Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Coalition filed suit to enjoin a renovation and expansion project under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The Court of Appeal held, in light of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 519, that a disparate impact claim based on a gentrification theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. In the published portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's gentrification-based claims under the FHA and FEHA. View "Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 2019, Lopez was charged with seven felonies, including forcible rape against Amalia, the mother of his minor children. At his September 2020 trial, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Los Angeles Superior Courts were operating under the safety protocols in General Order No. 021, which mandated that all persons entering any courthouse wear a face mask covering the nose and mouth at all times. After a jury trial in which all persons in the courtroom were masked, including witnesses, Lopez was convicted on six charges. The court imposed a 16-year prison sentence and a 10-year protective order prohibiting Lopez from contact with Amalia and both children.The court of appeal rejected Lopez’s argument the court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by denying his pretrial motion to remain unmasked during the trial and to have all witnesses testify without a face mask. Supreme Court precedent establishes the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” The masking procedure fairly balanced Lopez's speedy trial rights with the need to reduce the substantial risk of infection to everyone in the courtroom. The court remanded in part; the minor children were not properly included in the postconviction protective order imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2(i). View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

After seeing Alvarez in their yard on their home security camera, the homeowners called 911. Deputies apprehended Alvarez just as he was at a side door to the house. Taking Alvarez to their patrol car, deputies noticed a large plastic trash bag and asked Alvarez whether the bag was his. Alvarez replied, “Yeah.” Deputies did not provide Alvarez with Miranda warnings before this exchange. Alvarez was convicted of first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code 459).The court of appeal affirmed. By not properly objecting at trial, Alvarez forfeited a “Miranda” argument that the trial court erred in admitting his statement about the bag. The court also rejected Alvarez’s argument that the court’s order during the COVID-19 pandemic that all persons in the courtroom, including testifying witnesses, wear a mask covering the mouth and part of the nose interfered with the jury’s ability to assess witness demeanor and thus violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The masking order satisfied an important public policy and retained essential safeguards of reliability. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law

The California Personnel Board (Board) sustained a complaint brought by Vickie Mabry-Height, M.D., against the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department) alleging discrimination based on age, race, and gender in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). The Board concluded that Dr. Mabry-Height established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination based on certain conduct, and the Department failed to rebut the presumption of discrimination by offering evidence that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for this conduct. The Department petitioned the trial court for a writ of administrative mandamus seeking an order setting aside the Board’s decision. The petition was denied, and judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Mabry-Height. The Department appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. State Personnel Bd." on Justia Law

In 2007, Langi was convicted of the second-degree murder of Martinez. Langi was one of four men who beat and robbed a group that included Martinez, who died after someone in Langi’s group punched him, causing him to fall and hit his head. Langi’s Penal Code section 1170.95 resentencing petition was filed before the 2021 amendment, which authorizes resentencing of persons convicted of murder “under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” Langi contends that another member of his group threw the fatal punch and that, although the trial court did not give an instruction framed in terms of the natural and probable consequences theory, the instructions were ambiguous and allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder under a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime. The trial court summarily denied his petition, finding that a 2009 opinion affirming his conviction established that he was convicted as the actual killer.The court of appeal reversed. Citing the Supreme Court’s 2021 "Lewis" decision, the court concluded that reliance on the 2009 opinion was improper. The record of conviction does not conclusively eliminate the possibility that the jury found Langi guilty of murder on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his participation in a crime. View "People v. Langi" on Justia Law

