Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Andrew Shouse was terminated from his employment as a captain of the Riverside County Sheriff’s Office (RCSO, the Department, or respondent), following an administrative hearing. Findings on the record reflected petitioner engaged in improper sexual relationships with subordinates under his command, misappropriated county equipment and electronic mail for his personal use, was insubordinate in violating a direct order prohibiting him from contacting any person with whom he had had a personal relationship during the pendency of the investigation, and unbecoming conduct discrediting the Sheriff’s Department. Following an administrative appeal, the findings were sustained. Petitioner petitioned for writ of mandate seeking review of his dismissal, and, upon denial of that petition, he appealed. The sole legal issue presented was whether petitioner’s rights pursuant to the Public Safety Officer’s Bill of Rights (POBRA) were violated where the investigation into his alleged improper conduct was not completed within one year of discovery. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Shouse v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against his former employer, Facility Solutions Group, Inc. (FSG), for disability discrimination and related causes of action under the Fair Employment & Housing Act. The same month Plaintiff filed this class action against FSG for Labor Code violations, which also included a claim under the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004.   The trial court in this action denied FSG’s motion, finding unconscionability permeated the arbitration agreement because it had a low to moderate level of procedural unconscionability and at least six substantively unconscionable terms, making severance infeasible. On appeal, FSG contends claim and issue preclusion required the trial court in this action to enforce the arbitration agreement.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court agreed with the trial court that the arbitration agreement is permeated with unconscionability, and the court cannot simply sever the offending provisions. Rather, the court would need to rewrite the agreement, creating a new agreement to which the parties never agreed. Moreover, upholding this type of agreement with multiple unconscionable terms would create an incentive for an employer to draft a onesided arbitration agreement in the hope employees would not challenge the unlawful provisions, but if they do, the court would simply modify the agreement to include the bilateral terms the employer should have included in the first place. View "Mills v. Facility Solutions Group" on Justia Law

The Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (Department) revoked a nightclub’s liquor license after the club’s owner, GC Brothers Entertainment LLC dba The Palms (Petitioner), failed to respond to an accusation alleging several violations of California statutes and regulations. Petitioner appealed the Department’s decision to the Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board (Appeals Board), which affirmed it, and now seeks a writ of mandate directing the Department to vacate its decision.   The Second Appellate District granted the writ. The court held that the licensing scheme and strong state policy in favor of resolving cases on the merits grant an ALJ discretion to issue an OSC when he or she receives even an arguably deficient motion for relief from default. It thus runs contrary to the spirit of the licensing scheme to insist that a licensee present its complete and best case for relief within seven days of service of a notice of default. Here, the ALJ not only apparently believed he had no discretion to liberally construe Respondent’s motion for relief, but also found that Respondent’s failure to establish an irrelevant issue—proper service—constituted a failure to show good cause for relief. The ALJ’s failure to appreciate the scope of his discretion and application of an improper standard requires that we remand the matter to afford the ALJ an opportunity to exercise his discretion in the first instance and, applying the proper standard, determine whether Petitioner has shown good cause for relief from default. View "GC Brothers Entertainment v. Alcoholic Beverage Control etc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff began working for the defendant Employer in 2006 as a sales representative. In March 2015, she accepted a position as an Area Sales Manager, which she held until June 2017, when she was promoted to the position of Field Sales Director. Later in 2017, as part of a corporate reorganization, Plaintiff's position was eliminated and she was terminated. Plaintiff raised several claims under FEHA and the Equal Pay Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to Employer.The Second Appellate District reversed in part, finding that Plaintiff raise triable issues of fact on her Equal Pay Act claims. The court otherwise affirmed. View "Allen v. Staples, Inc." on Justia Law

In a matter of first impression for the Court of Appeal, the issue presented for review centered on whether the 45-day time period to file a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories began to run upon service of a combination of unverified responses and objections if the motion challenged only the objections. Petitioner was a corporate entity running golf establishments in the state of California. Real parties in interest brought a number of gender discrimination claims against petitioner stemming from certain women-only promotions offered in its stores. Petitioner served each real party in interest with a set of interrogatories; each party either delayed in responding or did not respond at all, compelling petitioner to move to compel responses. Petitioner sought substantive responses to these questions, and Plaintiffs objected to all of them based on privacy assertions. In opposition to the motions, all three parties argued the interrogatories were untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300(c) and that the notices actually filed and served were inadequate without supporting documentation. The trial court agreed and denied both motions as untimely; it ordered sanctions against petitioner. Petitioner then sought a writ of peremptory mandate overturning the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause on November 24, 2021, to which real parties in interest filed a return. To the issue presented, the Court answered in the negative, and disagreed with the trial court’s analysis concluding otherwise. "The most reasonable construction of the applicable statutes seems to us to require verification of such a hybrid of responses and objections before the time period begins to run. ... Petitioner’s motions may have involved a vagary of civil procedure, but the motions were properly denied because of petitioner’s own mistakes. Petitioner failed to initiate a meet and confer attempt early in the 45-day period which necessitated law and motion practice on a rushed timeline. Because of this, petitioner had to scramble to file a motion on the deadline itself, and apparently encountered technical issues which delayed the filing to the day after the deadline. And for reasons we cannot fathom, petitioner chose to file incomplete moving papers to boot. There was no substantial justification for this, and we cannot say the court abused its discretion in awarding respondents sanctions." View "Golf & Tennis Pro Shop v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Lucas was living at the Aranda, a residential hotel that provides supportive housing to formerly homeless individuals. The management company sought a workplace violence restraining order (Code Civ. Proc. 527.8) against Lucas with affidavits from four employees, alleging that Lucas had been very aggressive and confrontational toward other tenants and Aranda employees.The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. Lucas filed a response, denying all of the allegations. Both parties were represented by counsel at the hearing. Only a janitor (Yee) and Lucas provided testimony. The trial court questioned Yee, who affirmed that each of the allegations in his affidavit was correct. Lucas then testified, answering questions posed by his attorney. Lucas’ counsel requested an opportunity to cross-examine Yee and any of the other witnesses. The trial court stated it had no authority to allow cross-examination at such a hearing and granted a three-year workplace violence restraining order, based on “clear and convincing evidence” that had “been supported” and was “logical” and “believable.” The court of appeal reversed. The court’s failure here to allow Lucas to cross-examine Yee was contrary to section 527.8(j) and raised due process concerns. View "CSV Hospitality Management v. Lucas" on Justia Law

