Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in California Courts of Appeal
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Lucas was living at the Aranda, a residential hotel that provides supportive housing to formerly homeless individuals. The management company sought a workplace violence restraining order (Code Civ. Proc. 527.8) against Lucas with affidavits from four employees, alleging that Lucas had been very aggressive and confrontational toward other tenants and Aranda employees.The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Lucas filed a response, denying all of the allegations. Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing. Only a janitor (Yee) and Lucas provided testimony. The trial court questioned Yee, who affirmed that each of the allegations in his affidavit was correct. Lucas then testified, answering questions posed by his attorney. Lucas’ counsel requested an opportunity to cross-examine Yee and any of the other witnesses. The trial court stated it had no authority to allow cross-examination at such a hearing and granted a three-year workplace violence restraining order, based on “clear and convincing evidence” that had “been supported” and was “logical” and “believable.” The court of appeal reversed. The court’s failure here to allow Lucas to cross-examine Yee was contrary to section 527.8(j) and raised due process concerns. View "CSV Hospitality Management v. Lucas" on Justia Law

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Appellants Patricia Flores and Angelica Sanchez appealed after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor defendant City of San Diego (the City). Flores and Sanchez sued the City for wrongful death and negligence, respectively, in connection with the death of William Flores, who was operating a motorcycle that was the subject of a police vehicle pursuit when he crashed and was killed. The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from liability under the grant of immunity provided for in Vehicle Code section 17004.7. The Court of Appeal concluded that the vehicle pursuit policy training required by section 17004.7 had to meet certain basic standards that were set forth in California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 1081, as adopted by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (the POST Commission), including an annual one-hour minimum time standard set out in that regulation, before a governmental entity was entitled to immunity under the statute. "Not only did the City fail to present undisputed evidence that the training it provided in the year prior to the incident at issue met the annual one-hour standard, but the City failed to dispute the fact, put forth by appellants, that the training implemented by the City comprised a single video of less than half the required one-hour duration." In the absence of training that met the standards imposed by Regulation 1081, as required by section 17004.7, the City was not entitled to immunity under that statute, as a matter of law. Summary judgment in favor of the City was therefore erroneously granted, and the judgment had to be reversed. View "Flores v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

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In this employment matter, Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant and respondent Foster Poultry Farms LLC (Foster Farms), on her claims of discrimination based on disability and race/national origin, and retaliation, under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and Labor Code section 1102.5. The principal issue on appeal is whether a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination under Labor Code section 132a has res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in the instant action.   The Fifth Appellate district reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was based on giving collateral estoppel effect to the WCAB decision. The court that Foster Farms is not entitled to summary adjudication, based on application of the collateral estoppel doctrine, on Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in an interactive process. Foster Farms’ argument that summary adjudication is warranted, in light of the WCAB decision, on Plaintiff’s remaining claims for failure to take all reasonable measures to prevent discrimination under FEHA, retaliation for asserting FEHA rights, and retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, is unavailing. View "Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC" on Justia Law

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Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) Cash Handlers are supervised by Foreworkers. A labor agreement describes the selection of Foreworkers by an Evaluation Committee, comprised of three union representatives and three management representatives. Eight criteria, with assigned point values, are used. Each qualified applicant takes a written test and completes an oral interview with the Committee.In 2014, Plaintiffs sued BART alleging racial discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by not promoting them to Foreworker in favor of less experienced non-African-Americans. Under a 2016 settlement, Plaintiffs released their employment-related claims; BART paid them a certain sum, admitting no liability. In the following years, the Evaluation Committee appointed four new Foreworkers; each had received the highest total point scores. No Plaintiff was promoted. Plaintiffs again sued BART under FEHA, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact race discrimination.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of BART. There was evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Plaintiffs (selection process scores). Plaintiffs failed to submit evidence that BART’s stated reason for not promoting them was untrue or that racial bias against African-Americans drove the promotion decisions. Plaintiffs did not present evidence of a statistically significant disparity between the percentage of qualified African-American applicants for the Foreworker position and the percentage of African-Americans promoted to Foreworker. View "Arega v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, surgeon Aram Bonni sued his employers, defendants Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center and St. Joseph Hospital of Orange, as well several other related entities and physicians (collectively, the Hospitals) for retaliation under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. Bonni alleged he made whistleblower complaints, which caused the Hospitals to retaliate against him by, among other things, suspending his medical staff privileges and initiating peer review proceedings to evaluate his privileges. In response, the Hospitals filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing Bonni’s retaliation cause of action arose from the peer review proceedings, which were protected activity, and that his claims had no merit. The trial court agreed and granted the motion in its entirety. Bonni appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Bonni’s retaliation claim did not arise from protected activity. The California Supreme Court then granted review, determining Bonni’s retaliation cause of action was composed of 19 distinct retaliation claims. Of these claims, it found eight arose from protected activity while the remainder did not. It remanded the matter back to the Court of Appeal to determine whether Bonni had shown a probability of prevailing on those eight claims. On remand, the appellate court concluded Bonni has not met the requisite burden because the eight claims at issue were all precluded by the litigation privilege. Based on this finding and the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the Hospitals’ anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The trial court was directed to enter an order granting the motion as to the eight claims at issue and denying it as to the remaining retaliation claims. View "Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System" on Justia Law

