Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Leslie Atkinson purchased a 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche through a retail installment sales contract, which granted the seller a security interest in the vehicle. The seller assigned the sales contract and the security interest to Credit Acceptance Corporation. When Atkinson defaulted on her payments, Credit Acceptance hired Carolina Repo to repossess the vehicle. During the repossession, Atkinson attempted to drive off in the vehicle, leading to a confrontation with the Carolina Repo representative. The representative called the Harnett County Sheriff’s Office for assistance, and Deputy Brent Godfrey arrived on the scene. Godfrey ordered Atkinson out of the vehicle so that the Carolina Repo representative could repossess it.Atkinson sued Godfrey and Sheriff Wayne Coats under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. She claimed that Godfrey, in his individual capacity, violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures of property by facilitating Carolina Repo’s repossession. She also alleged that Coats, in his official capacity as the sheriff, failed to train officers and created policies that deprived her of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures of property.The defendants moved to dismiss Atkinson’s § 1983 claim, asserting that Atkinson did not allege facts showing they acted under color of law, that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity, and that, without an underlying constitutional violation, Atkinson failed to bring an actionable claim against the Sheriff’s Office through Coats in his official capacity. The district court denied the motion, finding it could not determine as a matter of law that Godfrey’s actions did not constitute state action, that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity, and that the Sheriff’s Office’s liability could be ruled out. Godfrey and Coats appealed the district court’s denial of their motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Godfrey’s motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The court found that neither the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit, the highest court of North Carolina, nor a consensus of other circuit courts of appeals had determined that conduct similar to that of Godfrey was unconstitutional. Therefore, the right alleged to be violated was not clearly established. The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Godfrey’s motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the appeal with respect to the claim against Coats, as the issues it presented were not inextricably intertwined with the resolution of the qualified immunity issues. View "Atkinson v. Godfrey" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court overruling Appellants' motion to vacate the court's order appointing a receiver for Appellants, holding that the petition filed by Patriots Bank seeking the appointment of a receiver pursuant to the Missouri Commercial Receivership Act (MCRA), Mo. Rev. Stat. 515.500-515.665, did not violate due process.Bank entered into lending relationships with Appellants, all of which defaulted. Bank filed a petition seeking the appointment of a receiver for Appellants. The circuit court entered the receiver order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Bank complied with the plain language of the MCRA's notice requirement; (2) the application of the MCRA to Appellants' case did not violate the due process protections under either the state or federal constitutions; (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellants' motion to vacate the receiver order; and (4) the receiver order did not violate the MCRA. View "Black River Motel, LLC v. Patriots Bank" on Justia Law

An Ohio tax lien on real property is enforced through a foreclosure action, which may result in a sale of the property at auction. If such a sale occurs and the price exceeds the amount of the lien, the excess funds may go to junior lienholders or the owner. If the tax-delinquent property is abandoned, an auction may not be required; the property may be transferred directly to a land bank, free of liens. When that happens, the county gives up its right to collect the tax debt, and any junior lienholders and the owner get nothing. The properties at issue were transferred directly to county land banks. US Bank owned one foreclosed property and claims to have held mortgages on the other two. US Bank alleges that at the time of the transfers, the fair market value of each property was greater than the associated tax lien and that the transfers to the land banks constituted takings without just compensation.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the dismissals of the suits. US Bank lacks standing in one case; it did not hold the mortgage at the time of the alleged taking. As to the other properties, US Bank had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of the law. It could have redeemed the properties by paying the taxes; it could have sought transfers of the foreclosure actions from the boards of revision to the common pleas courts; it could have appealed the foreclosure adjudications to those courts. View "US Bank Trust, National Association v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

NJBA, a non-profit trade association representing 88 New Jersey banks, sought to make independent expenditures and contributions to political parties and campaigns for state and local offices. NJBA has not made these payments because of N.J. Stats. 19:34-45, which provides that, “[n]o corporation carrying on the business of a bank . . . shall pay or contribute money or thing of value in order to aid or promote the nomination or election of any person, or in order to aid or promote the interests, success or defeat of any political party.” NJBA brought a facial challenge on its own behalf and on behalf of third-party banks.The district court held that section 19:34-45’s prohibition on independent expenditures violates the First Amendment but that the ban on political contributions by certain corporations does not violate the First Amendment and passes intermediate scrutiny. The Third Circuit reversed, declining to address the First Amendment issues. The statute does not apply to trade associations of banks. NJBA is not “carrying on the business of a bank.” With respect to the facial challenge, NJBA does not satisfy the narrow exception to the general rule against third-party standing. View "New Jersey Bankers Association v. Attorney General New Jersey" on Justia Law

