Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the City, alleging retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5. The City asked the trial court to dismiss plaintiff's action for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies, but the trial court concluded that an appeal to the HR Commission was unnecessary. After the case proceeded to trial, the jury found for plaintiff and awarded him about $4 million, including $2 million in past noneconomic damages and $1.5 million in future noneconomic damages. The trial court subsequently denied the City's motion for a new trial.The Court of Appeal concluded that the involvement of plaintiff's direct superior in the underlying dispute, on one hand, and his expected role in deciding plaintiff's appeal, on the other, violated the requirements of due process and therefore excused plaintiff from proceeding with his administrative appeal. The court also found no reversible evidentiary error by the trial court. However, the court agreed with the City that the $3.5 million noneconomic damages award -- comprising $2 million in past and $1.5 million in future noneconomic damages -- was so excessive as to suggest it resulted from passion or prejudice. Accordingly, the court vacated the awards for past and future noneconomic damages and remanded for a new trial on these issues, unless plaintiff accepts a reduction of the awards to $1 million and $100,000, respectively. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Briley v. City of West Covina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a reality show's production and media companies for various causes of action after discovering she was filmed while changing clothes in a dressing area designated for models, and that her "nearly fully nude body had been exposed on national television" during the airing of the show. Defendant production and media companies filed a special motion to strike the model's complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation under the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.The Court of Appeal concluded that plaintiff's claims arise from the production and broadcast of an episode of "Shahs of Sunset," which is protected activity. In this case, the court agreed with defendants' assertion that the footage at issue is relevant to the storyline of the episode and that the experience of being a model is an issue of public interest. However, the court concluded that plaintiff has shown a probability of success on her causes of action for invasion of privacy; tortious misappropriation of name or likeness; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and negligence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court's order denying defendants' special motion to strike the complaint, as modified: the separate cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is stricken from the complaint, as it is part and parcel of the negligence cause of action. View "Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against McCullough for malicious prosecution. In 2018, the Court of Appeal reversed an order denying McCullough's anti-SLAPP motion and ordered the trial court to issue a fee award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1). This appeal stems from the attorney fees award of $146,010 to McCullough.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's attorney fee order, concluding that the trial court properly determined the reasonable market value of the attorneys' services. The court explained that the trial court has discretion to award an hourly rate under the lodestar method that exceeds the rate that was actually incurred or paid. In this case, the trial court properly determined that the market rate for experienced appellate lawyers in Los Angeles County and exercised its discretion to not so narrowly focus on the package rate agreed to in this matter. Furthermore, the court could not conclude, in these circumstances, that the award of attorney fees shocks the conscience or suggests that passion and prejudice had part in it. View "Pasternack v. McCullough" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate and a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging statewide delays in the transfer of incompetent to stand trial (IST) defendants from county jails to DSH and DDS to begin substantive services. The trial court granted the petition in part, first finding that defendants systematically violate the due process rights of IST defendants in California who are committed to DSH pursuant to Penal Code section 1370 or to DDS pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(i). The trial court found that due process requires defendants to commence substantive services for these IST defendants within 28 days of the date on which the order transferring responsibility for those defendants to DSH or DDS is served. The trial court denied the petition as to certain IST defendants charged with felony sex offenses who are committed to DDS pursuant to section 1370.1, subdivision (a)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii).The Court of Appeal concluded that defendants have systematically violated the due process rights of all IST defendants in California by failing to commence substantive services designed to return those defendants to competency within 28 days of service of the transfer of responsibility document, which is the date of service of the commitment packet for all defendants committed to DSH and the date of service of the order of commitment for all defendants committed to DDS. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment as to the issues raised in defendants' appeal, but reversed as to the issue raised in plaintiffs' cross-appeal. The court remanded to the trial court with directions to modify its order granting in part plaintiffs' petition for writ of mandate to reflect a uniform transfer of responsibility date for all IST defendants committed to DDS. View "Stiavetti v. Clendenin" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated and remanded the trial court's order granting respondent's anti-SLAPP motion to strike Brighton's cross-claim for fraud. The parties' dispute stemmed from a contract between respondent and Brighton where Brighton would pay respondent $3,000 for a one-day photo shoot. Respondent filed suit against Brighton, alleging that the company failed to pay her immediately upon completion of the photoshoot. Brighton cross-complained, asserting claims for declaratory relief and fraud.The court concluded that, even if it were to assume that respondent met her burden of showing that Brighton's cross-claim for fraud arose from protected conduct, reversal is required because Brighton has shown a probability that it will prevail on its claim. In this case, the evidence submitted shows that Brighton's fraud cross-claim has the requisite minimal merit where Brighton submitted evidence that respondent made a misrepresentation when she told the company to pay LA Models for her services during the photoshoot upon receipt of an invoice rather than immediately upon her "termination" as an employee when the shoot concluded; it can be inferred that plaintiff knew that misrepresentation was false based on her actions, she intended for Brighton to rely on her misrepresentation, and Brighton justifiably did so; and reliance on respondent's misrepresentation damaged Brighton by exposing it to $90,000 in waiting-time penalties plus attorney fees and costs— in addition to the costs Brighton incurred in defending itself against her lawsuit. View "Brighton Collectibles, LLC v. Hockey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, All of Us or None–Riverside Chapter (All of Us or None), Jane Roe, and Phyllis McNeal, filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Superior Court of California, County of Riverside (Riverside Superior Court), and its Executive Officer and Clerk, W. Samuel Hamrick, Jr. