Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Bankruptcy
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In 2013, the City of Detroit filed for chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, facing problems “run[ning] wide and deep”—including the affordable provision of basic utilities. In 2014, plaintiffs, customers, and the purported representatives of customers, of the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD), filed an adversary proceeding, based on DWSD’s termination of water service to thousands of residential customers. Citing 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Supreme Court holding in Monell v. Department of Social Services, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal. Section 904 of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly prohibits this relief. Whether grounded in state law or federal constitutional law, a bankruptcy court order requiring DWSD to provide water service at a specific price, or refrain from terminating service would interfere with the City’s “political [and] governmental powers,” its “property [and] revenues,” and its “use [and] enjoyment of . . . income-producing property,” 11 U.S.C. 904. Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection claims were inadequately pled. View "Lyda v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of federal laws. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's failure to disclose her claims in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings judicially estopped her from pursuing them. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Van Horn v. Martin" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that her employer discriminated against her based upon her sex. While pursuing the discrimination action, plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, failing to list the bankruptcy action in her bankruptcy schedules. The employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment in the discrimination action on the ground that judicial estoppel prohibited plaintiff from proceeding. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. However, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining whether plaintiff's bankruptcy omission was "mistaken" or "inadvertent." View "Quin v. County of Kauai Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

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A bankruptcy court ordered that the Laurel Avenue house be vacated and authorized U.S. Marshals to physically remove plaintiff, the debtor's son, from the home. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the dismissal of his suit, which alleged, inter alia, that his constitutional rights were violated when the house, its contents, and his person were searched and seized. The court found no error in the dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against the federal defendants where he did not allege a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics action in the amended complaint, nor did he seek to amend to add the claim; plaintiff's section 1983 claim failed against the city and the city's officers where plaintiff failed to set forth sufficient facts to show a direct causal link between the city's policy or custom and the alleged violation of his constitutional rights; the district court did not err in dismissing his tort claims against the trustees under the doctrine established in Barton v. Barbour, which established that an equity receiver could not be sued without leave of the court that appointed him; and because the dismissal of plaintiff's federal claims was proper, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alexander v. Hedback, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC against his employer, Dollar General, alleging that Dollar General failed to provide reasonable accommodation for his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. While awaiting the EEOC's notice of his right to sue, plaintiff filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Then plaintiff filed the present suit in district court. Dollar General moved for summary judgment, arguing that the filing of plaintiff's Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition deprived plaintiff of standing to maintain his ADA claim. The court agreed with its sister circuits and concluded that because of the powers vested in the Chapter 13 debtor and trustee, a Chapter 13 debtor could retain standing to bring his pre-bankruptcy petition claims. The court also concluded that because plaintiff was unable to show that he could perform the essential functions of his position with a reasonable accommodation, the district court properly granted summary judgment in Dollar General's favor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View " Wilson v. Dollar General Corp." on Justia Law

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Petitioner claimed a trailer was his, but, upon evidence the trailer was stolen, the justice court awarded the trailer to the State. Later, Petitioner filed for bankruptcy and scheduled the trailer as an asset of his estate. Petitioner also sued for damages for the lost use of his property as a constitutionally compensable taking. The trial court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction, concluding that the justice court judgment was not void but was only voidable, and the judgment was voidable only if the bankruptcy court made certain determinations. The court of appeals reversed, holding (1) a judgment rendered in violation of the automatic stay is void, not merely voidable, and a state court has jurisdiction to make that determination, even though the bankruptcy court might later disagree; and (2) as to Petitioner's takings claim, subsisting fact issues precluded dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a judgment that violates the automatic stay is void and subject to collateral attack in state court; but (2) the judicial award of property to the State was not, in these circumstances, a taking. Remanded.

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The Chapter 7 trustee for the bankruptcy estate of Stacey Williams appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Gate Gourmet on Williams' claim of pregnancy discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and state law negligence. The court held that the district court improperly granted summary judgment on Williams' Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., claim for pregnancy discrimination because Williams had presented enough circumstantial evidence to allow a jury to reasonably infer that her supervisor's action in terminating her because of her pregnancy and his inaction in not attempting to find her a light-duty job were a violation of Title VII. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Gate Gourmet on Williams' Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981 race discrimination claims because she had not shown a genuine issue of material fact about whether Gate Gourmet intentionally discriminated against her based on her race. Summary judgment was improperly granted against Williams' Title VII and section 1981 retaliation claims because there was a reasonable inference that the statutorily protected filing of and refusal to settle the EEOC charge caused Gate Gourmet to deny Williams a light-duty position, which was a materially adverse action. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

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Plaintiff asserted federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and under 42 U.S.C. 1981, as well as a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, asserting that his employer subjected him to racial discrimination. At the time plaintiff filed both his EEOC charge and his complaint initiating the instant case, plaintiff was a debtor in a Chapter 13 proceeding, having filed a petition for bankruptcy. The employer subsequently moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff should be judicially estopped from pursuing his claims against the employer because he failed to disclose those claims to the bankruptcy court. The district court granted the motion, dismissing plaintiff's case, and plaintiff appealed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to plaintiff's claims after finding that plaintiff failed to create a fact issue regarding his purported inadvertence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

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Plaintiff-Appellant Mauerhan and the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee brought suit against Mauerhan's former employer Defendant-Appellee Wagner Corporation alleging a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The lower court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs appealed. Mauerhan had tested positive for drug use and was fired from Defendant's employ, but was told he may return if he was able to complete a rehabilitation program. Mauerhan completed the program, but Defendant's job duties and compensation would be less than what it previously had been. Mauerhan declined Defendant's offer. Later that year, Mauerhan filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and received a discharge of his debts by the end of the year. After filing for bankruptcy, but before the case was closed, Mauerhan learned that he had a viable claim of discrimination against Defendant under the ADA, and filed it with the EEOC. The Bankruptcy Trustee learned of the claim, and moved to amend Mauerhan's bankruptcy petition to include the claim in the bankruptcy estate. The lower court found that Mauerhan had only abstained from drugs for one month, too short to receive protection from the ADA at the time Mauerhan asked to be rehired. On appeal, this Court upheld the lower court's grant of summary judgment.