Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In 2000, Appellant Karl Roberts was convicted of the capital murder of a twelve-year-old and was sentenced to death by lethal injection. Appellant signed a waiver of his right to pursue an appeal and postconviction remedies. In 2003, the circuit court entered an order stating that Robert had knowingly and intelligently waived all rights to postconviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed. In 2008, Roberts filed a petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.5. The circuit court denied the petition, finding that the petition was untimely filed and Roberts was not entitled to relief. The Supreme Court dismissed Roberts's appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding (1) where the ninety-day filing period under rule 37.5 has expired and a waiver of postconviction relief has been affirmed by the Court, a petitioner must file the appropriate motion to reopen postconviction proceedings before a rule 37 petition can be brought in circuit court; and (2) because this was not done in the present case, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to entertain Roberts's rule 37.5 petition, and the Supreme Court was likewise without jurisdiction to hear an appeal from any decision of the circuit court in the matter.

Appellant Frank Randolph was found guilty by a jury of robbery, theft of property, and kidnapping and was sentenced as a habitual offender to twenty-five years' imprisonment for each offense to be served consecutively. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending (1) his consecutive sentences were illegal because the trial judge referred to the terror experienced by the victim, which was not a fact admitted by Appellant or found by the jury, and (2) it was a violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy for him to be sentenced for kidnapping. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition because the petition did not state a basis to warrant issuance of the writ.

Petitioner Jamie Lee was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and four counts of first-degree battery. Petitioner (1) filed a petition with the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that certain testimony was deleted from the trial transcript, and the court reporter, prosecutor, and trial judge committed egregious misconduct by misleading the appellate court; and (2) asked the Court grant him leave to proceed with a belated petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court (1) denied Petitioner's petition because Petitioner did not state a ground for the writ; and (2) denied Petitioner's request because there was no provision in Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1 for a belated petition.

Appellant Billy Kelley was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment as a habitual offender. Kelley filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial attorney was ineffective for not preserving a Confrontation Clause challenge for appellate review. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's denial of postconviction relief was not clear error where, pursuant to the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, Kelley failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's failure to obtain a ruling on his Confrontation Clause objection, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

Appellant Roderick Williams was first convicted for several offenses, after which the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial. Upon remand, Appellant was convicted of capital murder, first-degree domestic battering, endangering the welfare of a minor, and possession of a firearm by a felon. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict on the capital-murder and child-endangerment charges and by denying his motion for a mistrial when the State's witness referred to Appellant's previous trial during her testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported Appellant's conviction of capital murder with premeditation and deliberation as well as Appellant's child-endangerment conviction; and (2) the witness's statement was not so patently inflammatory that it would cause the drastic relief of granting a mistrial.

Appellant Rodney Webb was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine and sentenced to twenty-two years' imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court committed reversible error in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine found on his person on the basis that Appellant was provided a lesser expectation of privacy because of his status as a parolee. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of suppression on the basis that the search of Appellant's person was consensual following a valid traffic stop, and therefore, the Court did not address the issue of Appellant's status as a parolee.

Appellant Ira Vankirk pled guilty to three counts of rape and was sentenced to three consecutive terms of life imprisonment. On appeal, Appellant argued that the circuit court erred during the sentencing proceedings by allowing the State to introduce a videotaped interview of an investigator for the Arkansas State Police Crimes Against Children division asking the victim in this case about the rape allegations. Specifically, Appellant contended the admission of the evidence violated Appellant's constitutional right to confrontation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the right of confrontation extended to Appellant's sentencing proceeding before a jury, (2) the circuit court erred in admitting the videotaped interview of the victim, and (3) such error was not harmless. Remanded for resentencing.

After a jury trial, Appellant Charles Rodgers was found guilty of rape and sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a timely pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. Appellant then filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that the writ should issue on the grounds that he was not afforded a speedy trial. The circuit court denied the petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion seeking an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that Appellant's speedy-trial issue was not cognizable in a habeas proceeding.

Appellant Clifford Ritter was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and committing a felony with a firearm and was sentenced to life imprisonment. Ritter appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found in his residence because the premises to be searched were not identified with particularity as is required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.2(b). Specifically, Ritter contended that, because the name and address in the search warrant incorrectly identified his residence, police officers had no authority to enter his property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Ritter's motion to suppress where (1) a search warrant is not automatically rendered invalid if it contains an incorrect address of the property to be searched, (2) the likelihood of searching the wrong residence was mitigated by the fact that the officers executing the warrant personally knew which premises were to be searched, and (3) the premises that were intended to be searched were, in fact, searched.

Appellant Calvin Perry was found guilty by a jury of second-degree battery, kidnapping, being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, and committing a felony in the presence of a child. After the jury fixed Appellant's sentences, the circuit court imposed an additional 180 months' imprisonment for commission of a felony with a firearm. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that the performance of his counsel at trial was deficient because counsel failed to object when the trial court decided to impose sentence on the firearm enhancement rather than submitting the question to the jury. The circuit court denied the petition, finding no merit in Appellant's claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's claim of prejudice was speculative and bereft of factual support for the assumption that the jury would have assessed a more lenient sentence than the trial court; and (2) Appellant's claim of prejudice based on the severity of the sentence was unavailing in a postconviction relief petition.