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants improperly maintained the Riverside Superior Court’s records in criminal cases in various ways. Plaintiffs alleged that these practices invaded their right to privacy as embodied in the California Constitution (fifth cause of action). Plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and writ of mandate (seventh cause of action) to remedy these violations. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s demurrer and summary judgment rulings. The Court of Appeal agreed with Plaintiffs the trial court erred in its ruling on the first, third, and fifth causes of action; as a result, the trial court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ remedial causes of action for declaratory relief (sixth cause of action) and injunctive relief (seventh cause of action) were also reversed. The matter was thus remanded for further proceedings. View "All of Us or None etc. v. Hamrick" on Justia Law

After a federal district court granted a petition for writ of habeas corpus triggering plaintiff's release from prison, he filed a claim with the Board, seeking compensation as a wrongfully convicted person. The Board denied the claim and plaintiff sought mandamus relief in the trial court, which upheld the board's determination.The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court should have granted the mandamus petition because the federal court's Schlup finding and the later grant of habeas relief that resulted in plaintiff's release from prison without retrial by the state amount to a finding of factual innocence that the Legislature intended to be binding, and to preclude holding a Board hearing. In determining otherwise, the court concluded that the Board did not accord the Schlup finding the significance it deserves and the Board construed Penal Code section 1485.55, subdivision (a) in a manner that undermines the Legislature's intent and effectively renders the statutory provision inoperative in practice. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for the trial court to enter a new judgment reversing the Board's order denying plaintiff's compensation claim and directing the Board to recommend, pursuant to section 4904, that an appropriation be made and petitioner's claim paid. View "Larsen v. California Victim Compensation Board" on Justia Law

A Milpitas Fire Department captain responded to Nunes’s house one afternoon based on a report of a “whole structure fire.” He saw no fire and no smoke. Neighbors standing outside stated they had recently seen smoke coming from the backyard. A police officer “pounded” on the house’s door. No one answered. The fire captain opened a gate and entered the backyard, where he smelled smoke in the air. He found no active fire but saw test tubes, chemistry equipment, and a homemade toy rocket that looked burned on the ground. The captain noticed a closed shed. No smoke was coming from it, nor did the smell of smoke seem to originate there. He opened the shed “to make sure everything is clear,” and saw a metal cabinet. The captain admitted there was nothing specific about the cabinet that made him think he should look inside: He opened the cabinet, saw unfamiliar bottled chemicals, and called the hazardous materials team.The police ultimately obtained a search warrant, based in part on those chemicals. After the search warrant was executed, Nunes was charged with numerous offenses for possessing explosives and explosive materials. Denying Nunes's motion to suppress evidence, the trial court concluded that the search was valid under the exigent circumstances exception. The court of appeal reversed. Opening the cabinet inside the shed, however prudent and well-intentioned, was not an action necessary to prevent imminent danger. View "People v. Nunes" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven adults claiming that they were molested by a priest when they were children, filed suit against the Archdiocese, alleging that it was vicariously liable for ratifying the molestation and directly liable for its own negligence in failing to supervise the priest. The Archdiocese moved to strike the operative complaint under the anti-SLAPP law, Code of Civil Procedure, section 425.16.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the Archdiocese's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the gravamen of the suit against the Archdiocese is not speech – it is the molestation and failure to supervise. The court concluded that the Archdiocese mischaracterizes the complaint by arguing that it has established that the child sexual abuse cause of action arises from protected activity because it is based on the Archdiocese's conduct in the Roe litigation and sheriff’s investigation. The court explained that, because the Archdiocese chooses to ignore the bulk of the allegations of the complaint against it, it makes no attempt to argue that these actual allegations are protected activity under the anti-SLAPP law. The court further explained that the focus must be on the alleged acts of sexual abuse and battery that form the basis of the tort cause of action, not the acts of the Archdiocese by which it is alleged to be vicariously liable for those acts. The court concluded that those underlying tortious acts are not protected activity. The court also concluded that a similar analysis defeats the Archdiocese's argument that the negligence cause of action is based on protected speech. Finally, the court concluded that the ruling on demurrer is not before it, and the ruling on the demurrer did not affect, and could not have affected, the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Ratcliff v. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting the school district's special motion to strike plaintiff's complaint for discrimination and retaliation in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Plaintiff's complaint stemmed from his removal from his school and placement on reassignment due to an unspecified allegation of misconduct. Plaintiff remained on paid suspension for more than three years, during which time he was told to stay home and not allowed to teach or pursue continuing education or professional development.As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that plaintiff's appeal of the Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP statute) order is properly before the court. On the merits, the trial court erred by granting the school district's special motion to strike where plaintiff's complaint does not arise from the school district's protected activity. The court explained that the school district's decisions to place plaintiff on leave and terminate his employment are not protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), even if those decisions were made in conjunction with an official investigation. Furthermore, the school district's participation in, or preparation for, the statutorily defined procedures for dismissal or suspension, without more, does not constitute conduct in furtherance of the school district's own right to petition. View "Verceles v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law