Abelardo Martinez, who was blind, brought an action against San Diego County Credit Union (Credit Union) claiming its website was incompatible with software permitting him to read website content. He alleged this defect denied him equal access to, and full enjoyment of, the Credit Union's website and its physical locations. Martinez asserted a single cause of action under the Unruh Civil Rights Act based on two alternate theories: (1) Credit Union's website violated the American Disabilities Act (ADA); and (2) Credit Union's actions constituted intentional discrimination prohibited by the Unruh Civil Rights Act. On the day scheduled for jury selection, the court dismissed the action on its own motion based on its understanding Martinez was intending to pursue only the ADA theory, and the court's finding Martinez had not sufficiently alleged Credit Union's website constitutes a "public accommodation" within the meaning of the ADA (although the court characterized its ruling as a nonsuit, the parties agree it was a conclusion based solely on Martinez's pleadings). Martinez appealed. The Court of Appeal found the trial court erred in dismissing the action at the pleadings stage based on the ADA's public-accommodation element: a disabled plaintiff can state a viable ADA claim for alleged unequal access to a private entity's website if there is a sufficient nexus between the claimed barriers and the plaintiff's ability to use or enjoy the goods and services offered at the defendant's physical facilities. Under this standard, the Court found Martinez alleged a sufficient nexus to state an ADA violation. The Court rejected the Credit Union's alternate argument that the dismissal was proper because the United States Congress has not enacted specific website accessibility standards. View "Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union" on Justia Law

Brintley is blind. To navigate the internet, she uses a screen reader that scans webpages and narrates their contents. The technology struggles with some material, especially pictures and video. With some effort, companies can make their websites fully screen-reader compatible. The credit unions, established under Michigan law, maintain a limited brick-and-mortar presence; both operate websites. Brintley tried to browse these websites but found her screen reader unable to process some of their content. A “tester” of website compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, Brintley sued the credit unions, seeking compensatory and injunctive relief, arguing that the websites were a “service” offered through a “place of public accommodation,” entitling her to the “full and equal enjoyment” of the websites. 42 U.S.C. 12182(a). The district court rejected an argument that Brintley failed to satisfy Article III standing. The Sixth Circuit reversed. To establish standing, Brintley must show that she sustained an injury in fact, that she can trace the injury to the credit unions’ conduct, and that a decision in her favor would redress the injury. Brintley must show an invasion of a “legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent” and that affects her in some “personal and individual way.” Brintley lacks eligibility under state law to join either credit union and her complaint does not convey any interest in becoming eligible to do so. View "Brintley v. Belle River Community Credit Union" on Justia Law

DLC filed a 42 U.SC. 1983 action against defendant, the Director of the South Dakota Division of Banking, alleging that license revocation without a pre-deprivation hearing deprived DLC of its procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of absolute or qualified immunity and its decision that the quick action exception to a pre-deprivation hearing was not applicable.The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because DLC failed to show a violation of a constitutional right that was clearly established. The court held that there was no procedural due process violation where DLC was on notice that the Division was investigating the lawfulness of its new loan product, DLC was afforded an opportunity to provide additional information addressing the Division's concerns, and the revocation order had no more of an effect on DLC's business than the simultaneously issued cease and desist order. View "Dollar Loan Center of South Dakota, LLC v. Afdahl" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the circuit court’s judgment and decree of foreclosure finding in favor of Bank and against Appellant on his counterclaims against Bank and his third-party complaint against the former vice president of commercial lending at Bank (“VP”). The court held (1) the circuit court erred in failing to submit Appellant’s legal counterclaims and third-party claims to the jury; (2) the circuit court erred in granting Bank and VP’s motion to strike Appellant’s jury trial demand based on a predispute jury-waiver clause contained in the loan agreement; and (3) Marvell Light & Ice Co. v. General Electric Co., 259 S.W. 741 (1924), is overruled to the extent that it holds that there is a per se new business rule preventing lost profits unless the business is an old business. View "Tilley v. Malvern National Bank" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether, under Connecticut law, after a judgment debtor’s wages have been garnished, the remaining wages are exempt from execution, and whether the transfer of those wages to a third party constitutes a fraudulent transfer. Pursuant to two state court judgments, The Cadle Company was Terry Fletcher’s judgment creditor, Fletcher owing the company more than $3 million. Since at least 2005, Terry has transferred more than $300,000 of his residual wages to the bank account of his wife, Marguerite Fletcher. The Cadle Company sued the Fletchers in federal district court, alleging, inter alia, that the transfer violated the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA). The district court granted the Fletchers’ motion for partial summary judgment, granted The Cadle Company’s motion for partial summary judgment, and ultimately rendered judgment for The Cadle Company in the amount of $401,426 on its CUFTA claim. The Fletchers appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit subsequently certified a question to the Supreme Court, which the Court accepted. The Supreme Court answered that Terry’s residual wages would not have been exempt from execution if he had retained possession of them, and therefore, they were subject to execution after Terry transferred them to his wife’s account. View "Cadle Co. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

Appellant filed two legal actions. Appellant filed a complaint in federal court alleging violations of his due process and equal protection rights. The federal district court dismissed the complaint, and Appellant appealed. Appellant also filed this original action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel an employee of JPMorgan Chase Bank to pay him a certain amount of money. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant’s claims were barred by res judicata, Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and Appellant failed to identify a clear legal right to the relief he sought. View "State ex rel. McQueen v. Weibling-Holliday" on Justia Law