Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A sex offender, who was convicted in the 1980s and had lived a law-abiding life for 37 subsequent years, petitioned the trial court to be removed from California’s registry of sex offenders. The People opposed the petition, arguing that one of the offender’s sex crimes would render him ineligible for removal from the registry if prosecuted today under a statute enacted 21 years after his conviction. The court had to decide whether a petition for removal from the sex offender registry could be denied on the grounds that the offender's underlying sex crime also constitutes a different, later-enacted sex crime that requires lifetime registration. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Two held that the trial court erred in giving controlling weight to the nature of the underlying sex offenses and ignoring the defendant's lack of reoffending over the years. The court's decision was reversed, and the defendant was ruled eligible for removal from the registry. View "People v. Franco" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, James McCray, appealed from a 2022 order that recommitted him for another one-year term under a statutory scheme governing violent offenders with mental health disorders. McCray argued that there was insufficient evidence that he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others due to a severe mental health disorder, that he voluntarily absented himself from his recommitment trial, and that the trial court failed to obtain from him a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, found that McCray's appeal was moot due to his subsequent recommitment in 2023. However, the court decided to address the trial court's failure to engage in a robust enough oral colloquy with McCray to establish that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial. The court concluded that the record is insufficient to support the determination that McCray made a valid waiver of his right to a jury. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal as moot but found that McCray's waiver of his right to a jury trial was not knowing and intelligent. View "People v. McCray" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of August 1, 2018, Gwendolyn Adams and Glenn Tyler Bolden were pursued in a high-speed chase by Michael William Becker, a peace officer employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Becker suspected Adams and Bolden of wrongdoing, although his suspicions were unfounded. The pursuit resulted in a catastrophic accident that caused severe injuries and, ultimately, the death of Adams's son, D'son Woods.Adams and Bolden filed a lawsuit against the CDCR, alleging negligence causing wrongful death, assault and battery, and violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. The CDCR sought summary judgment, arguing that Becker was not acting within the scope of his employment during the pursuit. The trial court agreed and entered judgment in favor of CDCR.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fourth Appellate District Division Three reversed and remanded the case. The appellate court found that whether Becker was acting within the scope of his employment when he pursued Adams and Bolden was a question of fact that should be decided by a jury. The court noted that Becker’s actions may have been influenced by his role as a peace officer, and it was not clear whether he was acting as a private citizen or a law enforcement officer during the pursuit. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the CDCR. View "Adams v. Dept of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

In the case from the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Five, the defendant, who was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances and an enhancement for personally and intentionally discharging a firearm causing great bodily injury or death, appealed his conviction on the grounds that his trial counsel exhibited racial bias towards him in violation of the California Racial Justice Act of 2020. He argued that his counsel's advice to testify in his natural linguistic style, which included the use of slang terms and a certain accent, displayed racial bias or animus. The court disagreed, ruling that advising a defendant to testify in an authentic and genuine manner did not indicate racial bias or animus and did not violate the Racial Justice Act. The defendant also argued that the trial court erred in imposing two sentence enhancements and a parole revocation restitution fine. The court agreed that the parole revocation restitution fine should be stricken, as the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. The judgment was thus modified to remove the parole revocation restitution fine, but otherwise affirmed. View "People v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In the case brought before the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, the petitioners, First Amendment Coalition and KQED Inc., sought public access to certain records in the possession of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice, relating to peace officers and custodial officers. The records primarily pertained to instances of use of force, discharge of firearms, and sustained findings of dishonesty or sexual assault by an officer, which were considered nonconfidential under section 832.7(b) of the Penal Code.However, the Department withheld certain records citing exemptions under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) due to other state laws prohibiting their disclosure. The petitioners filed a motion for judgment compelling disclosure of these withheld documents but were denied by the trial court.The court, applying rules of statutory construction, concluded that section 832.7(b) of the Penal Code supersedes state law disclosure exemptions that conflict with its decree that records within its scope are not confidential and shall be made available to the public. As such, the court ordered a directive for the respondent court to vacate its judgment to the extent it denies the petitioners’ motion for judgment based on Government Code section 11183, which prohibits the disclosure of subpoenaed records. In all other respects, the petition for writ of mandate was denied. View "First Amendment Coalition v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The court case in question involves James McCray, a violent offender with mental health disorders (OMHD), who has been committed to the State Department of State Hospitals (DSH) since 2005. McCray appealed a 2022 order recommitting him for another one-year term, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove he represented a substantial danger to others due to his severe mental health disorder, that he voluntarily absented himself from his recommitment trial, and that the trial court did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury from him before the trial.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District Division Four dismissed McCray's appeal as moot since the recommitment order he appealed from had expired and he had been recommitted for another year. However, the court addressed his claim that the trial court failed to ensure he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial, given its recurring importance.Upon review, the court found that the trial court relied entirely on McCray's counsel's brief questioning about his understanding of the right to a jury trial and did not take any steps to ensure McCray fully understood the significance of a jury trial and the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial. The court concluded that McCray did not make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to a jury trial, and highlighted the importance of the court directly informing an OMHD defendant about the right being waived to ensure a meaningful record of the defendant's understanding of a jury waiver. View "P. v. McCray" on Justia Law

