Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

When a person is arrested for driving under the influence, the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") holds a hearing to determine if the driver's license should be suspended. The DMV requires that the hearing officers act as both advocates for the DMV as well as triers of fact. The DMV also authorizes managers to change hearing officers’ decisions, or demand hearing officers change their decisions, without providing notice to the driver.Plaintiffs, a group of lawyers, challenged the DMV's administrative hearings process on three grounds. The district court resolved one of Plaintiffs' grounds in favor of the DMV in summary judgment, entering judgment as a matter of law for Plaintiffs on their two remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the hearing officers' dual roles as an advocate for the DMV and adjudicator violates drivers’ due process rights; and (2) granting the DMV’s motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim.The Second Appellate District reversed on these issues, finding Plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all their 1983 claim. The lack of neutral hearing officers violates drivers’ federal and state due process rights. The court also found that the trial court did not err in awarding attorneys fees to Plaintiffs. However, because Plaintiff's succeeded on appeal, the court remanded the case for a recalculation of the attorney's fee award. View "California DUI Lawyers Assn. v. Cal. Dept. of Motor Vehicles CA2/" on Justia Law

Vacaville Officer Hill followed a car and noticed the license plate light and third brake light at the vehicle's back window appeared not to be working. Hill initiated a traffic stop. Pantoja was alone in the car. When Pantoja gave his name, Hill remembered Pantoja “had a history of violence and firearm possession, and he was at the time an investigative lead in a homicide.” There was no smell of marijuana and no contraband in plain view. Hill saw no signs that Pantoja was intoxicated. Hill ran a record check and learned Pantoja had a valid license and was not on probation or parole. Hill asked Pantoja if he could look in the vehicle for contraband. Pantoja declined. Hill then asked Pantoja to exit his car and put his hands behind his head because Hill was going to issue a citation for the lighting infractions. Pantoja did not make any furtive gestures or sudden movements. As Hill patted Pantoja’s waistband area, he found a revolver. Pantoja was arrested.The trial court granted Pantoja’s motion to suppress, explaining: “[T]he officer … didn’t have any specific or articulable facts to believe that this individual was presently armed or dangerous. The court of appeal affirmed. An officer’s knowledge of a suspect’s past arrests or convictions is inadequate to furnish reasonable suspicion as is the knowledge that a suspect is merely under investigation. View "People v. Pantoja" on Justia Law

The defendant hired the plaintiff as a gardener and required him to sign an employment agreement (“Agreement”), which mandates arbitration of “all disputes between Employee and Company relating, in any manner whatsoever, to the employment or termination” of the employee. Plaintiff sued his employer, and the employer demanded arbitration. Plaintiff argued that the defendant waived the right to arbitrate, that he did not sign the Agreement or signed without informed consent, and the Agreement is unconscionable.On appeal, the court reasoned that arbitration agreements are “valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1281. To declare an agreement unenforceable, a court must find procedural and substantive unconscionability. Here, the court found that defendant had superior bargaining power over the plaintiff. Further, the employer drafted the Agreement and presented it to the plaintiff as a condition of employment on a take-it-or-leave basis. The plaintiff claimed he had no opportunity to review the Agreement and was told the English-language Agreement involved a company change, not that it waived his right to a jury trial. The plaintiff was instructed to sign the Agreement or be fired.The court found that the employer presented the plaintiff with an agreement in a language he cannot read, misrepresented the nature of the document, denied him an opportunity to review it, included unfair and onerous provisions, and chilled his ability to claim civil rights violations. Thus, the court denied the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Nunez v. Cycad Management LLC" on Justia Law

Holiman was found in possession of illegal drugs and a handgun during a traffic stop initiated after he made a right-hand turn at a stop sign, while the arresting officer’s patrol car was stopped directly behind him. Holiman did signal the turn, but the basis for the traffic stop was that he did not turn on his signal blinker early enough: for the 100 feet he drove before coming to a stop. The arresting officer cited him for violation of Vehicle Code section 22108. The trial court denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence, following which he pled guilty to two felony drug charges.The court of appeal reversed. The warrantless seizure of the evidence violated the Fourth Amendment because the police lacked objectively reasonable suspicion. Holiman’s turn did not violate the Vehicle Code, and no reasonable police officer could think that it did. The statute refers to “the giving of an appropriate signal in the manner provided in this chapter in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement.” The prosecution presented no evidence that the turn could have affected any vehicle, including the officer’s patrol car. View "People v. Holiman" on Justia Law

