Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tilton Rhodes was convicted of rape and second-degree sexual assault of a twelve-year-old girl and was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment for each offense. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel allegedly failed to prepare witnesses and to introduce evidence. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's findings were not clearly erroneous as Appellant (1) failed to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the amount of time that defense counsel spent with witnesses, and (2) Appellant failed to carry his burden of proving deficient conduct and prejudice with regard to counsel's failure to anticipate a hearsay objection to certain evidence that counsel was unable to introduce.

Appellant Kenneth Osburn was convicted of capital murder and kidnapping and was sentenced to life without parole and life respectively. Osburn appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case based on trial error in the admission of evidence. On interlocutory appeal, Appellant challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty on retrial of the charge of capital murder, asserting that because he was sentenced to life without parole as a matter of law when the jury deadlocked in the penalty phase at his first trial, principles of double jeopardy precluded imposition of the death penalty on retrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that upon remand, the State may seek the death penalty as (1) the failure of a jury to reach a decision fails to act as an acquittal on the death penalty, and (2) the mandatory entry of a sentence of life without parole as a matter of law involves no findings and does not trigger a double-jeopardy bar on retrial.

Appellant Dan Huffman was convicted of second-degree murder and was sentenced as a habitual offender to fifty years' imprisonment. Appellant was sentenced pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 5-4-505, which provided for an extended term of imprisonment for fifteen years when a defendant employed a firearm in furtherance of the felony. Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lincoln County circuit court, alleging that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enhance his sentence and that the order improperly reflected the enhanced sentence. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that although Appellant was incarcerated in Lincoln County when he filed the petition, because he was no longer incarcerated in Lincoln County at the time of the appeal, he could not prevail on appeal because the Lincoln County circuit court could no longer grant the requested relief.

Appellant James Hill was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 360 months' incarceration. Appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied without a hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing, among other things, prosecutorial misconduct, temporary mental incompetency, and denial of due process based on the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for a mistrial. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for photocopying at public expense. The Court declared the motion moot and dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant could not prevail on appeal because he failed to raise a single claim that was cognizable in a postconviction relief petition.

Appellant Jose Fernandez was convicted of rape and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, raising a number of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. Appellant then filed a pro se motion for belated appeal. The Supreme Court granted the motion because the trial court failed to provide the required notice to Appellant of the entry of the order denying his petition. Before the Court was Appellant's motion to file a belated reply brief. The Court declared the motion moot and dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court did not err in denying relief and that Appellant could not prevail on appeal because none of the claims raised in Appellant's petition had merit.

Appellant Ralph Douthitt was convicted by a jury of three counts of rape, twenty-nine counts of violation of a minor, and twenty-nine counts of incest. Appellant later filed a motion for permission to file a belated petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to convince the circuit court to suppress evidence seized during a search of Appellant's garage. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that Appellant's ineffective-assistance argument was not cognizable in a habeas petition.

Appellant John Dickinson was convicted of capital murder and attempted first-degree murder and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole. Appellant subsequently filed for postconviction relief, and the circuit court denied his petition. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, making three allegations of error concerning claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and being improperly charged by information instead of indictment. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's arguments were either not grounds for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus or should have been raised prior to trial.

Appellant John Cummings entered a negotiated plea of nolo contendere to a charge of first-degree murder for which he was sentenced to a term of twenty-eight years in prison. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied. Appellant appealed, contending that he did not enter his guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not inform him that he would not be eligible for parole. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Appellant's petition because there is no constitutional requirement for defense counsel to inform clients about parole eligibility, and the failure to impart such information does not fall outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.

Appellant Anthony Borum pled guilty to second-degree murder and was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty years' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lee County circuit court, alleging that he was not accurately informed of the nature of the charge against him or of the minimum and maximum punishments for the offense. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that because Appellant did not file the petition in the county in which he was held in custody, the Lee County circuit court did not have jurisdiction over Appellant and could not issue a writ of habeas corpus that would be returnable to the court to effect Appellant's release.

Appellant David Vance was convicted of raping his fourteen-year-old daughter and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the rape conviction and argued that the circuit court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by excluding evidence under the rape-shield statute involving an alleged relationship between Appellant's daughter and another girl. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported Appellant's rape conviction, and the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's rape-shield motions as (i) Appellant's Confrontation Clause argument was not preserved for appellate review, and (ii) the question of whether Appellant's daughter and another girl displayed any sexual conduct toward one another was entirely collateral and was therefore not relevant.