Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant Marcus Atkins was convicted of first-degree battery, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by certain persons. Appellant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to object when the trial judge sentenced him to a firearm enhancement rather than submitting the issue to a jury. After holding a joint hearing on the petitions filed by Appellant and two codefendants, the trial court denied relief. The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the appeal of one of Appellant's codefendants from the same circuit court order. The Supreme Court then affirmed the denial of Appellant's petition, holding (1) Appellant's petition and the arguments he made on appeal were virtually identical to those made by his codefendant; and (2) for the reasoning explained in the appeal of the codefendant, the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition.

Appellant Vera Arnold was convicted of criminal solicitation to commit capital murder and criminal conspiracy to commit theft by deception. After she was paroled, Appellant filed petitions to seal the records of both convictions pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-105(a)(2) and Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-1201 to -1210. The circuit court denied the petitions. Appellant subsequently filed new petitions to seal the records of her convictions, asserting she had been sentenced under Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-105(a)(1) and Ark Code Ann. 16-93-301 to -303. Along with the petitions, Appellant filed a motion for relief from the circuit court's previous order, arguing (1) because sections 16-93-1201 to -1210 were not in effect as of the date of her offenses, she was eligible to refile her petitions under sections 16-93-301 to -303; and (2) sections 16-93-301 to -303 were unconstitutional. The circuit court denied the petitions and the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in applying rational-basis review to the statutes in question; (2) the trial court did not err in finding the statutes in question constitutional; and (3) the statutes in question did not violate Appellant's constitutional right to a legal sentence.

Appellant Lemuel Whiteside, a juvenile who was seventeen at the time the offense was committed, was convicted of capital-felony murder and aggravated robbery. Whiteside was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the capital-murder conviction and thirty-five years imprisonment for the aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was more than sufficient to convict Appellant of capital-felony murder; (2) Appellant's sentence of life without the possibility of parole was did not violate the Eighth Amendment under Graham v. Florida because Appellant was convicted of a homicide; (3) under existing case law, the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile capital-felony-murder offender does not violate the Arkansas Constitution prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment and thus, Appellant's sentence did not violate the Arkansas Constitution; and (4) the imposition of the mandatory life-without-parole sentence did not violate Appellant's right to a jury trial or due process.

Appellant Calvin Washington was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Washington argued that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement he gave to the police while in custody. Specifically, Appellant argued that his question of "when he would get a chance to see a lawyer" reflected a past tense usage of the question that clearly indicated his intention to invoke his right to an attorney. The circuit court's ruling was based on a finding that the officers' testimony was more convincing and entitled to more weight, and both officers testified that Appellant did not question them about when he would see an attorney. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's finding of voluntariness was not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.

Appellants Lucille Smith and Brenda Spencer were found guilty by a jury in Arkansas County of murder in the first degree. More than thirty-seven years after their trial for first-degree murder, Appellants filed in Arkansas County a pro se motion to dismiss the information with an absolute bar to prosecution, arguing that neither appellant had been formally sentenced in accordance with Arkansas law in violation of their constitutional right to a speedy trial. The circuit court dismissed the motion, finding that it was without jurisdiction because the motion was untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to rule on Appellants' speedy-trial argument because the motion Appellants filed, over three decades after their trial, was untimely.

Appellant Mitchell Skinner entered into a negotiated plea of guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to life without parole. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing (1) the trial court failed to comply with the rules of criminal procedure during the guilty-plea proceeding, (2) his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered into, and (3) his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The circuit court dismissed the petition, ruling (1) Appellant failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, and (2) because Appellant had previously made his claims on direct appeal and in a petition for postconviction relief, the doctrine of law-of-the-case precluded reconsideration of the issues. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed Appellant's petition because Appellant failed to state a cognizable claim, and therefore, he failed to show any basis for a finding that a habeas writ should issue.

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to first-degree murder and received a life sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. At the time of Appellant's conviction, Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c) required that a petition claiming relief must be filed within three years of the date of commitment unless the ground for relief would render the judgment absolutely void. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition on procedural grounds as the petition was not filed within the requisite three years, and on substantive grounds as the allegations were insufficient to void the conviction. Appellant appealed, contending that the three-year period did not control because his conviction was void as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims were not sufficient to render his conviction absolutely void, and thus his petition, which was filed well beyond the three-year limit rule, was untimely filed.

In a dependency-neglect case, the circuit court awarded permanent custody of two children to their maternal grandmother and awarded standard visitation to their father, appellant Jamie Mahone. On appeal, Mahone contended that the circuit court erred by basing its decision on the goal of not separating siblings rather than by applying the preferred goals set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-338. Specifically, Mahone asserted that reunification with him was the first preference set forth in the statute and that, because he was fit to take his children, the circuit court erred in choosing the fifth preference listed, a fit and willing relative, on the basis of its desire not to separate the children from their half-sibling. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the first statutory preference applied to Mahone, and (2) as it was not certain that the circuit court would have awarded custody to the grandmother had it applied the statutory preference afforded to parents in its best-interest analysis, a remand was necessary. Remanded.

Appellant Thernell Hundley pled guilty to capital murder and was sentenced to a life term of imprisonment without parole. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition to dismiss the judgment, arguing that he was seventeen years of age at the time of his conviction and that his life sentence violated, among other things, the Eighth Amendment. In support of his Eighth Amendment claim, Appellant cited as authority Graham v. Florida, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant pled guilty to a homicide offense, his sentence of life imprisonment did not violate the Eighth Amendment under Graham.

Appellant Jim Henson pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault and failure to appear. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err as (1) the evidence supported the circuit court's findings that Appellant's guilty pleas were voluntarily and intelligently made; (2) the evidence showed that Appellant's guilty pleas were made on the advice of competent counsel; (3) Appellant failed to show there was a reasonable probability that, had a mental evaluation been requested by counsel on the day Appellant pled guilty, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different; and (4) Appellant did not demonstrate prejudice by his sentence.