Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Ross was charged with battery on a nonconfined person by a prisoner. Ross pleaded guilty to the administrative charge of battering the counselor. At trial, several officers and an intercepted letter corroborated the victim’s testimony about the attack. The defense presented no evidence. During discussions about jury instructions, Ross declared, “Man, you are fired” and “I will represent myself.” Ross cursed at the court, which had him removed. Defense attorney Fallman stated that he tried to talk with Ross, who refused and declined to return to the courtroom. Fallman noted that Ross had fired his previous attorney and that he knew of no “provocation.” The court continued without Ross. During closing arguments, Fallman admitted Ross touched the officer willingly, in a harmful or offensive manner, but argued there was no preplanning or weapon. Fallman asked the jury to find Ross guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery. The jury convicted Ross, finding two prior strike allegations true. Finding six aggravating factors true and no mitigating factors, the court sentenced Ross to the upper term of four years, doubled to eight years under the Three Strike Law.The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting Ross’s argument that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment rights by conceding his guilt. There was no evidence that his claimed desire to maintain innocence to the exclusion of all other defense strategies was ever communicated to Fallman or the court. The court remanded for resentencing due to Senate Bill 567., which requires that when a statute specifies three potential terms of imprisonment, a court must presumptively impose the middle term. View "People v. Ross" on Justia Law

Casey N. sued the County of Orange (the County) and two employees of the County’s Social Services Agency (the Agency) for violating her civil rights in connection with a dependency proceeding involving Casey’s minor child. A jury found in Casey’s favor and awarded her damages. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: (1) the trial court did not err by failing to determine the materiality of allegedly fabricated or misrepresented evidence or omitted exculpatory evidence before giving the case to the jury for deliberation; (2) the jury’s verdict against the employees was supported by substantial evidence; (3) the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the jury’s verdict against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) was supported by substantial evidence. View "Casey N. v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff R. Kemp was convicted, released from prison, and placed on parole. In 2020, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) offered Kemp a job in Sacramento. Defendant Accurate Background LLC (Accurate) provided a background report to Amazon revealing Kemp’s criminal conviction. Amazon then withdrew its job offer. Because Kemp’s 2011 conviction predated the 2020 report by more than seven years, he filed a complaint alleging Accurate: (1) violated the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA); (2) violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA); and (3) derivatively violated the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Accurate filed a demurrer: Kemp’s parole ended in 2014, which predated the 2020 report by less than seven years. Accurate argued under the ICRAA and the CCRAA, “the term ‘parole’ refers to the end of the parole period,” thus barring liability. Alternatively, Accurate argued the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted the state ICRAA, and therefore Kemp’s ICRAA claim was barred as a matter of law. The trial court overruled Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the plain meaning of ‘from the date of . . . parole’ refers to the start date of conditional release.” The court sustained Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the FCRA preempts the ICRAA claim.” Accurate and Kemp both filed petitions for extraordinary writ relief to the Court of Appeal. The Court held the phrase "from the date of parole" referred to the start date of parole, and the FCRA did not preempt Kemp’s ICRAA claim. Thus, the appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order, which partially sustained Accurate’s demurrer, and to issue a new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. View "Kemp v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

M.G. was detained in August 2022 for the 14-day confinement allowed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250 (Lanterman-Petris-Short Act). The 14-day period was set to expire September 4. On August 26, a Friday, M.G. sought habeas relief ordering her release, arguing that she was not mentally disordered, gravely disabled, or a danger to anyone. A hearing was set for the following Tuesday, August 30. M.G. is hearing impaired; she requested two sign language interpreters: an ASL interpreter and a certified deaf interpreter. Relay interpreting using both interpreters was necessary for M.G. to understand the proceedings and communicate with counsel. On Tuesday, the court informed the parties that neither interpreter was available that day. The hearing was continued to Thursday, September 1. On August 31, M.G. petitioned the appeal court.After the court issued an order to show cause, counsel indicated M.G. had been released. Unable to grant the relief requested—release from confinement—the court denied her petition as moot, noting that temporary confinement can last at most 14 days, so a challenge to its propriety will routinely evade appellate review. Welfare and Institutions Code 5276 imposes a mandatory duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days of a detained person’s request; failure to do so requires that the detainee be immediately released. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minor had been sexually abused by her father. Mother was not named as an offending parent in the petition. The juvenile court found that the Department failed to prove the sexual abuse allegations against the father but did not dismiss the petition. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported jurisdiction based upon unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by the mother, a position urged by the minor’s counsel but opposed by the Department. The court subsequently entered a disposition order.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court violated the mother’s due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on the conduct of a parent the Department never alleged was an offending parent, and on a factual and legal theory not raised in the Department’s petition. Parents have a due process right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so that they can make an informed decision on whether to appear, prepare, and contest the allegations. View "In re S.V." on Justia Law

