Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Harris is charged with a violent rape that occurred in 1989. DNA from the crime scene and a vaginal swab matched Harris’s. A “pretrial services court report” indicated that Harris appeared to be an appropriate candidate for release on his own recognizance with enhanced monitoring. Harris asked for release on his own recognizance with nonfinancial conditions, e.g., a no-contact order, limitation of his use of dating websites, and GPS tracking. Harris argued that he is indigent, there is no indication he is a flight or safety risk, the alleged crimes occurred 32 years ago, he has not tried to contact the victim, he had a limited criminal history in the interim years, and he had community ties. The prosecution offered testimony by the victim that she feared for her safety, the doctor who treated the victim, and several women who reported that Harris liked to tie women up during sex and enact rape fantasies.Ultimately, the trial court denied Harris bail. finding that the charged felony offenses involved acts of violence on another person and that there is clear and convincing evidence of a substantial likelihood that Harris’s release would result in great bodily harm to others. The court of appeal remanded. The court erred in failing to set out reasons on the record why less restrictive alternatives to detention could not reasonably protect the public or victim safety. View "In re Harris" on Justia Law

The Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (the Hospital) terminated the employment of registered nurse Kimberly Wilkin (Wilkin) after discovering she had violated the Hospital’s policies governing the handling and documentation of patient medications. Wilkin sued the Hospital, alleging her discharge constituted disability discrimination, retaliation, and otherwise violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); resulted in the unlawful denial of medical leave and retaliation in violation of the Moore- Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA); and constituted a wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Over a year after Wilkin filed her complaint, the Hospital moved for summary judgment, producing undisputed evidence, including Wilkin’s deposition testimony, showing she had violated policies governing the handling of medication, and, for over a year before she was discharged, had been regularly counseled for her chronic absenteeism and other issues. The trial court concluded the Hospital carried its burden of producing evidence showing its decision was based on legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. After Wilkin did not produce any evidence showing the Hospital’s reasons were fabricated or otherwise pretextual, the trial court concluded a reasonable trier of fact could not find in favor of Wilkin on any of her claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital. To this, the Court of Appeal affirmed. "As all of Wilkin’s claims depended on there being a triable issue of fact regarding the lawfulness of her discharge, and our record does not show such a triable issue of fact exists, summary judgment was properly granted." View "Wilkin v. Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula" on Justia Law

Fisher was stopped for reckless driving and officers found, in his car's trunk, three pipe bombs that could cause serious injury to anyone holding them when lit. Fisher was released on bail. The friend who facilitated his release found chemicals in Fisher's garage and called the police, who found chemical powders and an AR-15 rifle, with no serial number, capable of accepting a magazine. Fisher was convicted of five destructive device felonies. Three offenses were subject to sentences served in county jail (Penal Code section 1170(h)) but Fisher was also convicted of two felony counts of simple possession of a destructive device, a “wobbler” offense that is not county jail eligible under section 1170(h). The court ordered that Fisher’s entire sentence be served in state prison.Fisher argued the disparate punishment of offenders convicted of the simple possession crime violates constitutional equal protection principles by treating similarly situated classes of offenders differently with no rational basis for the disparate treatment. The court of appeal found that persons charged with the various destructive device offenses are similarly situated and that there is no realistically conceivable legislative purpose to require a state prison sentence for those convicted of possession while affording the benefits of county jail incarceration for the 1170(h)-eligible offenses. The court concluded that the proper remedy is to reform section 18710 by making its violation punishable under section 1170(h). View "People v. Fisher" on Justia Law

A wardship petition charged Y.C., then 17 years old, with assault with a firearm, carrying a loaded firearm, and possession of a firearm by a minor. Y.C. allegedly shot a suspected rival gang member in the leg. Arrested, Y.C. was taken to the Juvenile Assessment Center, where he met with a probation officer and invoked his Miranda rights. Y.C. agreed to participate in a mental health assessment conducted by a family therapist, pursuant to an established protocol of the Juvenile Services Division of the San Mateo County Probation Department. The therapist provided a summary of her interview to the probation department, which included the summary in a report provided to the juvenile court at Y.C.’s detention hearings.The court of appeal dismissed Y.C.’s writ petition as moot to the extent that it sought relief relating to his detention During the pendency of the proceeding, Y.C. entered a change of plea and was released from detention. The court otherwise denied the petition, rejecting arguments that the disclosure of the assessment interview to the probation department and juvenile court, and its use at his detention hearings, violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel, as well as HIPAA and California’s Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. View "Y.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2013, Crane was studying in a GED class at the High Desert State Prison. Inmate Dolihite approached Crane from behind and stabbed him in the neck with a pencil. Crane was taken to the prison’s emergency clinic. Crane alleges that after he was released from administrative segregation, he was assaulted by other prisoners and prison guards. He sued the correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Crane contends the assaults were retaliation against him for previously suing the warden and two captains for denying outdoor exercise and staging assaults on inmates.Crane, self-represented, sued Dolihite. The suit was dismissed for failure to serve the summons and complaint within the time prescribed by Code Civ. Proc., 583.210(a). Dolihite had been transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison; for a time, Crane was unable to identify his location. The superior court advised Crane to use the sheriff’s office to effect service but the Monterey County Sheriff’s Office refused to serve the summons and complaint. The litigation coordinator at Salinas Valley refused to accept service on behalf of Dolihite.The court of appeal reversed the dismissal. The litigation coordinator’s refusal contradicts Penal Code 4013(a) and Code of Civil Procedure 416.90, which have been interpreted as authorizing state prison litigation coordinators to accept service on behalf of inmates. Crane’s statutory right to initiate and prosecute a civil action was infringed. View "Crane v. Dolihite" on Justia Law