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Defendant Chopard USA Ltd. (Chopard) appealed the trial court’s order of attorney fees and costs in favor of Plaintiff. Plaintiff, who is legally blind, alleged a single cause of action against Chopard under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that Chopard failed to ensure that its website was adequately accessible to her.   On appeal, Chopard argued that Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees and costs. Alternatively, it argued that the trial court’s award of fees was excessive and unreasonable. The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order. The court further rejected Plaintiff’s request for additional attorney fees, as she failed to file a cross-appeal raising the contention. The court explained that as the party challenging the fee award, the appellant has the affirmative obligation to provide an adequate record so that the court may assess whether the trial court abused its discretion; failure to do so may result in affirmance. Here, Chopard has not met this burden. Although the trial court’s order and judgment awarding attorney fees are in the record, they do not reflect the trial court’s reasons for accepting Plaintiff’s calculations.  The hearing was not reported, and without a reporter’s transcript, there is no basis upon which to review the reasoning underlying the trial court’s determination of the amount of attorney fees to award. However, the court wrote it cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion on the record. View "Gutierrez v. Chopard USA Ltd." on Justia Law

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In 2020, California and Santa Clara County issued public health orders intended to combat the Covid-19 pandemic, including orders restricting indoor gatherings and requiring face coverings, social distancing, and submission of a social distancing protocol by businesses, including churches. Calvary Chapel failed to comply with those orders. On November 2, 2020, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order, followed by a November 24 modified TRO, and a preliminary injunction that enjoined Calvary from holding indoor gatherings that did not comply with the restrictions on indoor gatherings and requirements that participants wear face coverings and social distance. Calvary was also enjoined from operating without submitting a social distancing protocol. Calvary violated the orders, failing to comply with any of the public health orders.The government sought an order of contempt, which the trial court issued on December 17, 2020, ordering Calvary and its pastors to pay monetary sanctions (Code of Civil Procedure sections 177.51 and 1218(a)). The court of appeal annulled the contempt orders and reversed the sanctions. The temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are facially unconstitutional under the recent guidance of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the First Amendment’s protection of the free exercise of religion in the context of public health orders that impact religious practice. View "People v. Calvary Chapel San Jose" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, as successor in interest to his brother, sought reversal of a judgment of dismissal following the successful demurrer of Cot’n Wash, Inc. (CW) to a complaint against CW alleging a single violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, Section 51 et seq.) (the Unruh Act). The operative complaint alleged CW violated the Unruh Act by intentionally maintaining a retail website that was inaccessible to the visually impaired because it was not fully compatible with screen reading software. On appeal, Martinez argues that the trial court erred in concluding (1) the alleged inaccessibility of CW’s website did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. Section 12111 et seq.) (the ADA), specifically Title III of the ADA (42 U.S.C. Sections 12181−12189) (Title III) and (2) the complaint did not allege sufficient facts to establish CW’s discriminatory intent, which the Unruh Act requires in the absence of an ADA violation.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The court held that the trial court was correct on both points. As to intentional discrimination, the California Supreme Court has held that the discriminatory effect of a facially neutral policy or action is not alone a basis for inferring intentional discrimination under the Unruh Act. As to the ADA violation theory, Plaintiff has not alleged, as he must in order for Title III of the ADA to apply, that CW’s website constitutes a “place of public accommodation.” View "Martinez v. Cot'n Wash, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff worked as a driver for California Transit. After California Transit terminated his employment, Evenskaas filed this wage and hour class action against California Transit; its owner, and the company that administered California Transit’s payroll, Personnel Staffing Group, LLC (collectively, the California Transit defendants).   Because Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement, in which he agreed to arbitrate all claims arising from his employment and waived his right to seek class-wide relief, the California Transit defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion. The California Transit defendants appealed, contending the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement.   The Second Appellate District reversed the order denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is reversed. The court directed the trial court to enter a new order granting the motion and dismissing Plaintiff’s class claims. The court explained that because the paratransit services California Transit hired Plaintiff to provide involve interstate commerce for purposes of the FAA, the FAA applies to the arbitration agreement and preempts the Gentry rule that certain class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are unenforceable. View "Evenskaas v. California Transit, Inc." on Justia Law

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After the police saw Ayon commit two minor traffic violations, they stopped him in his car and detained him until a narcotics dog arrived, 12 minutes and 45 seconds into the stop. After the dog indicated the presence of drugs, the police searched the car, wherein they found cocaine, methamphetamine, currency, and a scale. The trial court denied Ayon’s motion to suppress, rejecting his argument that the police unlawfully prolonged the duration of the stop in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.The court of appeal reversed. “A careful reading of the record shows the stop was actually part of a preexisting drug investigation, and the police used the traffic infractions as a pretext for the stop.” While that fact does not by itself render the search unconstitutional, based on the evidence in the record viewed objectively—including police body camera videos of the stop—the police unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. One officer’s body camera continued to record for a total of 61 minutes, at which time the stop and search were still underway. View "People v. Ayon" on Justia Law