded in part; the minor children were not properly included in the postconviction protective order imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2(i). View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

After seeing Alvarez in their yard on their home security camera, the homeowners called 911. Deputies apprehended Alvarez just as he was at a side door to the house. Taking Alvarez to their patrol car, deputies noticed a large plastic trash bag and asked Alvarez whether the bag was his. Alvarez replied, “Yeah.” Deputies did not provide Alvarez with Miranda warnings before this exchange. Alvarez was convicted of first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code 459).The court of appeal affirmed. By not properly objecting at trial, Alvarez forfeited a “Miranda” argument that the trial court erred in admitting his statement about the bag. The court also rejected Alvarez’s argument that the court’s order during the COVID-19 pandemic that all persons in the courtroom, including testifying witnesses, wear a mask covering the mouth and part of the nose interfered with the jury’s ability to assess witness demeanor and thus violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The masking order satisfied an important public policy and retained essential safeguards of reliability. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

The California Personnel Board (Board) sustained a complaint brought by Vickie Mabry-Height, M.D., against the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) alleging discrimination based on age, race, and gender in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Board concluded that Dr. Mabry-Height established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination based on certain conduct, and the Department failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination by offering evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for this conduct. The Department petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus seeking an order setting aside the Board’s decision. The petition was denied, and judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Mabry-Height. The Department appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

In 2007, Langi was convicted of the second-degree murder of Martinez. Langi was one of four men who beat and robbed a group that included Martinez, who died after someone in Langi’s group punched him, causing him to fall and hit his head. Langi’s Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition was filed before the 2021 amendment, which authorizes resentencing of persons convicted of murder “under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Langi contends that another member of his group threw the fatal punch and that, although the trial court did not give an instruction framed in terms of the natural and probable consequences theory, the instructions were ambiguous and allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder under a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime. The trial court summarily denied his petition, finding that a 2009 opinion affirming his conviction established that he was convicted as the actual killer.The court of appeal reversed. Citing the Supreme Court’s 2021 "Lewis" decision, the court concluded that reliance on the 2009 opinion was improper. The record of conviction does not conclusively eliminate the possibility that the jury found Langi guilty of murder on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime. View "People v. Langi" on Justia Law

The Acting Warden of the California Institute for Men petitioned a Superior Court for authorization to perform electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) on inmate Rudy Terraza. Convicted of first-degree murder at age 17, Terraza was a 44-year-old with a history of mental illness. According to a prison psychiatrist, Terraza has a “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type . . . characterized by auditory hallucinations, delusions, and impairment in thought processing, volition and motivation, and social functioning, as well as significant mood swings, depression, and mania.” Despite medication and psychiatric treatment, his mental health had grown worse over time, and he had resided in a psychiatric hospital since September 2019. He had been “consumed” by voices, with no desire to socialize or “practice self-care.” He occupied a single hospital room and was unable to function in standard prison housing. A psychiatrist averred that ECT was the “gold standard” treatment for patients like Terraza; seizures produced by the treatment would "help the brain return to normal functioning." The trial court authorized ECT after making several findings required by the Penal Code, including that ECT would be beneficial and that there was a compelling justification for it. In this habeas proceeding, the inmate argued the state constitutional right to privacy required the appointment of a surrogate to make a consent determination for him, beyond trial court findings of ECT’s suitability. Upon consideration of precedent, the Court of Appeal concluded the state constitutional right to refuse medical treatment did not require appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a court’s authorization of ECT therapy had to include a consideration of whether the inmate, when he or she was competent, expressed any preferences, views, or beliefs that would operate to preclude consent to the procedure. "By statute, such consideration is required for most medical procedures performed on incarcerated persons lacking capacity to consent." Because the statutory balancing test for ECT did not do so, the Court granted the writ to allow further consideration. View "In re Terraza" on Justia Law