Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Casandra Murrey, a single, 46-year-old female, worked for General Electric Company (GE) as a product sales specialist for ultrasound equipment. The complaint alleged GE hired Murrey in early 2018 and she was a “top performer.” In 2019, GE hired Joseph Gorczyca, III. In January 2020, he became Murrey’s direct supervisor, and he engaged in continuous sexual harassment in the workplace with Murrey and others. She alleged GE “never properly completed an immediate [n]or appropriate investigation or took any . . . corrective action. Instead, [GE] later informed [her] that Gorczyca was ‘no longer with the company.’” Thereafter, GE “commenced an illegal pattern of retaliatory behavior against Murrey because [she] engage[ed] in protective activity” that included “denying appropriate support for [her] sales position” and refusing to promote her. Eight months after Murrey filed the complaint, GE moved to compel arbitration. GE sent all new hires a “welcome e-mail” to the new hire’s personal e-mail address that contained a link to GE’s electronic onboarding system/portal. Each document was assigned a separate task and the new hire signed employment-related agreements using his or her electronic signature. Based on this process and GE’s other security measures, GE’s lead HR specialist Michelle Thayer concluded Murrey’s electronic signature on an Acknowledgment was made by Murrey that Murrey assented to an included arbitration in the onboarding materials. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration, concluding:(1) GE met its burden of showing the arbitration agreement covered Murrey’s claims; (2) all of Murrey’s causes of action arose out of or were connected with her employment; and (3) Murrey met her burden showing procedural unconscionability because it was a contract of adhesion; but (5) Murrey failed to show a sufficient degree of substantive unconscionability to render the agreement unenforceable. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the arbitration agreement in this case contained a high degree of procedural unconscionability. "When we consider the procedural and substantively unconscionable provisions together, they indicate a concerted effort to impose on an employee a forum with distinct advantages for the employer." The Court issued a writ of mandate on the trial court to vacate the order compelling arbitration, and to enter a new order denying the motion. View "Murrey v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Defendant is a resident of the City of Oxnard (the City). Defendant gathered signatures for a number of initiatives, including Measures M and N. The City’s voters passed both initiatives. The City brought the instant action to have the measures declared void as administrative rather than legislative in nature. Defendant responded with an anti-SLAPP motion requesting that the trial court dismissed the City’s action. Defendant claimed that the City is not a proper party to bring the action, that he is not a proper defendant, and that the City cannot prevail on the merits. The court denied the motion on all three grounds.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment as to Measure M and affirmed as to Measure N. The court explained that the City argued that Measure M is invalid under the exclusive delegation rule. The City contends that the initiative intrudes into a subject exclusively delegated by statute to the City council. Thus, standards that allow greater access are purely a municipal affair. The provisions of Measure M are intended to allow for greater access. Measure M is not invalid under the exclusive delegation rule. Further, the manifest purpose of Measure N is to ensure that Measure O revenue is expended for road repair. Measure N tells the City how it must administer general tax revenue, even setting precise dates for the completion of the work. Measure N is clearly administrative in nature. View "City of Oxnard v. Starr" on Justia Law

Jail personnel search inmate mail for contraband. To preserve confidentiality, mail from an inmate to an attorney is opened in front of the inmate; the contents are visually inspected but not read. An officer noticed an envelope from Cortez addressed to his attorney; with a “bulk in the center.” It smelled of feces. Suspecting the envelope contained contraband, he opened it but not in front of Cortez. The envelope contained another envelope fashioned from the lined yellow paper, marked “do not read.” The officer opened it and found multiple "kites," each made from different colored paper and with different writing. Kites are clandestine notes, written by inmates on small pieces of paper in very small print, then rolled up to minimize their size and facilitate concealment. The officer informed his supervisor.A magistrate conducted an in-camera examination and concluded: The messages have “the teeny tiny writing ... indicative of a gang-related kite…. I did not read the substance … none of them were addressed to [Cortez’s attorney]. None of them ... appeared to even be written by Cortez…. I do not find the attorney-client privilege applies.” The court of appeal agreed. The magistrate’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. Even if the jail violated the regulation requiring legal mail to be opened in the inmate’s presence, the remedy would not automatically render everything inside the envelope—including communications intended for people other than an attorney—subject to attorney-client privilege. View "People v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County" on Justia Law

The primary issue, in this case, is whether Respondent Whittier Union High School District (hereinafter Respondent or the District) is required to reimburse Appellant Law Office (hereinafter Appellant or Firm) for the “cost of work product” under California Elections Code section, 10010. Appellant had sent Respondent a demand letter that resulted in Respondent changing its at-large voting system to district-based voting. This case turns on whether the trial court’s determination that Appellant did not represent a “prospective plaintiff” under section 10010 requires evidence limited to identifying a person who has formally retained the lawyer, or whether it also encompasses a law firm working on behalf of one or more persons the law firm avers it will be able to name as a plaintiff if the demand letter is unsuccessful.   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded so that the trial court may determine the “cost of work product” recoverable by Appellant. The court concluded that the trial court’s finding that Appellant did not represent a prospective plaintiff is based on an overly restrictive interpretation of the statute. The court further concluded that the “cost of work product” for which a prospective plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement is not limited to out-of-pocket expenditures by the prospective plaintiff, but also includes costs advanced by their lawyer. View "Law Office of Carlos R. Perez v. Whittier Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

