Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the County under Government Code section 12940, alleging disability discrimination based on the County’s removing him from his job as bailiff and placing him on an unpaid leave of absence because of its incorrect assessment that he could not safely perform his duties as a bailiff even with reasonable accommodation. Principally at issue on appeal is how to instruct a jury on the employer’s intent to discriminate against a disabled employee and, more specifically, what role “animus” plays in defining that intent. The court concluded that the instruction and special verdict form in this case contained error. Under Harris v. City of Santa Monica, plaintiff could prove the requisite discriminatory intent by showing his actual or perceived disability was a “substantial motivating factor/reason” for the County’s decision to place him on a leave of absence. The Legislature decided that the financial consequences of an employer’s mistaken belief that an employee is unable to safely perform a job’s essential functions should be borne by the employer, not the employee, even if the employer’s mistake was reasonable and made in good faith. The court further concluded that the instructional error was prejudicial and remanded plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim for a limited retrial. View "Wallace v. County of Stanislaus" on Justia Law

Defendants who are found mentally incompetent to stand trial (IST) are transferred to the Department of State Hospitals for treatment, under procedures set forth in Penal Code section 13701. Petitioners requested that the court order the Department to admit IST defendants from Contra Costa County to DSH-Napa within four weeks after a trial court makes an order of commitment. The trial court ordered that such admissions must take place within 60 days, not four weeks, of the commitment order. The court of appeal affirmed and remanded with directions to modify the order as necessary to conform to new statutory provisions enacted while the appeal was pending. The court rejected arguments that the order was inconsistent with section 1370; undermined DSH’s ability to carry out its statutory duties under section 1370, causing disruption and public harm, and subjecting DSH to potential equal protection and due process claims; and circumvented established habeas procedures. View "In re Loveton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging claims of negligence, fraud, breach of contract, common counts, and exemplary damages. On appeal, plaintiff challenged an order granting a special motion to strike her complaint by respondent, an attorney, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP motion). As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that respondent's motion was timely. On the merits, the court concluded that the allegations against respondent arose from protected speech - they occurred within the context of anticipated litigation and settlement - and plaintiff failed to include with her response any evidence suggesting that she had a probability of prevailing on the merits of her claims. Further, the trial court did not violate plaintiff's rights by failing to provide her with a copy of the tentative ruling on the day of the hearing. Finally, the exception set forth in section 425.17, subdivision (c) is inapplicable and respondent's alleged actions were not illegal. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Karnazes v. Ares" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Proposition D, the current medical marijuana ordinance of the City of Los Angeles. The trial court dismissed the complaint. The court held that there is no constitutional or statutory right to possess, cultivate, distribute, or transport marijuana for medical purposes. The court concluded that Prop D's enactment did not violate Government Code Section 35804; if regulation of medical marijuana is a matter of statewide concern, Prop D, which regulates medical marijuana solely within the City’s borders, is still a municipal initiative on a wholly municipal matter – which was properly enacted without a planning commission hearing; Prop D's enactment did not violate City Charter Section 558; Prop D does not grant the equivalent of a conditional use permit or variance; and Prop D survives all of plaintiffs' substantive challenges regarding due process, equal protection, unconstitutional "special" law, drug house abatement, improper exercise of local regulatory power, violation of rights of privacy and association, disability discrimination, improper threats of criminal sanctions for plaintiffs' exercise of rights, taking without just compensation, waste of public funds, Fifth Amendment right/privacy, unnecessary regulation without rational basis/unfair stigma, and attorney's fees. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs are not entitled to leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Safe Life Caregivers v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Six years after a San Jose police officer testified falsely against plaintiff during a preliminary hearing, the city agreed to pay plaintiff $150,000 and not to oppose any motion plaintiff might bring for a declaration of factual innocence of the criminal charges brought against him. The parties agreed that plaintiff’s counsel could seek an award of costs incurred and reasonable attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988. Plaintiff sought $1,448,397 in attorney fees and $75,255 in costs, based on “2,419.9 compensable attorney hours … utilizing reasonable hourly billing rates roughly 20% below established market rates[,] i.e[.,] ranging from $425 to $650 per hour,” plus $102,998.75, added for “fees-on-fees work.” Plaintiff also requested a 1.5 multiplier to the lodestar amount “to account for the significant risk counsel has taken in litigating this hotly[ ]contested matter on a wholly contingent basis, with little prospect of settlement until the eve of trial.” The court awarded compensation of $436,807.50, declined to apply the 1.5 multiplier, and awarded costs of $23,935.07. The court of appeals remanded, finding the lower court’s reasoning inadequate. View "Kerkeles v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

