Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant Brian Nelson was convicted of four counts of sexual assault of a minor and was sentenced to 672 months' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the Arkansas Rape Shield Statute, and contending that his custodial statement should have been excluded and that the evidence regarding the victim's character for truthfulness should have been admitted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict; (2) the rape shield statute was constitutional and did not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine; (3) Appellant's argument that his custodial statement should have been excluded was not supported by citation to authority of any kind and therefore need not be addressed; and (4) Appellant's failure to proffer testimony regarding the victim's character for truthfulness precluded the Court's review of Appellant's final issue.

A jury found Appellant Jesse Manning guilty of delivery of cocaine and sentenced him as a habitual offender to forty years' incarceration. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus, requesting that the circuit court declare that, despite his convictions for at least eight felonies, he was only a third-time offender and was eligible for parole. Appellant also asked the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Department of Correction ordering officials to treat him as being eligible for parole. The circuit court dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's claims regarding his sentence and parole eligibility under the circumstances here were direct challenges to the judgment of conviction and were not cognizable in a suit for declaratory judgment and writ of mandamus.

In 1985, Appellant Kenny Halfacre was convicted of burglary and theft of property. In 2007, Appellant filed a petition to correct his sentence, seeking relief on the basis that his conviction was illegally imposed as a result of testimony of his wife that was impermissibly admitted into evidence under the holding in Ricarte v. State. The trial court treated the petition as one for postconviction relief and dismissed on the basis that the petition was successive. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the trial court's basis for dismissal was in error because the petition could not be treated as one for postconviction relief, but (2) the record did not establish that the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition because the petition was not timely filed.

Appellant Charles Goodman was found guilty by a jury of two counts of rape and sentenced to 180 months' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently timely filed a petition for postconviction relief, challenging the effectiveness of trial counsel, the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court's jurisdiction, and the fact that the trial court engaged in ex parte communications with the jury. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant either provided only conclusory statements without factual substantiation in support of his arguments, the issues were not properly before the Court, or the issues were not cognizable in a postconviction relief proceeding.

Appellant Jerry Eaton was found guilty by a jury of rape and incest and was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment for rape and thirty-six months for incest, with the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. The trial court denied the petition on the ground that it was not timely filed. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant's appeal because it was not timely filed pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2, and (2) Appellant presented no compelling reason or argument for the Court to overrule its prior case law holding that the filing requirements of rule 37.2 are jurisdictional.

Appellant Michael Davis was convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping and was sentenced to life plus 480 months' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to proffer at trial a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter and thus failing to adequately preserve for appeal Appellant's claim that he was entitled to an instruction on manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in denying Appellant's petition as Appellant failed to demonstrate any merit to the argument that he was entitled to an instruction on manslaughter.

After a jury trial, Appellant Ellis Butler was convicted of three counts of rape and four counts of violation of a minor in the first degree. The case was retried, and Appellant was convicted of three counts of rape. After retrial, Appellant was sentenced twenty years longer on each count of rape than he had originally been sentenced. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. On the second remand, the circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in rejecting Appellant's arguments that trial counsel was ineffective (1) for failing to object, move for mistrial, or move for a reduction of sentence on the basis of vindictive sentencing; (2) for failing to specifically inquire, object, or move for mistrial when the trial court had communications with a juror and when the trial judge gave an implied dynamite charge; (3) for failing to move to strike a potential juror for cause during voir dire; and (4) for referring during voir dire to the fact that Appellant had previously been tried for rape.

Appellant Ernest Wade was convicted, as an accomplice and habitual offender, of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment. Appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition as Appellant did not meet his burden of establishing that counsel was ineffective under the Strickland v. Washington standard or otherwise show he was entitled to postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1.

A jury found Appellant Jerry Sykes guilty of capital murder, kidnapping, robbery, and theft of property. Appellant subsequently timely filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition after a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court did not clearly err in finding no merit in Appellant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as (1) counsel's decision to inform the jury about Appellant's pending drug charges fell within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment, and (2) the decision not to introduce mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of trial was of Appellant's own making.

In 1996, Appellant Kiara Smith pled guilty to robbery and was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment with ten years suspended. Appellant was paroled in 2002. In 2006, Appellant pled guilty to violating the terms of his suspended sentence and was sentenced to forty-eight months' imprisonment. While incarcerated, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence was illegal because the circuit court did not have the authority to revoke his suspended sentence in 2006. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that because Appellant was no longer incarcerated, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of the matter.