Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2001, Sands was 24 years old when he committed special circumstance murder (Penal Code 187, 190.2(a)(10)) and was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court denied his motion, seeking to develop a record of mitigating circumstances for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under “Franklin.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting his Equal Protection argument. The statute provides an opportunity for release (via youth offender parole hearings) to most persons convicted of crimes committed before the age of 26 in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence imposed for their “[c]ontrolling offense,” sections 3051(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4). The statute excludes offenders who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes they committed at age 18-25. The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment but the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26. The Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further. View "People v. Sands" on Justia Law

Defendants Sergeant Richard Knox and Sheriff’s Deputy Jeff Garrett, of the Tehama County Sheriff’s Department (Department), confronted plaintiff Michael Murchison on his rural property, while Knox and Garrett were trying to secure a rifle they had spotted. Plaintiff brought multiple claims against Knox, Garrett, Sheriff Dave Hencratt, and Tehama County, including federal law claims of unlawful search and excessive force, and state law claims of battery by a peace officer, assault, and interference with his constitutional rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion. The trial court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion in its entirety. On appeal, plaintiff contended there were triable issues of fact as to two of his claims under title 42 United States Code section 1983: whether Knox and Garrett committed an unexcused warrantless search that proximately caused his injuries; and whether they used excessive force in detaining him. He also claimed the trial court erred in granting of summary judgment as to his state law claims for violation of his constitutional rights, battery by a peace officer, and assault. The Court of Appeal reversed with directions to the trial court to vacate its ruling on summary judgment and enter a new order denying the motion as to the following causes of action as to Knox and Garrett: (1) the first cause of action under section 1983 based on unlawful search and excessive force; (2) the second cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 52.1; (3) the fourth cause of action alleging battery by a peace officer; and (4) the fifth cause of action for assault. View "Murchison v. County of Tehama" on Justia Law

The Department filed suit against M&N, alleging numerous causes of action stemming from defendants' operation of a business that purchased retail installment sales contracts from used car dealerships where defendants used a formula that considered the gender of the car purchaser in deciding how much to pay for the contracts. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department on the first and second causes of action, which alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 51) and Civil Code section 51.5, and assessed over $6 million in statutory damages pursuant to Civil Code section 52, subdivision (a). The trial court dismissed the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, which alleged violations of Government Code section 12940, subdivisions (i) and (k) of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in dismissing the fifth cause of action and otherwise affirmed the trial court's judgment. In the fifth cause of action, the Department alleged that M&N "knowingly compelled and coerced its employees to engage in practices that violated" FEHA and Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5, in violation of section 12940, subdivision (i). The court held that employees who are coerced by their employer to violate Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5 are "aggrieved" within the meaning of section 12965, subdivision (a) and have standing to sue their employer pursuant to section 12940, subdivision (i). Therefore, the employees of M&N who were coerced by M&N into violating Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5 could be individually liable for sex discrimination. The court explained that these employees would necessarily be "aggrieved" by their employer's unlawful employment practice as their personal interests would be affected by their employer's misconduct. Therefore, the Department was authorized to file a civil action on behalf of these employees and the trial court erred by dismissing the fifth cause of action. View "Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. M&N Financing Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Cheryl Thurston was blind and used screen reader software to access the Internet and read website content. Defendant-respondent Omni Hotels Management Corporation (Omni) operated hotels and resorts. In November 2016, Thurston initiated this action against Omni, alleging that its website was not fully accessible by the blind and the visually impaired, in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. By way of a special verdict, the jury rejected Thurston’s claim and found that she never intended to make a hotel reservation or ascertain Omni’s prices and accommodations for the purpose of making a hotel reservation. On appeal, Thurston contended the trial court erred as a matter of law: (1) by instructing the jury that her claim required a finding that she intended to make a hotel reservation; and (2) by including the word “purpose” in the special verdict form, which caused the jury to make a “factual finding as to [her] motivation for using or attempting to use [Omni’s] Website.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Thurston v. Omni Hotels Management Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the University, alleging a claim for retaliation, as well as age and gender discrimination. The trial court granted the University's motion for summary judgment but erroneously excluded evidence that a University employee rejected a job candidate because she "wanted someone younger."The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the University and concluded that the trial court erroneously excluded evidence. The court stated that Reid v. Google, Inc., (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535–545, explained that such remarks can be relevant in age discrimination suits. The court examined the record as a whole to see if the previous comment changes the propriety of summary judgment under governing law. Applying the three-part burden-shifting Bechtel test, the court concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate in this case where three factors show that the remark changed the pretext analysis: first, the remark evidence is relatively strong; second, the dean created a pay differential between male and female Associate Deans hired concurrently; and sources unrelated to plaintiff criticized the Dean's management. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Jorgensen v. Loyola Marymount University" on Justia Law