The Acting Warden of the California Institute for Men petitioned a Superior Court for authorization to perform electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) on inmate Rudy Terraza. Convicted of first-degree murder at age 17, Terraza was a 44-year-old with a history of mental illness. According to a prison psychiatrist, Terraza has a “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type . . . characterized by auditory hallucinations, delusions, and impairment in thought processing, volition and motivation, and social functioning, as well as significant mood swings, depression, and mania.” Despite medication and psychiatric treatment, his mental health had grown worse over time, and he had resided in a psychiatric hospital since September 2019. He had been “consumed” by voices, with no desire to socialize or “practice self-care.” He occupied a single hospital room and was unable to function in standard prison housing. A psychiatrist averred that ECT was the “gold standard” treatment for patients like Terraza; seizures produced by the treatment would "help the brain return to normal functioning." The trial court authorized ECT after making several findings required by the Penal Code, including that ECT would be beneficial and that there was a compelling justification for it. In this habeas proceeding, the inmate argued the state constitutional right to privacy required the appointment of a surrogate to make a consent determination for him, beyond trial court findings of ECT’s suitability. Upon consideration of precedent, the Court of Appeal concluded the state constitutional right to refuse medical treatment did not require appointment of a surrogate decisionmaker. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a court’s authorization of ECT therapy had to include a consideration of whether the inmate, when he or she was competent, expressed any preferences, views, or beliefs that would operate to preclude consent to the procedure. "By statute, such consideration is required for most medical procedures performed on incarcerated persons lacking capacity to consent." Because the statutory balancing test for ECT did not do so, the Court granted the writ to allow further consideration. View "In re Terraza" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a defamation case against defendant, alleging that defendant falsely told independent insurance agents that plaintiff is dishonest and unethical in her business practices and falsifies insurance documents. Defendant and Auchel World filed an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure 426.16, which the trial court granted.The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute does not protect defendant's statements because they squarely fall within the commercial speech exemption set forth in section 425.17, subdivision (c). Courts are admonished to examine section 425.17 as a threshold issue before proceeding to an analysis under section 425.16. Section 425.17 expressly provides that speech or conduct satisfying its criteria is entirely exempt from anti-SLAPP protection even if "the conduct or statement concerns an important public issue." In this case, the trial court also erred in finding that plaintiff's claims arose from protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). The court explained that defendant's alleged slander of a competitor in a private setting to solicit business is neither speech in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition nor the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue. View "Xu v. Huang" on Justia Law

After a scandal that led to plaintiff's resignation from his positions at Banc of California, plaintiff filed suit against Banc, several individual directors and Banc executives, and Banc's lead auditor. Defendant filed anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) motions to strike various of the causes of action plaintiff alleged.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the Brown order granting Defendant Brown's motion in part. The court held that statements in an annual 10-K report filed with the SEC constitute statements "made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by [an] official proceeding" under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). View "Sugarman v. Brown" on Justia Law

After a scandal that led to plaintiff's resignation from his positions at Banc of California, plaintiff filed suit against Banc, several individual directors and Banc executives, and Banc's lead auditor. Defendant filed anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuits against public participation, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16) motions to strike various of the causes of action plaintiff alleged.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal held that statements Banc made in its Forms 8-K and 10-Q filed with the SEC, as well as related investor presentations and conversations, are protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) as matters under review and consideration by the SEC. Furthermore, statements related to financial projections were also protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), as matters of public interest. View "Sugarman v. Benett" on Justia Law

Lange drove past California Highway Patrol Officer Weikert, who noticed Lange was blaring music and honking unnecessarily. Weikert followed Lange, activating his overhead lights to signal that Lange should pull over. Seconds later, Lange arrived at the driveway of his home and drove into his attached garage. Weikert followed Lange into the garage and began questioning him. Lange appeared intoxicated. Weikert conducted field sobriety tests, which Lange failed. Lange’s blood-alcohol content was over three times the legal limit. Lange, charged with DUI and operating a vehicle’s sound system at excessive levels, unsuccessfully moved to suppress all evidence collected after Weikert entered Lange’s garage.In 2019, the court of appeal affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, reasoning that an officer’s hot pursuit into the house to prevent the suspect from frustrating the arrest is always permissible under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the “flight of a suspected misdemeanant does not always justify a warrantless entry into a home”; an “officer must consider all the circumstances in a pursuit case to determine whether there is a law enforcement emergency,” and vacated for reconsideration.The court of appeal again affirmed the denial of the motion. Weikert followed binding state appellate law when he entered the garage in pursuit of Lange. The exclusionary rule does not require exclusion of the evidence seized in Lange’s home, even though under the Supreme Court’s new pronouncement. View "People v. Lange" on Justia Law