In a dispute between Christopher Leahy and Jeffrey Peterson, the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California, reversed and remanded a lower court's decision to renew a civil harassment restraining order for a second five-year period without requiring a demonstration of new harassment. Leahy, a police detective, had obtained the original restraining order against Peterson in 2014, followed by a five-year renewal in 2017, based on Peterson's stalking and harassment. In 2022, Leahy requested another five-year renewal, which was granted by the Superior Court of San Diego County.The court of appeal held that the lower court erred in its interpretation of section 527.6, subdivision (j)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which allows for renewal of a civil harassment restraining order “without a showing of any further harassment since the issuance of the original order.” This provision, according to the court of appeal, does not authorize a second five-year renewal without a showing of new harassment. The court also clarified that constitutionally protected activity, such as filing a lawsuit, cannot constitute harassment under section 527.6. The case was remanded to the lower court to reconsider the renewal petition under the proper standard. View "Leahy v. Peterson" on Justia Law

This case concerns John HR Doe and other Doe plaintiffs, who alleged that William Babcock, a counselor at an elementary school in the Marysville Joint Unified School District, committed sexual misconduct causing them injury and damages. The Doe plaintiffs filed three separate lawsuits against the School District. The first two, filed in state court, were voluntarily dismissed. The third, filed in federal court, also alleged violations of federal law. The School District moved to dismiss the federal court action, claiming immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for most of the claims. The Doe Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their federal court action and filed a third state court action.The School District demurred to the third state court complaint, arguing res judicata based on the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the second action in federal court. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint, ruling that the dismissal of the federal court action constituted res judicata. On appeal, the Doe plaintiffs contended that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims on the merits because the School District argued Eleventh Amendment immunity. They also argued that California state law controls, under which a second voluntary dismissal does not constitute res judicata.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the federal court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims because it had jurisdiction over the federal law claims, with supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Moreover, the court held that res judicata applied because federal law determines the claim-preclusive effect of a federal court judgment in a federal question case, and under federal law, a second voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that California law should control, stating that states must accord federal court judgments the effect that federal law prescribes. As such, the Doe plaintiffs' third state court action was barred by res judicata due to their second voluntary dismissal in federal court. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Trammel was sentenced to 12 years in prison: the upper term of eight years for kidnapping, a consecutive 16 months for burglary, a consecutive eight months for making criminal threats, and a consecutive two years for a June 2017 domestic violence conviction (one year for the conviction plus a year on an attached arming enhancement). The court imposed concurrent three-year terms for two remaining domestic violence convictions and concurrent time-served sentences for misdemeanors.The court of appeal concluded that the court erred by imposing separate punishment for both domestic violence and simple assault, based on the same incident. The trial court conducted a full resentencing, noting that new sentencing laws (effective January 2022) applied. The court reviewed a mitigation assessment and resentenced Trammel to 12 years and four months–eight years for kidnapping; a consecutive 16 months for burglary; a consecutive two years for a 2017 domestic violence conviction–one year for the conviction plus a year on the attached arming enhancement; and consecutive one-year terms on the remaining domestic violence counts. The court stayed the punishment for criminal threats and misdemeanors. The court found that the lower term or middle term would be inappropriate because Trammel showed no remorse.The court of appeal again remanded. The imposition of a longer sentence on remand violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy. The court rejected Trammel’s request for another full resentencing hearing before a different judge, finding no showing of vindictiveness. View "People v. Trammel" on Justia Law

Relying on New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. __ (2022), individuals charged in California with unlawfully possessing a handgun have contended that their charges and resulting convictions were unconstitutional. They argued, unsuccessfully, that Bruen rendered California’s entire licensing scheme facially unconstitutional, and as a result, it was unconstitutional to punish nonfelons such as them for carrying a firearm in public solely because they did not have a license. Defendants-respondents Jaime Mosqueda and Juanita Mosqueda successfully raised the same contention against their unlawful possession charges by demurrer in the trial court. The Court of Appeal determined defendants had standing to raise the defense by demurrer, but also that Bruen did not render California’s entire licensing scheme or the charges against them unconstitutional. The offending “good cause” requirement was severable from the remainder of the licensing statute, as was the “good moral character” element which, for the sake of argument, presumed to violate the test laid down in Bruen. "Bruen is also not grounds for a facial attack on the discretionary nature of California’s licensing scheme, and it did not invalidate any of the other licensing provisions in [Penal Code] section 26150." The Court reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, which concluded otherwise. View "California v. Mosqueda" on Justia Law