In 1984, Friend robbed an Oakland bar and fatally stabbed Pierucci. Convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with a special circumstance, Friend was sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and denied Friend’s state habeas corpus petition.Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016, requires that capital habeas corpus petitions generally be presented to the sentencing court and that a successive habeas corpus petition be dismissed unless the court finds that the petitioner makes a showing of actual innocence or ineligibility for the death penalty. A petitioner may appeal the denial of a successive petition only if the sentencing court or the court of appeal grants a certificate of appealability (COA). The sentencing court denied Friend’s second habeas petition and his request for a COA. The court of appeal denied a COA. The California Supreme Court remanded with directions to analyze whether Friend made a substantial showing that the claims in his second habeas corpus petition are not successive.On remand, the court of appeal again denied relief. Friend essentially acknowledged that all the claims in his second petition were either known or could and should have been discovered earlier and he failed to allege specific facts showing the omission of some claims from the initial petition reflects incompetence of prior habeas counsel. Friend failed to show a substantial claim that he is either actually innocent or ineligible for the death sentence. View "In re Friend" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal held that the predominant relationship between a medical resident and a hospital residency program is an employee-employer relationship, and so the rule of academic deference does not apply to the jury's determination whether the resident was terminated for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons. In this case, plaintiff presented credible evidence of gender discrimination and retaliation by SMMC, and there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the erroneous jury instruction, she would have obtained a more favorable verdict. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Khoiny v. Dignity Health" on Justia Law

On March 4, 2020, Governor Newsom declared a state of emergency in response to the global outbreak of COVID-19, On March 16, the San Francisco Health Officer issued a shelter-in-place order. On March 23, Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye issued an emergency statewide order suspending jury trials and continuing them for 60 days, extending by 60 days the speedy trial time period provided for in Penal Code section 1382 for holding a criminal trial. The order was later extended an additional 30 days. In December, in response to the surge in COVID-19 cases, the San Francisco health officer issued another stay-at-home order. After trials resumed, there were backlogs and trials were continued beyond the statutory deadlines. Defendants alleged violations of their speedy trial rightsThe court of appeal declined to order dismissal of their cases. The continuances were supported by good cause. In making a determination of good cause based on reasons of court congestion or backlog, the critical inquiry is whether the congestion or backlog is attributable to chronic conditions as opposed to exceptional circumstances considering all of the relevant circumstances. The District Attorney adequately showed exceptional circumstances connected to the COVID-19 pandemic, not chronic conditions in the court. View "Hernandez-Valenzuela v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit to enjoin a renovation and expansion project under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, section 12900 et seq.). The Court of Appeal held, in light of Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (2015) 576 U.S. 519, that a disparate impact claim based on a gentrification theory is not cognizable under the Fair Housing Act. In the published portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Coalition's gentrification-based claims under the FHA and FEHA. View "Crenshaw Subway Coalition v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

In 2019, Lopez was charged with seven felonies, including forcible rape against Amalia, the mother of his minor children. At his September 2020 trial, during the global COVID-19 pandemic, Los Angeles Superior Courts were operating under the safety protocols in General Order No. 021, which mandated that all persons entering any courthouse wear a face mask covering the nose and mouth at all times. After a jury trial in which all persons in the courtroom were masked, including witnesses, Lopez was convicted on six charges. The court imposed a 16-year prison sentence and a 10-year protective order prohibiting Lopez from contact with Amalia and both children.The court of appeal rejected Lopez’s argument the court violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses by denying his pretrial motion to remain unmasked during the trial and to have all witnesses testify without a face mask. Supreme Court precedent establishes the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute and “must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” The masking procedure fairly balanced Lopez's speedy trial rights with the need to reduce the substantial risk of infection to everyone in the courtroom. The court remanded in part; the minor children were not properly included in the postconviction protective order imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 136.2(i). View "People v. Lopez" on Justia Law

After seeing Alvarez in their yard on their home security camera, the homeowners called 911. Deputies apprehended Alvarez just as he was at a side door to the house. Taking Alvarez to their patrol car, deputies noticed a large plastic trash bag and asked Alvarez whether the bag was his. Alvarez replied, “Yeah.” Deputies did not provide Alvarez with Miranda warnings before this exchange. Alvarez was convicted of first-degree residential burglary (Pen. Code 459).The court of appeal affirmed. By not properly objecting at trial, Alvarez forfeited a “Miranda” argument that the trial court erred in admitting his statement about the bag. The court also rejected Alvarez’s argument that the court’s order during the COVID-19 pandemic that all persons in the courtroom, including testifying witnesses, wear a mask covering the mouth and part of the nose interfered with the jury’s ability to assess witness demeanor and thus violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The masking order satisfied an important public policy and retained essential safeguards of reliability. View "People v. Alvarez" on Justia Law