WAC owns and operates 10 “luxury” health and fitness clubs in the San Francisco Bay Area and a sports resort in San Diego. WAC offers a range of membership levels, providing various privileges at one or more of its locations. WAC also offers reduced-cost memberships, including corporate employee discounts, senior discounts, and family memberships. The Young Professional program offers a reduced-cost membership for individuals ages 18 to 29. Due to capacity constraints, Young Professional members do not have access to two WAC clubs during specified “peak” hours. In 2013, a Young Professional membership at the Bay Club San Francisco cost approximately $140 per month—$55 less than a standard membership. Javorsky filed a purported class action, alleging that the Young Professional discount constituted illegal age discrimination and violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, and the unfair competition law. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of WAC, finding no arbitrary, unreasonable, or invidious discrimination. View "Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit to invalidate the County's ordinance banning marijuana dispensaries, cultivation and storage of medical marijuana in all its zoning districts. Plaintiff argued that the ordinance created an unconstitutional conflict with the right to cultivate, possess and use medical marijuana provided by the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), Health & Saf. Code, 11362.5, and the Medical Marijuana Program (MMP), Health & Saf. Code, 11362.7 et seq. The trial court sustained the County's demurrer without leave to amend. The court concluded that the ban on cultivation adopted under the County’s authority to regulate land use does not conflict with the CUA or the MMP, which do not expressly restrict local government’s authority over land use; in regard to implicit restrictions, the court recognized the statutory provisions contain some ambiguities, but applicable legal principles require a clear indication of the Legislature’s intent to restrict local government’s inherent power to regulate land use; the ambiguous provisions fail to provide such clear indication and therefore the court upheld the County's ban on marijuana dispensaries, cultivation and storage of medical marijuana; and the provision in the ordinance that classifies the cultivation of medical marijuana as a misdemeanor is preempted by California’s extensive statutory scheme addressing crimes, defenses and immunities relating to marijuana. Because plaintiff has stated a narrow cause of action challenging the validity of the criminalization provision, the court reversed the judgment of dismissal. View "Kirby v. County of Fresno" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate and/or prohibition asking the superior court to vacate its order granting the petition of real party in interest, the District, for a right of entry pursuant to the Eminent Domain Law, Code Civ. Proc., 1245.010 et seq. The superior court permitted the District to conduct certain investigations and environmental testing on petitioner's property. Petitioner argued that the District's actions constitute a taking requiring the District to file a condemnation suit to litigate the need for the taking and to provide petitioner with just compensation. The court concluded, however, that the District's proposed actions, which are temporary and limited intrusions on the property, neither violate the entry statutes nor do they constitute a taking requiring a jury determination of just compensation. Accordingly, the court denied the writ petition. View "Young's Market Co. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The State and California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Tawney appealed a judgment in which the jury found Tawney violated 42 U.S.C. 1983 by making a constitutionally unreasonable detention and search of plaintiff and Civil Code section 52.1, also known as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane Act), by making threats of violence. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the finding that Tawney unreasonably detained plaintiff; the trial court arguably erred by admitting evidence of plaintiff's acquittal of violating Vehicle Code section 27007, but Tawney and the state have failed to establish prejudice; substantial evidence supports the unreasonable search finding; the state and Tawney were not entitled to judgment not withstanding the verdict on the basis of qualified immunity; the trial court did not err by excluding testimony regarding CHP policy; the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's finding that Tawney violated the Bane Act; and plaintiff's cross-appeal on his Bane Act claim is moot. Accordingly, the court reversed as to the Bane Act cause of action and otherwise affirmed. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

The City appealed the trial court's order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict following the second trial of plaintiff’s employment claims. The court concluded that the City had a viable statute of limitations defense; accepting as true that the events in the 1990's show race harassment and retaliation for complaining about discrimination and harassment, these events are insufficient as a matter of law to show a continuing course of conduct; there is no substantial evidence to support a claim of disparate impact race discrimination within the limitations period; there is no substantial evidence to support a claim of racial harassment within the limitations period; there is no substantial evidence to support a claim of retaliation for plaintiff's complaints about race discrimination or harassment within the limitations period; and the claim of failure to prevent race discrimination, retaliation, and harassment also fails. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the City. View "Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law