The California Constitution directs that laws be made to exclude “persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes” from serving on juries. Former Code of Civil Procedure 203(a)), provided, “All persons are eligible and qualified to be prospective trial jurors, except” “Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights have not been restored.” In 2019, Senate Bill 310 eliminated the exclusion of persons convicted of felonies from serving on juries. Section 203(a) now excepts from eligibility to serve as jurors “Persons while they are incarcerated. … Persons who have been convicted of a felony and are currently on parole, postrelease community supervision felony probation, or mandated supervision for the conviction of a felony. … Persons who are currently required to register as a sex offender … based on a felony conviction.”Plaintiffs alleged that the categorical exclusion of current sex offender registrants from jury service denied registrants equal protection under the California Constitution. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit. The statutory disparity withstands rational basis scrutiny. Plausible reasons for the Legislature’s line-drawing include ensuring impartial juries by excluding those persons convicted of felonies deemed more likely to harbor anti-government bias. View "Doe v. Finke" on Justia Law

The Department of State Hospitals (DSH) serves defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST). Chunn was found incompetent to stand trial. After being ordered admitted to Napa State Hospital, he waited 75 days for admission. Chunn argued that DHS’s failure to promptly commence competency assessment and treatment violated his state and federal due process rights. Other defendants, also found incompetent to stand trial, sought sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 against DSH. The trial court consolidated the cases and ordered DSH to implement specific steps within specific timeframes to meet its obligations to IST defendants in Solano County. DSH appealed. Four months later, another court of appeal (Stiavetti) concluded that the DSH had systematically violated the due process rights of all California IST defendants, holding that 28 days is the maximum constitutional limit for commencing substantive services to restore IST defendants to competency.The court of appeal remanded the Chunn order. The trial court’s ruling did not violate separation of powers principles at the time it was made, nor, for the most part, does it conflict with Stiavetti. The court did not abuse its discretion. The problems created by limited funding, resources, and bed space and the many efforts by DSH do not relieve DSH of its responsibilities. Some aspects of the order must be modified and others may be reconsidered, due to changes in the law. Welfare and Institutions Code section 4335.2 now allows DSH to conduct “reevaluations” of IST defendants after the initial commitment order. View "In re Chunn" on Justia Law

YouTube, a video-sharing website, places “advertising restrictions” on certain videos to prevent the user who posted the video from realizing advertising revenues. Network administrators and individual subscribers can also elect to limit user access to YouTube videos using “Restricted Mode.” YouTube considers whether the content involves drugs, alcohol, sex, violence, tragedies, inappropriate language, and whether the content is "gratuitously incendiary, inflammatory, or demeaning towards an individual or group.” YouTube uses an “automated filtering algorithm.” Users whose videos have been restricted or demonetized may request human review. Prager has posted more than 250 YouTube videos and has been prohibited from monetizing over 50 of its videos. In some cases, other users have posted videos identical to Prager’s restricted videos; the copycat videos have not been restricted. Prager claims the restrictions are based on its political identity or viewpoints.After a district court dismissed its federal lawsuit, Prager sued in state court. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing immunity under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, for interactive computer service providers acting as “publishers or speakers” of content provided by others. The challenged conduct is the exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions, The court rejected arguments that the defendants are themselves information content providers, that their terms of service and public pronouncements subjected them to liability notwithstanding the Act, and that the Act, in immunizing defendants from Prager’s state law claims, is unconstitutional. View "Prager University v. Google LLC" on Justia Law

In 2010, Cannon pled guilty to assault with intent to commit rape and dissuading a witness. Cannon was sentenced to a term of seven years. In 2016, the district attorney filed a petition to commit Cannon under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, 6600). Cannon’s SVPA trial was continued several times. Updated evaluations were prepared in 2018, revealing a split in opinion among the experts as to whether Cannon qualified as an SVP. At a pretrial conference unattended by Cannon, his counsel waived his right to a jury trial. Cannon’s bench trial began in 2020. There was testimony that Cannon suffered a traumatic injury to the prefrontal lobes of his brain and subsequently became obsessed with sex and began consuming large amounts of pornography. He was aggressive toward teenage girls. Family members became overwhelmed with Cannon’s sexual disinhibition.The court of appeal remanded the resulting commitment order for a determination of whether Cannon’s constitutional right to equal protection was violated by the court’s failure to advise him of his right to a jury trial and to obtain his personal waiver of that right. The court otherwise affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to expert witness testimony that included case-specific hearsay. View "People v. Cannon" on Justia Law

Kowalczyk was charged with felony vandalism, three felony counts of identity theft, misdemeanor petty theft of lost property, and one misdemeanor count of identity theft. The court set bail at $75,000 and denied a motion seeking release on his own recognizance with drug conditions and electronic monitoring. Kowalczyk was on probation and had 64 prior offenses, across several states. The court viewed Kowalczyk’s property crimes as a significant public safety issue. He received the maximum score of 14 on the Virginia Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument, and the pretrial services report indicated he failed to abide by conditions of supervision in the last five years. Kowalczyk was unhoused and unemployed. Different judges later denied additional motions to reduce bail.Kowalczyk filed a habeas petition. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal addressed the state constitutional provisions governing bail in noncapital cases—Article I, section 12(b), (c); Article I, section 28(f)(3) and concluded that the provisions can be reconciled. Section 12’s general right to bail in noncapital cases remains intact, while full effect must be given to section 28(f)(3)’s mandate that the rights of crime victims be respected in bail and release determinations. Section 12 does not guarantee an unqualified right to pretrial release or necessarily require courts to set bail at an amount a defendant can afford. View "In re Kowalczyk" on Justia Law