Appellants Patricia Flores and Angelica Sanchez appealed after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor defendant City of San Diego (the City). Flores and Sanchez sued the City for wrongful death and negligence, respectively, in connection with the death of William Flores, who was operating a motorcycle that was the subject of a police vehicle pursuit when he crashed and was killed. The City moved for summary judgment on the ground that it was immune from liability under the grant of immunity provided for in Vehicle Code section 17004.7. The Court of Appeal concluded that the vehicle pursuit policy training required by section 17004.7 had to meet certain basic standards that were set forth in California Code of Regulations, title 11, section 1081, as adopted by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (the POST Commission), including an annual one-hour minimum time standard set out in that regulation, before a governmental entity was entitled to immunity under the statute. "Not only did the City fail to present undisputed evidence that the training it provided in the year prior to the incident at issue met the annual one-hour standard, but the City failed to dispute the fact, put forth by appellants, that the training implemented by the City comprised a single video of less than half the required one-hour duration." In the absence of training that met the standards imposed by Regulation 1081, as required by section 17004.7, the City was not entitled to immunity under that statute, as a matter of law. Summary judgment in favor of the City was therefore erroneously granted, and the judgment had to be reversed. View "Flores v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In this employment matter, Plaintiff appealed from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Defendant and respondent Foster Poultry Farms LLC (Foster Farms), on her claims of discrimination based on disability and race/national origin, and retaliation, under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and Labor Code section 1102.5. The principal issue on appeal is whether a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability discrimination under Labor Code section 132a has res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in the instant action.   The Fifth Appellate district reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was based on giving collateral estoppel effect to the WCAB decision. The court that Foster Farms is not entitled to summary adjudication, based on application of the collateral estoppel doctrine, on Plaintiff’s claims for disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and failure to engage in an interactive process. Foster Farms’ argument that summary adjudication is warranted, in light of the WCAB decision, on Plaintiff’s remaining claims for failure to take all reasonable measures to prevent discrimination under FEHA, retaliation for asserting FEHA rights, and retaliation under Labor Code section 1102.5, is unavailing. View "Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC" on Justia Law

Bay Area Rapid Transit District (BART) Cash Handlers are supervised by Foreworkers. A labor agreement describes the selection of Foreworkers by an Evaluation Committee, comprised of three union representatives and three management representatives. Eight criteria, with assigned point values, are used. Each qualified applicant takes a written test and completes an oral interview with the Committee.In 2014, Plaintiffs sued BART alleging racial discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by not promoting them to Foreworker in favor of less experienced non-African-Americans. Under a 2016 settlement, Plaintiffs released their employment-related claims; BART paid them a certain sum, admitting no liability. In the following years, the Evaluation Committee appointed four new Foreworkers; each had received the highest total point scores. No Plaintiff was promoted. Plaintiffs again sued BART under FEHA, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact race discrimination.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of BART. There was evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for not promoting Plaintiffs (selection process scores). Plaintiffs failed to submit evidence that BART’s stated reason for not promoting them was untrue or that racial bias against African-Americans drove the promotion decisions. Plaintiffs did not present evidence of a statistically significant disparity between the percentage of qualified African-American applicants for the Foreworker position and the percentage of African-Americans promoted to Foreworker. View "Arega v. Bay Area Rapid Transit District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, surgeon Aram Bonni sued his employers, defendants Mission Hospital Regional Medical Center and St. Joseph Hospital of Orange, as well several other related entities and physicians (collectively, the Hospitals) for retaliation under California Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. Bonni alleged he made whistleblower complaints, which caused the Hospitals to retaliate against him by, among other things, suspending his medical staff privileges and initiating peer review proceedings to evaluate his privileges. In response, the Hospitals filed an anti-SLAPP motion, arguing Bonni’s retaliation cause of action arose from the peer review proceedings, which were protected activity, and that his claims had no merit. The trial court agreed and granted the motion in its entirety. Bonni appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Bonni’s retaliation claim did not arise from protected activity. The California Supreme Court then granted review, determining Bonni’s retaliation cause of action was composed of 19 distinct retaliation claims. Of these claims, it found eight arose from protected activity while the remainder did not. It remanded the matter back to the Court of Appeal to determine whether Bonni had shown a probability of prevailing on those eight claims. On remand, the appellate court concluded Bonni has not met the requisite burden because the eight claims at issue were all precluded by the litigation privilege. Based on this finding and the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order granting the Hospitals’ anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The trial court was directed to enter an order granting the motion as to the eight claims at issue and denying it as to the remaining retaliation claims. View "Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System" on Justia Law