Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order denying Federal's special motion to strike a civil complaint for fraud as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, as well as the trial court's order overruling its evidentiary objections. In the underlying action, plaintiffs filed lawsuits against Moldex, alleging Moldex manufactured defective air respirators and masks that failed to protect them. This litigation ensued between Truck, Federal, and First State over coverage and the extent to which Truck was obligated to reimburse Federal and First State for payments made for Moldex's defense and indemnity, plus interest. Federal argued that Truck's complaint for fraud is based on Federal's "acts in furtherance of its right to petition" and are thus protected speech pursuant to section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on Federal's evidentiary objections and concluded that the first amended complaint is not relevant to the court's review of the anti-SLAPP motion. The court also affirmed Federal's special motion to strike Truck's complaint for fraud, concluding that Federal met its burden of showing that Truck's complaint for fraud arises from Federal's protected activity, and that the trial court correctly found that Truck met its burden to establish a probability of success on the merits of its fraud cause of action.In this case, a factfinder considering all the circumstances could reasonably conclude that when Truck signed the July 2013 settlement agreeing to pay nearly $5 million to Federal and to dismiss its pending appeal of the February 2013 judgment, it did so in reasonable reliance on Federal's course of conduct and Federal's stated position that it had a duty to defend Moldex pursuant to its policy. Furthermore, Truck agreed to file a request for dismissal of its pending appeal, with prejudice, when it entered the settlement agreement, which further supports a finding of extrinsic fraud by Federal. Finally, Federal is mistaken in its belief that Truck "released the claim for which it now seeks damages" by signing the July 2013 settlement agreement. View "Truck Insurance Exchange v. Federal Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2008, Murray was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first-degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. In 2020, Murray unsuccessfully sought a Franklin hearing, contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. The court cited section 3051(h), “people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed when they were at least 18 years of age but no more than ‘25 years of age or younger are not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.” The court of appeal affirmed.Meanwhile, Murray sought habeas corpus relief, asserting an equal protection violation, arguing that section 3051(h) violates his right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders (those under 18 at the time of their offense) a youth offender parole hearing while denying youthful LWOP offenders (those 18-25 years old at the time of their offense) a hearing. The court of appeal denied relief. There is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders; children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing. The court joined “others in encouraging the Legislature to revisit where it has drawn the line.” View "In re Murray" on Justia Law

After an employee brought a wage and hour class action against her employer and prior to certification, the parties settled. The employer paid a sum to the employee and she dismissed the class claims without prejudice, with court approval. Then the employer brought a malicious prosecution action against the employee and her counsel. The employee and her counsel each moved to strike the action under the anti-SLAPP law, which the trial court denied on the basis that the employer established a prima facie showing of prevailing on its malicious prosecution cause of action.The Court of Appeal concluded that, because the prior action resolved by settlement, the employer is unable to establish that the action terminated in its favor as a matter of law. The court explained that the class claims are not severable from the individual claims for the purposes of the favorable termination analysis. Furthermore, the entire action terminated by settlement – a termination which was not favorable to the employer as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for determination of one unadjudicated anti-SLAPP issue, and whether the employee and her counsel are entitled to an award of attorney fees. View "Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

After plaintiff filed suit in federal court against the City and three police officers for arresting and strip searching her, a federal jury unanimously found that the police acted reasonably and the verdict defeated plaintiff's federal claims. The state law claims were also later dismissed by a United States District Judge. Plaintiff then filed a second lawsuit in state court against the City and the three officers, alleging negligence and other state law claims based on the strip search.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court concluded that Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, which barred civil rights plaintiffs who lost in federal court from pursuing equivalent state law claims in a second suit in state court, is controlling in this case. The court explained that, although Hernandez involves a fatal shooting rather than a strip search, the difference between Hernandez and this case is nominal. Therefore, plaintiff cannot sue a second time because her first suit definitively settled her dispute: she lost and cannot now try to prove defendants acted unreasonably. View "Shuler v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Quality Coast, alleging that the company's decision not to hire him was the result of race and gender discrimination and a violation of the Displaced Janitor Opportunity Act (DJOA). A jury returned a defense verdict on the discrimination claims and the trial court found that plaintiff was not entitled to protection under the DJOA because he was a supervisory employee.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court correctly found that plaintiff is a supervisory employee for DJOA purposes; there was no error in giving the modified business judgment rule instruction at trial; and the trial court's costs award is not erroneous. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Jones v. Quality Coast, Inc." on Justia Law

The 1993 National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 20501(b)(1), requires states to register voters for federal elections, including “by application in person” at designated state offices. Each state must designate all offices that provide public assistance, all offices that provide state-funded programs primarily engaged in providing services to persons with disabilities, and “other offices. ” Each designated agency must offer certain voter registration services and, in California, must assign an employee to be responsible for the agency’s compliance (Elec. Code, 2406.) California’s Secretary of State coordinates the state’s responsibilities under the Act.The plaintiffs sought additional designations. The Secretary committed to designating as voter registration agencies programs for students with disabilities at community colleges, certain county welfare departments, and the Office of Services to the Blind. The trial court held, and the court of appeal affirmed, that the Secretary had a mandatory duty to designate as voter registration agencies state offices that administer General Assistance or General Relief programs and California Student Aid Commission Financial Aid Programs, as well as all private entities under contract to provide services on behalf of a voter registration agency. The court found that no mandatory designation duty existed as to offices administering the California Department of Education Nutrition Programs, special education offices, and Area Agencies on Aging. View "Senior Disability Action v. Weber" on Justia Law