Big Sugar filed suit alleging libel, slander, and violation of the Unfair Competition Law after defendant aired his dissatisfaction with the bakery to his 1.5 million social media followers and later discussed the experience on his podcast. Defendant responded with a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti-SLAPP), which the trial court denied.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that defendant's statements at issue did not involve the public interest. The court applied the Rand test and concluded that defendant's statements were not about a topic of public interest; defendant and Big Sugar's supposed proximities to fame do not turn this into a case of public interest; and the court rejected defendant's contention that his statements provide consumer protection information. In this case, the consumer protection cases defendant cites do not support his case. Furthermore, defendant's statements relate only to one transaction with Big Sugar; he published them on his social media accounts to air his dissatisfaction with a particular cake; and his statements were not part of a larger discussion. View "Woodhill Ventures, LLC v. Yang" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants for wrongful arrest after plaintiffs were arrested for public intoxication under Carson Municipal Code section 4201. Plaintiffs spent a night and the better part of the next day in jail, but they were never charged.Because Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f) has preempted section 4201, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that a violation of the Carson ordinance, if proved, would establish reasonable cause to arrest. The court also concluded that the erroneous instruction was prejudicial where the instruction and special verdict form afforded no other basis to find the deputy had reasonable cause to arrest plaintiffs without a warrant. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment rendered on the jury's special verdict findings and remanded for further proceedings. View "Carcamo v. L.A. County Sheriff's Dept." on Justia Law

In 2008, Murray was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for a first-degree special circumstance murder he committed when he was 22 years old. His conviction was affirmed In 2010, In 2020, Murray sought a Franklin hearing, contending he was eligible for a youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051.3 The trial court denied his motion because under the terms of section 3051(h), “people sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes committed when they were at least 18 years of age but no more than ‘25 years of age or younger are not eligible for youth offender parole hearings.” The court of appeal affirmed.The court of appeal then rejected Murray’s argument that section 3051 violates his constitutional right to equal protection by affording juvenile LWOP offenders a youth offender parole hearing but denying such a hearing to youthful LWOP offenders. There is a rational basis for distinguishing between juvenile and youthful LWOP offenders in this context. View "In re Murray" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from an order denying its petition to compel arbitration of Labor Code claims pursued by former employees, who contend that their lawsuit is limited to recovering civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA).The Court of Appeal again interpreted the California Supreme Court's decision in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, to mean "that PAGA representative claims for civil penalties are not subject to arbitration" under a predispute arbitration agreement. In this case, the PAGA claims alleged in the former employees' complaint are owned by the state and are being pursued by the former employees as the state's agent or proxy. The court explained that the arbitration agreements at issue are not enforceable as to the PAGA claims because the state was not a party to, and did not ratify, any of those agreements. Furthermore, after the former employees became representatives of the state, they did not agree to arbitrate the PAGA claims. Consequently, under the rule of California law recognized in Esparza v KS Industries, L.P. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1228, 1234, and many other decisions of the Court of Appeal, the court concluded that the PAGA claims cannot be forced into arbitration based on agreements made by the former employees before they became authorized representatives of the state. Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied this rule of law.The court also concluded that defendant's argument that arbitration is compelled by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and federal preemption fails for similar reasons. The court concluded that the FAA does not reach the PAGA claims alleged in this case and, therefore, federal law does not preempt the rule of California law stating PAGA claims are subject to arbitration only if the state, or the state’s authorized representative, consents to arbitration. View "Herrera v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal denied a petition for writ of habeas corpus to petitioner who was convicted of murdering her three young children by setting a house fire that killed them. Petitioner argues that the current scientific understanding of burn patterns and how fire behaves under certain conditions fatally undermines expert testimony offered by the prosecution at trial regarding the cause and origin of the fire at petitioner's home, as well as the fire scene investigation on which the experts based those opinions.The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief under Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (b). Although petitioner has identified real advances in fire investigation science, the court explained that section 1473, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1) condition the availability of habeas relief on the effect such advancements likely would have had on the particular expert testimony at issue in the particular proceedings at issue. In this case, given the extent to which the same criticisms of the prosecution's expert testimony were litigated at the original trial, the continuing expert debate on these topics reflected at the evidentiary hearing, the lack of any authority rejecting some aspect of the original investigation as improper or incorrect by current standards, and the other evidence of guilt offered against petitioner at trial, petitioner has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she is entitled to relief.The court also concluded, for largely the same reasons, that petitioner failed to establish that the state of fire investigation science at the time of trial rendered her trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process. The court stated that, although additional scientific support for the defense's expert testimony at trial would have been helpful to the defense in rebutting the prosecution expert's opinions, the absence of such additional support did not necessarily prevent a fair trial. View "In re Parks" on Justia Law