Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the NCAA for seven causes of action and the NCAA exercised a peremptory challenge to the trial judge assigned to the case at the time. The case was reassigned to a different jurist. The NCAA then moved to strike the complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. In this petition for writ of mandate, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law by ruling on a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute and requests the court to vacate its order accepting the postappeal peremptory challenge. The court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, subdivision (a)(2) allows a party to exercise a second peremptory challenge only after prevailing in an appeal from a final judgment, but not following reversal of an interim decision. The court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its order accepting the NCAA's peremptory challenge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, and enter a new order rejecting the challenge. View "McNair v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

NSSF and SAAMI filed the underlying action for declaratory relief seeking to enjoin Penal Code section 31910, subdivision (b)(7)(A) on the ground that it is impossible to comply with dual placement microstamping requirements. Section 31910, subdivision (b)(7)(A), provides that, commencing January 1, 2010, a semiautomatic pistol is an “‘unsafe handgun’” if “it is not designed and equipped with a microscopic array of characters that identify the make, model, and serial number of the pistol, etched or otherwise imprinted in two or more places on the interior surface or internal working parts of the pistol, and that are transferred by imprinting on each cartridge case when the firearm is fired .…” The trial court granted the State's motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend on the ground that the separation of powers doctrine precluded plaintiffs' action. Because judgment was granted on the pleadings, the court must accept the truth of the complaint’s properly pleaded facts. Therefore, the court must accept plaintiffs' claim that it is impossible to effectively microstamp the required characters on any part of a semiautomatic pistol other than the firing pin. The court rejected the State's position that stamping the characters in two places on the firing pin would comply with the statute. The court concluded that plaintiffs have the right to present evidence to attempt to prove their claim. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "National Shooting Sports Foundation v. State of California" on Justia Law

Lambirth is serving a life term at the Soledad Correctional Training Facility. He claims that he learned during his 2013 pre-annual interview that he was subject to a “child visiting restriction.” He complained to his counselor, Miley, that it was unwarranted. Miley promised to investigate and to remove the restriction if it was without basis. He raised the issue again at his 2014 review; the classification committee assured him that Miley would investigate and take appropriate action. Lambirth sent Miley a follow-up note, asking for a copy of the action removing the restriction. Lambirth received from Miley “a single-page copy” of the classification chrono from his 2009 program review, which noted his “sex offense history” and, under “Sex Offenses,” referred to “Sexual Perversion.” It stated that Lambirth acknowledged his understanding [of] and agreement with [the] committee’s actions.” Lambirth denied every being charged with any sexual crime against a child. The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) cancelled his administrative appeal, which was timely submitted but was received after expiration of the 30-day period, and declined to consider it on the merits. The court of appeal granted habeas relief and directed the Department to consider the appeal on the merits. View "In re: Lambirth" on Justia Law