The issue presented for the Court of Appeal in this case centered on whether Alicia Clark exhausted her administrative remedies under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) prior to filing suit against her former employer, Arthroscopic & Laser Surgery Center of San Diego, L.P. (ALSC). Clark filed an administrative complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) alleging ALSC committed various acts of employment discrimination against her. While Clark’s DFEH Complaint contained an inaccuracy as to ALSC’s legal name, it clearly and unequivocally reflected Clark’s intent to name ALSC as a respondent. Specifically, Clark’s DFEH Complaint named, as respondents, “Oasis Surgery Center LLC,” and “Oasis Surgery Center, LP,” which are variants of ALSC’s registered business name, “Oasis Surgery Center.” In addition, Clark’s DFEH Complaint referenced the names of her managers, supervisors, and coworkers. The same day that Clark filed her DFEH Complaint, the DFEH issued a right-to-sue notice and Clark filed this action against “Oasis Surgery Center LLC,” and “Oasis Surgery Center, LP.” One week after filing her DFEH Complaint and the initial complaint in this action, Clark filed an amended complaint in this action, properly naming ALSC as a defendant. Notwithstanding that Clark’s DFEH Complaint clearly identified her former employer as the intended respondent, the trial court granted ALSC’s motion for summary judgment as to all of Clark’s FEHA claims brought against it because Clark “named the wrong entity in her DFEH [C]omplaint, and . . . never corrected that omission.” Clark then filed a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, requesting that it vacate the trial court’s order granting ALSC’s motion for summary judgment. After considering the text and purpose of the relevant statutory exhaustion requirement, administrative regulations, and applicable case law, the Court of Appeal concluded Clark exhausted her administrative remedies against ALSC. "This is particularly true in a case such as this, in which the plaintiff’s error could not possibly have hampered any administrative investigation or prejudiced the defendant in any judicial proceedings." Accordingly, Clark’s writ petition was granted and the trial court directed to vacate its order granting ALSC’s motion for summary judgment. View "Clark v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Rosario Contreras-Velazquez (Velazquez) sued her former employer, Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc. (Family Health), alleging disability discrimination and related causes of action after she suffered a work-related injury and Family Health terminated her employment. A jury found Family Health not liable, but the trial court ordered a new trial as to three of Velazquez’s causes of action after finding the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict—a ruling, the Court of Appeal affirmed in a prior appeal. After retrial, a jury found in favor of Velazquez. The jury awarded her $915,645 in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive damages. However, the trial court granted in part a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and reduced the punitive damages award to $1,831,290 (a 2:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages). The court reasoned a punitive damages award equal to twice the compensatory damages award was the maximum amount permissible under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Family Health appealed, contending certain special verdict findings returned by the first jury estopped Velazquez from prevailing at the retrial under the issue preclusion doctrine. Family Health also appealed the JNOV order on the basis that the reduced punitive damages award remained grossly excessive in violation of Family Health’s due process rights. The Court of Appeal concluded the first jury’s special verdict findings did not constitute a final adjudication of any issue and, therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that the issue preclusion doctrine did not require entry of judgment in Family Health’s favor. Further, the Court concluded the trial court properly reduced the punitive damages award to an amount equal to twice the compensatory damages award—and no further. Therefore, both the judgment and the JNOV order were affirmed. View "Contreras-Velazquez v. Family Health Centers of San Diego, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that prison officials retaliated against him because he disclosed information to the Office of Internal Affairs of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) about prison officials covering up a murder and he filed administrative grievances addressing misconduct by officials at Corcoran State Prison. Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of replevin directing prison officials to return his personal property or pay its value. The trial court dismissed the action based on failure to exhaust.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On a question of properly pleading the excuse of unavailability, the court concluded that plaintiff must allege specific facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the machinations, misrepresentations or intimidations were accomplished. In this case, the papers plaintiff filed in the trial court and in this appeal demonstrate he could amend his petition to allege specific facts showing the administrative process is unavailable to him because prison officials have thwarted his use of the inmate grievance procedure through misrepresentations and machinations. View "Foster v. Sexton" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to set aside its order enjoining the County from enforcing its orders to the extent they prohibit outdoor dining due to the COVID-19 pandemic until after conducting an appropriate risk-benefit analysis. During the pendency of the petition, the County lifted its prohibition based on infection rates declining and ICU availability increasing. However, the court concluded that these cases are not moot because conditions may change and the County may re-impose its outdoor restaurant dining ban.The court held that courts should be extremely deferential to public health authorities, particularly during a pandemic, and particularly where, as here, the public health authorities have demonstrated a rational basis for their actions. In this case, the County's order banning outdoor dining is not a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law and is rationally related to limiting the spread of COVID-19.Even assuming that Mark's, a restaurant, has a First Amendment right to freedom of assembly, or that Mark's has standing to bring a First Amendment challenge on behalf of its patrons or employees, the court held that the order does not violate Mark's purported First Amendment right to freedom of assembly or that of its patrons. The court explained that the County's order does not regulate assembly based on the expressive conduct of the assembly; it is undisputed that limiting the spread of COVID-19 is a legitimate and substantial government interest; and the order leaves open alternative channels for assembling. Accordingly, the court entered a new order denying the Restauranteurs' request for a preliminary injunction. View "County of Los Angeles Department of Health v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law