Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Levonia Gray of first-degree battery and first-degree terroristic threatening. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant then filed a petition for postconviction relief, claiming that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict and that counsel's failure to address whether the victim was battered by means of a firearm in a directed-verdict motion resulted in prejudice to him. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's denial of relief was not clearly erroneous because (1) Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict and failed to establish a reasonable probability that the circuit court would have acquitted him if counsel had presented the "by means of a firearm" argument to the court in a motion for directed verdict, and (2) therefore, Appellant failed to satisfy the second prong of Strickland v. Washington in his argument that his trial counsel was ineffective.

A jury found Appellant David Fuson guilty of computer child pornography, for which Appellant was sentenced to twenty years' incarceration. On appeal, Appellant contended that the circuit court erred in denying his motions to suppress his custodial statements and to exclude the evidence seized in search of his vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction, holding (1) the circuit court did not clearly err in denying the motion to suppress Appellant's custodial statements as he waived the suppression issue by testifying at trial and adopting as true the material portions of the challenged pretrial statement, and (2) because the circuit court based its decision regarding Appellant's argument concerning the denial of the motion to suppress evidence on two independent grounds and Appellant challenged only one ground on appeal, the merits of Appellant's argument could not be addressed on appeal.

Appellant Robert Davis was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Appellant contended that the admission of a witness's out-of-court statement deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. Specifically, Appellant asserted that because the witness was unable to remember her out-of-court statement, she was constructively unavailable as a witness. The Supreme Court found no error and affirmed, holding that the fact that the witness was unable to recall the details of her out-of-court statement on direct examination was of no consequence where Davis declined the opportunity to cross-examine her.

Appellant Gregory Cook pled guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied, finding that (1) Appellant's allegations failed to demonstrate that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction or that his commitment order was invalid on its face, and (2) Appellant's claim that he was denied a transcript of his plea hearing was not one cognizable in a habeas proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's objections to the form or sufficiency of an indictment or information should have been raised in the court below, and (2) Appellant's allegations that the judicial officer did not sign his arrest warrant, that his plea was not voluntarily made, and that it was a miscarriage of justice for him to be denied a copy of the transcript of his plea-agreement hearing were not issues cognizable in a habeas proceeding.

Appellant Louis Butler was convicted of capital murder by unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle. During trial, the circuit court rejected Butler's proffered instruction on manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense and manslaughter committed under extreme emotional disturbance because the court did not find "a scintilla" of evidence to support any form of manslaughter other than the question of whether Butler recklessly caused the victim's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the proffered instruction because there was no evidence to support the other forms of manslaughter and, therefore, no rational basis on which to give the proffered instruction.

Appellant Frederick Burnley pled guilty to aggravated robbery, felony theft of property, misdemeanor theft of property, kidnapping, and second-degree battery. Appellant subsequently filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his life sentence violated a negotiated plea agreement that he made with the State to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of fifty years in prison for all counts. The circuit court denied relief on the basis that Appellant had failed to obtain service pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 4. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the circuit court erred in dismissing Appellant's habeas petition by applying the rules of civil procedure to the petition, but (2) Appellant failed to state a claim in his petition was that cognizable in a habeas proceeding and, therefore, could not prevail on appeal.

Appellant Matthew Boivin entered a negotiated plea of guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant fell short of establishing that the trial court in his case lacked jurisdiction or that the commitment was invalid on its face as (1) Appellant's claim that his guilty plea was involuntary did not raise a question such as may be addressed in a habeas-corpus proceeding, and (2) the bases for the rest of Appellant's claims were issues that should have been raised on appeal or in a petition for postconviction relief and were not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.

Appellant Albert Bell was convicted for two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was denied. Appellant later filed a petition for recall and for resentencing based on the U.S. Supreme Court's Graham v. Florida, wherein the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant's petition must be treated as one for postconviction relief and Appellant did not demonstrate that his first postconviction relief petition was denied without prejudice, he was not allowed to file a subsequent petition under the rule; and (2) even if Appellant's petition were allowed, his argument failed because he was not convicted of a nonhomicide offense, and therefore, Graham was inapplicable.

Appellant pled guilty to overdraft and failure to register as a sex offender. In the latest of a series of motions that Appellant filed seeking to set aside his convictions for failure to register as a sex offender, Appellant filed this petition for postconviction relief, contending that his convictions should be overturned because an Oklahoma court vacated the rape conviction on which the registration requirement was based, that the circuit court's refusal to set aside the convictions violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that under federal law it was the responsibility of the releasing institution to inform the local government of the requirement to register. The circuit court denied postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because the petition was not timely filed, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider it; and (2) because Appellant previously sought postconviction relief, he was not entitled to seek such relief again.

Appellant Timothy Wise pled guilty to first-degree battery and was sentenced to a term of 240 months' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus, asserting that at the time of his plea he was not given meaningful and adequate notice that he would be required to serve one hundred percent of his sentence and that he would not be eligible for parole. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's petition, finding that he failed to demonstrate any viable basis for relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding it was not error for the circuit court to dismiss his petition because (1) Appellant's claims should have been raised in a petition for postconviction relief, and (2) Appellant failed to present any cognizable ground upon which the court could grant the relief sought by means of a complaint for declaratory judgment and a petition for writ of mandamus.