This case presented two issues of first impression for the Court of Appeals’ review. The issues touched on the interaction between (a) hospital peer review proceedings against doctors governed by sections 805 to 809.7 of the Business and Professions Code, and (b) the hospital whistleblower statute, Health and Safety Code section 1278.5. The first question was left open by the California Supreme Court “Fahlen v. Sutter Central Valley Hospital,” (58 Cal.4th 655 (2014)). Fahlen held that a physician could prosecute a section 1278.5 action without first having to prevail in an administrative mandate proceeding attacking a peer review determination, but the court did not go so far as to excuse the physician from completing the internal peer review process before filing a section 1278.5 action. The second question was whether a physician bringing a section 1278.5 action could name as defendants individual physicians involved in the peer review process who allegedly instigated the process in retaliation for the physician’s whistleblowing. Based on the analysis of “Fahlen” and the text and legislative history of section 1278.5, the Court of Appeals held that a physician need not complete the internal peer review process prior to filing a section 1278.5 action. With respect to the second issue, the Court held that a physician may not name individual physicians in his/her 1278.5 complaint. A third issue involved the tripartite interaction of the anti-SLAPP stattue, the peer review process, and a physician’s religious discrimination claims against a hospital under FEHA. Specifically, the issue raised here was whether the fact the physician reiterated complaints of religious discrimination by the hospital in the context of protesting the initiation of peer review proceedings against him so intertwined his discrimination claims with the peer review proceedings as to subject his discrimination claims to an anti-SLAPP motion. The Court of Appeals found that based on the facts of this case, the physician first voiced his complaints of religious discrimination prior to the initiation of the peer review proceedings. His discrimination claims were therefore not based on activity protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. View "Armin v. Riverside Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former on-air radio personality for Univision, filed suit alleging disability discrimination, wrongful termination and related employment claims. The court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Gov. Code, 12900 et seq., claim for discrimination where plaintiff was not entitled to raise a medical condition as an alleged basis for discrimination for the first time in opposition to the motion for summary judgment; trial issues of fact exist as to whether plaintiff had a disability under FEHA; and trial issues of fact exist as to whether Univision acted with discriminatory intent. The court also concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to provide reasonable accommodation; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's FEHA claim for failure to engage in interactive process; the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's Moore-Brown-Roberti Family Rights Act (CFRA), Gov. Code 12945.1 et seq., claims; and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's common law claim for wrongful termination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Soria v. Univision Radio Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1972, Dinslage was employed by the San Francisco Recreation and Parks Department. As part of a large-scale restructuring, Dinslage‘s employment classification was eliminated in 2010. He was one of many employees who were laid off. Although he applied to be rehired in a newly created classification, he was not offered a position. He then retired from city employment. Dinslage sued, alleging age discrimination, retaliation, and harassment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). (Gov. Code 12940(a), (h), (j).) The defendants claimed, with supporting evidence, that their actions were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Dinslage had refused to cooperate in the implementation of a new Department policy, moving away from separate recreational events for the disabled and toward inclusion in general events. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed rejection of Dinslage‘s age discrimination and retaliation claims. Dinslage‘s opposition to Department policies and practices he viewed as discriminating against disabled members of the general public is not protected activity because his opposition was not directed at an unlawful employment practice. View "Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

After defendant was taken into custody for psychiatric evaluation and treatment for up to 72 hours pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, she was released and banned from owning, possessing, controlling, receiving, or purchasing any firearm for five years. The Superior Court of Kern County denied her petition to lift the prohibition and found that the preponderance of the evidence established that defendant would not be likely to use firearms in a safe and lawful manner. The court found that the superior court’s order was appealable, but found that defendant is not entitled to appointed counsel; concluded that section 8103, subdivision (f)(6), employs a constitutional standard of proof and is not unconstitutionally vague; and concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s denial of defendant's petition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "People v. Mary H." on Justia Law

Croft appealed the superior court's order denying their petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the City to return fees it collected when Croft applied for building permits. As an initial matter, the court concluded that Croft's facial challenge is time barred pursuant to Government Code section 65009, subdivision (c)(1)(B)-(C) where Croft raised its challenge more than 90 days after the City enacted the Ordinance and adopted the fee schedule. The court also concluded that Croft’s as-applied challenge improperly places the burden on the City and incorrectly states how the fee must be reasonable. In this case, the reasonableness test applies to the creation of the fee schedule, not its application. Croft mischaracterizes the nature of the reasonableness inquiry and does not present evidence relating to the correct inquiry; even if it had, the claim related to such an inquiry would be facial and time barred. Finally, the court concluded that the City correctly calculated the parks and recreation fee; Croft abandoned its traffic fees claim on appeal; and the City collected the fees at an appropriate time. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "616 Croft Ave., LLC v. City of West Hollywood" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Trigg seeking rescission of the settlement agreement in Suarez I based on Trigg’s fraudulent concealment of the prospects for sale of the company, and quantum meruit. Trigg filed a special motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Civil Procedure section 425.16, asserting that plaintiff's claims arise out of communications that occurred during the course of Suarez I. The trial court dismissed the action without leave to amend. The court agreed with the trial court's finding that plaintiff's causes of action arose from litigation activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute - the right of free speech - and that he failed to make a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Suarez v. Trigg Labs." on Justia Law

The People filed a nuisance abatement action against defendants, alleging that Weedland was an illegal medical marijuana business under the City of Los Angeles Municipal Code, and seeking an injunction against the continuing operation of Weedland. The trial court found that Weedland did fall under the statute, and therefore the People showed a likelihood of prevailing. The court affirmed the trial court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, concluding that the applicable Municipal Code section broadly defines a “medical marijuana business” as any location where medical marijuana is “distributed, delivered, or given away.” Weedland is a location that distributes medical marijuana to its “members,” and is therefore a medical marijuana business as defined in the Municipal Code. View "People ex rel. Feuer v. FXS Mgmt." on Justia Law