O’Connor is the parent of John. When John was 14 years old, O’Connor allegedly “supplied excessive amounts of alcohol to her son and his minor friends to the point where minors would vomit, be unable to stand, and fall unconscious. When these minors were extremely intoxicated from the alcohol, she encouraged them to engage in sexual activity with each other, facilitated sexual encounters, and watched some of these sexual encounters.” O’Connor also helped the minors leave their homes at night without their parents’ knowledge, communicating with them via Snapchat or text message and picking them up down the street from their homes.O’Connor is currently held in pretrial custody on charges of 39 offenses involving 15 minor victims. The trial court denied release on bail due to the seriousness of the charged offenses, which include 12 counts of felony child endangerment (Penal Code 273a(a)), along with evidence showing that less restrictive conditions of release on bail would not protect the public or the minor victims. O’Connor filed a habeas petition, contending that she was entitled to bail as a matter of law. On remand from the California Supreme Court, the court of appeal again denied the petition, concluding that O’Connor was charged with qualifying felony offenses involving an act of violence on another person within the meaning of California Constitution, article I, section 12(b). View "In re O'Connor" on Justia Law

Ross was charged with battery on a nonconfined person by a prisoner. Ross pleaded guilty to the administrative charge of battering the counselor. At trial, several officers and an intercepted letter corroborated the victim’s testimony about the attack. The defense presented no evidence. During discussions about jury instructions, Ross declared, “Man, you are fired” and “I will represent myself.” Ross cursed at the court, which had him removed. Defense attorney Fallman stated that he tried to talk with Ross, who refused and declined to return to the courtroom. Fallman noted that Ross had fired his previous attorney and that he knew of no “provocation.” The court continued without Ross. During closing arguments, Fallman admitted Ross touched the officer willingly, in a harmful or offensive manner, but argued there was no preplanning or weapon. Fallman asked the jury to find Ross guilty of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor battery. The jury convicted Ross, finding two prior strike allegations true. Finding six aggravating factors true and no mitigating factors, the court sentenced Ross to the upper term of four years, doubled to eight years under the Three Strike Law.The court of appeal affirmed the conviction, rejecting Ross’s argument that his attorney violated his Sixth Amendment rights by conceding his guilt. There was no evidence that his claimed desire to maintain innocence to the exclusion of all other defense strategies was ever communicated to Fallman or the court. The court remanded for resentencing due to Senate Bill 567., which requires that when a statute specifies three potential terms of imprisonment, a court must presumptively impose the middle term. View "People v. Ross" on Justia Law

Casey N. sued the County of Orange (the County) and two employees of the County’s Social Services Agency (the Agency) for violating her civil rights in connection with a dependency proceeding involving Casey’s minor child. A jury found in Casey’s favor and awarded her damages. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed: (1) the trial court did not err by failing to determine the materiality of allegedly fabricated or misrepresented evidence or omitted exculpatory evidence before giving the case to the jury for deliberation; (2) the jury’s verdict against the employees was supported by substantial evidence; (3) the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the jury’s verdict against the County under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) was supported by substantial evidence. View "Casey N. v. County of Orange" on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff R. Kemp was convicted, released from prison, and placed on parole. In 2020, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) offered Kemp a job in Sacramento. Defendant Accurate Background LLC (Accurate) provided a background report to Amazon revealing Kemp’s criminal conviction. Amazon then withdrew its job offer. Because Kemp’s 2011 conviction predated the 2020 report by more than seven years, he filed a complaint alleging Accurate: (1) violated the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA); (2) violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA); and (3) derivatively violated the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Accurate filed a demurrer: Kemp’s parole ended in 2014, which predated the 2020 report by less than seven years. Accurate argued under the ICRAA and the CCRAA, “the term ‘parole’ refers to the end of the parole period,” thus barring liability. Alternatively, Accurate argued the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted the state ICRAA, and therefore Kemp’s ICRAA claim was barred as a matter of law. The trial court overruled Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the plain meaning of ‘from the date of . . . parole’ refers to the start date of conditional release.” The court sustained Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the FCRA preempts the ICRAA claim.” Accurate and Kemp both filed petitions for extraordinary writ relief to the Court of Appeal. The Court held the phrase "from the date of parole" referred to the start date of parole, and the FCRA did not preempt Kemp’s ICRAA claim. Thus, the appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order, which partially sustained Accurate’s demurrer, and to issue a new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. View "Kemp v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

M.G. was detained in August 2022 for the 14-day confinement allowed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 5250 (Lanterman-Petris-Short Act). The 14-day period was set to expire September 4. On August 26, a Friday, M.G. sought habeas relief ordering her release, arguing that she was not mentally disordered, gravely disabled, or a danger to anyone. A hearing was set for the following Tuesday, August 30. M.G. is hearing impaired; she requested two sign language interpreters: an ASL interpreter and a certified deaf interpreter. Relay interpreting using both interpreters was necessary for M.G. to understand the proceedings and communicate with counsel. On Tuesday, the court informed the parties that neither interpreter was available that day. The hearing was continued to Thursday, September 1. On August 31, M.G. petitioned the appeal court.After the court issued an order to show cause, counsel indicated M.G. had been released. Unable to grant the relief requested—release from confinement—the court denied her petition as moot, noting that temporary confinement can last at most 14 days, so a challenge to its propriety will routinely evade appellate review. Welfare and Institutions Code 5276 imposes a mandatory duty to conduct an evidentiary hearing within two judicial days of a detained person’s request; failure to do so requires that the detainee be immediately released. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minor had been sexually abused by her father. Mother was not named as an offending parent in the petition. The juvenile court found that the Department failed to prove the sexual abuse allegations against the father but did not dismiss the petition. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported jurisdiction based upon unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by the mother, a position urged by the minor’s counsel but opposed by the Department. The court subsequently entered a disposition order.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court violated the mother’s due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on the conduct of a parent the Department never alleged was an offending parent, and on a factual and legal theory not raised in the Department’s petition. Parents have a due process right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so that they can make an informed decision on whether to appear, prepare, and contest the allegations. View "In re S.V." on Justia Law