In 2016, Rodriguez was charged in two criminal cases. In 2018, the court found Rodriguez not competent and signed an order committing Rodriguez. The order stated the “maximum term is 3 years minus 0 days actual credit” Later, the court found Rodriguez’s competency restored and reinstated the criminal proceedings. Rodriguez was present in court and waived time for trial. Almost four months later, the court again declared a doubt about Rodriguez’s competency and suspended the proceedings. The court later found Rodriguez not competent and ordered that Rodriguez be committed for placement in a locked psychiatric facility.Rodriguez claimed that, although certification of his mental competency had been filed, he had reached the two-year maximum period for an incompetency commitment under Penal Code 1370(c)(1) before a judicial hearing on the certification had been held, so that the trial court lacked authority to hold such a hearing. The court of appeal concluded that Rodriguez’s maximum commitment period has not yet run. View "Rodriguez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2001, Sands was 24 years old when he committed special circumstance murder (Penal Code 187, 190.2(a)(10)) and was sentenced to a prison term of life without the possibility of parole. The trial court denied his motion, seeking to develop a record of mitigating circumstances for an eventual youth offender parole hearing under “Franklin.”The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting his Equal Protection argument. The statute provides an opportunity for release (via youth offender parole hearings) to most persons convicted of crimes committed before the age of 26 in their 15th, 20th, or 25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence imposed for their “[c]ontrolling offense,” sections 3051(a)(2)(B), (b)(1)-(4). The statute excludes offenders who were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for crimes they committed at age 18-25. The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may violate the Eighth Amendment but the same sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26. The Legislature could rationally decide to remedy unconstitutional sentences but go no further. View "People v. Sands" on Justia Law

Defendants Sergeant Richard Knox and Sheriff’s Deputy Jeff Garrett, of the Tehama County Sheriff’s Department (Department), confronted plaintiff Michael Murchison on his rural property, while Knox and Garrett were trying to secure a rifle they had spotted. Plaintiff brought multiple claims against Knox, Garrett, Sheriff Dave Hencratt, and Tehama County, including federal law claims of unlawful search and excessive force, and state law claims of battery by a peace officer, assault, and interference with his constitutional rights by threat, intimidation, or coercion. The trial court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion in its entirety. On appeal, plaintiff contended there were triable issues of fact as to two of his claims under title 42 United States Code section 1983: whether Knox and Garrett committed an unexcused warrantless search that proximately caused his injuries; and whether they used excessive force in detaining him. He also claimed the trial court erred in granting of summary judgment as to his state law claims for violation of his constitutional rights, battery by a peace officer, and assault. The Court of Appeal reversed with directions to the trial court to vacate its ruling on summary judgment and enter a new order denying the motion as to the following causes of action as to Knox and Garrett: (1) the first cause of action under section 1983 based on unlawful search and excessive force; (2) the second cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 52.1; (3) the fourth cause of action alleging battery by a peace officer; and (4) the fifth cause of action for assault. View "Murchison v. County of Tehama" on Justia Law

The Department filed suit against M&N, alleging numerous causes of action stemming from defendants' operation of a business that purchased retail installment sales contracts from used car dealerships where defendants used a formula that considered the gender of the car purchaser in deciding how much to pay for the contracts. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department on the first and second causes of action, which alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 51) and Civil Code section 51.5, and assessed over $6 million in statutory damages pursuant to Civil Code section 52, subdivision (a). The trial court dismissed the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action, which alleged violations of Government Code section 12940, subdivisions (i) and (k) of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court erred in dismissing the fifth cause of action and otherwise affirmed the trial court's judgment. In the fifth cause of action, the Department alleged that M&N "knowingly compelled and coerced its employees to engage in practices that violated" FEHA and Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5, in violation of section 12940, subdivision (i). The court held that employees who are coerced by their employer to violate Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5 are "aggrieved" within the meaning of section 12965, subdivision (a) and have standing to sue their employer pursuant to section 12940, subdivision (i). Therefore, the employees of M&N who were coerced by M&N into violating Civil Code sections 51 and 51.5 could be individually liable for sex discrimination. The court explained that these employees would necessarily be "aggrieved" by their employer's unlawful employment practice as their personal interests would be affected by their employer's misconduct. Therefore, the Department was authorized to file a civil action on behalf of these employees and the trial court erred by dismissing the fifth cause of action. View "Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. M&N Financing Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Cheryl Thurston was blind and used screen reader software to access the Internet and read website content. Defendant-respondent Omni Hotels Management Corporation (Omni) operated hotels and resorts. In November 2016, Thurston initiated this action against Omni, alleging that its website was not fully accessible by the blind and the visually impaired, in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act. By way of a special verdict, the jury rejected Thurston’s claim and found that she never intended to make a hotel reservation or ascertain Omni’s prices and accommodations for the purpose of making a hotel reservation. On appeal, Thurston contended the trial court erred as a matter of law: (1) by instructing the jury that her claim required a finding that she intended to make a hotel reservation; and (2) by including the word “purpose” in the special verdict form, which caused the jury to make a “factual finding as to [her] motivation for using or attempting to use [Omni’s] Website.” Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Thurston v. Omni Hotels Management Corporation" on Justia Law