Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant James Clemons was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se brief to support his petition for postconviction relief. The trial court declined to consider the brief as it exceeded the ten-page limit for petitions, and also denied the petition. Appellant appealed and sought by motion an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition for postconviction relief because the petition was not timely filed with the circuit clerk.

Appellant Harold Cassell was found guilty of capital murder. Appellant subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of the county in which he was incarcerated. The circuit court denied the petition. On appeal, Appellant contended (1) he was convicted of capital murder as an accomplice pursuant to statutes that were not in effect at the time the offense was committed and that the application of those statutes violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws, (2) he should have been indicted as an accessory under the statutes that were in effect when the murder occurred, and (3) he was tried on charges that were not contained in the information. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriate form of relief for Appellant's claims.

Appellant Jimmy Bumgardner was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of pseudoephedrine. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Lincoln County. After Appellant filed his petition, he was transferred to Jefferson County. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that Appellant's arguments had been addressed in his petition for postconviction relief and that he failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that because Appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus was not filed pursuant to the procedural requirements of Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-105, he could not seek relief until he filed the petition in the county in which he was currently held in custody.

Appellant Joseph Bienemy was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Subsequently, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective. The trial court denied Appellant's original petition as well as his request to file an amended petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's requested relief as he failed to satisfy the Strickland v. Washington test establishing that his counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) Appellant's constitutional rights were not violated when the circuit court denied him the right to file an amended petition because the court (a) did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, and (b) required Appellant to comply with a page-length limitation.

Carlos Aguilar pled guilty to second-degree murder and residential burglary and was sentenced to consecutive terms totaling thirty years' imprisonment. Subsequently, Aguilar filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the department of corrections to recompute his parole eligibility date. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Aguilar failed to show he was entitled to declaratory judgment or a writ of mandamus where (1) Aguilar did not show the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing after Aguilar filed his petition, and (2) Aguilar's classification as a second-time violent offender for purposes of parole eligibility did not violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Appellant Roosevelt Abernathy was convicted by a jury of capital murder and first-degree battery. Abernathy filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that his capital murder conviction was void because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment and commitment order as the felony information was flawed. The circuit court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Abernathy failed to make the requisite showing that his commitment was facially invalid or that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment, and (2) Abernathy's claims were the type that should be raised on direct appeal.

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of sexual assault in the second degree. Subsequently, Appellant filed in the circuit court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the writ should issue on the grounds that (1) he was not afforded a speedy trial and was denied due process with respect to his right to a speedy trial, (2) he was subjected to abuse while in custody awaiting trial, and (3) he did not enjoy effective assistance of counsel at trial. The petition was denied, and Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were Appellant's motions seeking an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief and for the State to duplicate the brief for him. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, concluding that Appellant could not prevail on appeal because Appellant's claims were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.

Appellant was convicted by a jury of kidnapping, rape, and burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. Many years later, Appellant filed a petition to vacate or set aside the judgment, alleging his actual innocence and requesting relief pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition, finding that Appellant failed to rebut the presumption of timeliness and failed to meet the requirements of the statute. Appellant appealed, contending that (1) the circuit court denied him of due process of law by denying his petition without first holding an evidentiary hearing; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that his petition failed to properly state a claim for relief, was untimely, and was not properly verified or made under penalty of perjury; and (3) he was entitled to a default judgment on his petition. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court, holding (1) Appellant's due process claim was not preserved for appellate review; (2) the circuit court properly denied Appellant's petition for relief; and (3) Appellant was not entitled to a default judgment on his opinion.

Bennie Guy entered a negotiated plea of guilty to rape in circuit court. More than a decade later, Guy filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court that asserted his actual innocence, alleged that his attorney had withheld from him DNA test results exculpating him, and sought relief under Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201 to -208 (Act 1780). The trial court appointed counsel to represent Guy. Defense counsel filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis and, in the alternative, declaratory relief requesting relief under Act 1780. The trial court denied relief. Guy appealed the order and filed a motion that requested permission to file a motion to submit evidence. The Supreme Court denied the motion and, because it was clear that Guy could not prevail, dismissed the appeal. The Court further held that the trial court did not err in declining to issue a writ of error coram nobis or in denying relief or any further proceedings under Act 1780.

A jury found Appellant Joe Clem guilty by a jury of rape and accomplice to rape. Appellant later filed in the circuit court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition was denied, and Appellant lodged an appeal. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, concluding that it was clear from the record that Appellant could not prevail on appeal and holding (1) Appellant did not demonstrate that the trial court in his case lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment entered was illegal on its face, and (2) Appellant's allegations concerning his counsel's effectiveness and sufficiency of the evidence were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.