Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a recipient of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits, appealed from the district court's judgment sua sponte dismissing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff sought an Order to Show Cause, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from levying against his SSI benefits to enforce a child support order. At issue was whether 42 U.S.C. 659(a) authorized levy against SSI benefits provided under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq., to satisfy the benefits recipient's child support obligations. The court concluded that SSI benefits were not based upon remuneration for employment within the meaning of section 659(a); section 659(a) did not preclude plaintiff's claims; and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the exception to federal jurisdiction for divorce matters did not preclude the district court from exercising jurisdiction over the matter. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment to the extent the district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against the agency defendants and remanded for further proceedings. However, the court affirmed the portion of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims against Bank of America because his complaint had not alleged facts establishing that the bank was a state actor for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983. View "Sykes v. Bank of America" on Justia Law

This case arose when the FDIC filed a complaint against appellants for sums due under various promissory notes. Appellants then entered into a Stipulated Judgment in favor of FDIC and against appellants. CadleRock moved ex parte to re-open the case to allow it to file the necessary pleadings to revive the Stipulated Judgment and the district court granted the motion. CadleRock then filed an ex parte motion to revive the Stipulated Judgment (Revived Judgment) as it pertained to appellants and the district court granted the motion. Five years later, CadleRock commenced collection and served appellants with pleadings and appellants moved to vacate and annul. At issue on appeal was the district court's order denying appellants' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) motion to vacate. The court concluded that the Revived Judgment was not void under Rule 60(b)(4); appellants' due process challenges failed; and, given that appellants have not shown an actual conflict between federal and state law, their preemption claim failed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "FDIC v. SLE, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a county sheriff can meet the constitutional obligation of providing notice of a sheriff's sale to a plaintiff by letter directing the plaintiff's attorney to monitor a website for a listing of the date, time, and location of sale. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the sheriff's sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that constructive notice by publication to a party with a property interest in a foreclosure proceeding via a sheriff's office website is insufficient to constitute due process when that party's address is known or easily ascertainable. Remanded. View "PHH Mtge. Corp. v. Prater" on Justia Law

Tracy and Steve Lind filed this suit after Defendants attached funds in the Linds' joint bank account pursuant to Minnesota's garnishment laws. The Linds alleged that Defendants deprived Tracy of her due process rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that Defendants violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court dismissed both claims, concluding (1) Tracy had received constitutionally sufficient notice and an opportunity for a hearing; and (2) the Linds failed to allege any independent violation of the FDCPA in the complaint. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because Tracy had actual notice and an opportunity for a postdeprivation hearing, her due process rights were not violated when Defendants attached funds from the Linds' joint bank account pursuant to the Minnesota garnishment statutes; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing the Linds' FDCPA claim, as the Linds alleged no specific acts that demonstrated violations of the Act.

David and Glenette Nothum sought a writ prohibiting the circuit court from compelling them to testify in a judgment debtor's examination conducted pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 513.380. The court ordered the Nothums to testify despite their assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination and held them in contempt when they refused to do so, finding that the immunity granted to the Nothums pursuant to section 513.380.2 was coextensive with their constitutional privilege. The Supreme Court granted a permanent writ of prohibition, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the Nothums to testify, as the immunity in this case did not include derivative use immunity and, so, was not coextensive with the Nothums' constitutional privilege.

In 1997 Javier unlawfully entered the U.S.; he married in 2001. In 2007 the bank hired wife. Husband, attempting to start a business, could not open a bank account without a social security number. He obtained an individual tax identification number. Wife named him a joint owner on her account and helped use his ITIN to open accounts of his own. The business failed. Husband returned to Mexico to deal with his citizenship. Wife revealed the situation to her supervisor, requesting time off to help husband obtain citizenship. The supervisor agreed and called the bank security officer, who was concerned that the accounts might implicate bank fraud laws. During a meeting, the security officer became angry and berated wife. Wife refused to attend another meeting without her attorney The bank terminated her employment and reported her activity to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and a consortium of area banks. Wife sued, claiming blacklisting, defamation, emotional distress, and employment discrimination, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the bank summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that any discrimination was not based on race or national origin, but on an unprotected classification, husband’s status as an alien lacking permission to be in the country.

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of its complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and from the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff asserted, inter alia, claims against defendants under the First and Fourth Amendments and under the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. 3401-3422, as well as under state constitutions and various anti-wiretapping, consumer protection, and deceptive trade practices laws. On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred by holding that it lacked standing, by denying jurisdictional discovery, and by denying it leave to amend its complaint. The court held that the district court correctly determined that plaintiff did not have Article III standing to assert its claims. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery and for leave to amend its complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and order of the district court.