Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Corey Turner was convicted, by way of an entry of a negotiated guilty plea in circuit court, on charges of delivery of hydrocodone and first-degree endangering the welfare of a minor. Appellant subsequently filed a petition and amended petition to correct a sentence. The trial court denied the petitions. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by Appellant relating to his appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that the only claim in Appellant's petition that alleged a facially invalid sentence nevertheless failed to state a claim sufficient to support relief under the sentence, and therefore, the trial court did not err in declining to modify the sentence.

Appellant was charged with capital murder and two counts of aggravated assault. Appellant was convicted of all three charges and sentenced to death on the murder charge. Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, as well as an amended petition, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant's trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to (1) interview or call Appellant's son as a mitigation witness during sentencing; (2) object to the prosecutor's statements in closing argument; (3) object to the State's admission of an aggravator that Appellant had committed a prior violent felony; (4) object to the admission of written victim-impact statements; (5) conduct voir dire on the issue of race; and (6) sufficiently explain his right to present uncomplimentary evidence about the victim during the penalty phase where, in support of this claim, Appellant presented only conclusory allegations.

Appellant Michael Schniepp pled guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession of a firearm by certain persons, and maintaining a drug premises. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's sufficiency-of-the-evidence, due-process, illegal-seizure, and severity-of-the-sentence arguments were subject to dismissal as being noncognizable due to Appellant's guilty plea; and (2) Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were procedurally barred from the Court's review, as the circuit court did not provide a ruling on those issues.

Appellant Michael Perry entered a plea of guilty to aggravated residential burglary, aggravated robbery, battery in the second degree, aggravated assault, misdemeanor theft of property, and misdemeanor interference with emergency communication. Appellant timely filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion related to the appeal. The Court declared the motion moot and dismissed the appeal, holding (1) because the allegations raised in the petition were without factual substantiation to support them, Appellant did not establish that he was prejudiced; and (2) Appellant's additional claims were not cognizable in a postconviction relief proceeding.

Petitioner Robert Loggins was found guilty by a jury of several drug-related crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that a third-party confession had become available to him that established information not available at trial, which would have resulted in a reasonable probability that the judgment would not have been rendered if the information had been brought out at trial. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) the information did not negate the evidence adduced at trial; and (2) Petitioner's claims were not grounds for coram-nobis relief, as assertions of a third-party confession after a judgment is affirmed are properly addressed to the executive branch in a clemency proceeding.

Joe Kelley was sentenced to five years' imprisonment by the Fourth Division circuit court on conviction of a terroristic act. Subsequently, Kelley was convicted of forgery in the Second Division circuit court and received a five-year sentence. The court ordered that the sentence be served concurrently with the Fourth Division sentence. Kelley was also sentenced in federal court. After Kelley was paroled early from the Department of Correction (ADC) on the Second Division conviction, he was transferred to the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to serve time for his federal conviction. Kelley was then notified that he would not begin serving his sentence on the Fourth Division sentence until he was released from the BOP. Kelley challenged the actions of the ADC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if Kelley began to serve his sentence in the ADC only on the Fourth Division sentence upon transfer back from the BOP, he would not have served his Second and Fourth Division sentences concurrently in violation of law; and (2) the ADC must correct its record to show that Kelley began serving his Fourth Division sentence on the same date he began to serve his Second Division sentence. Remanded.

Ricky Justus pled guilty to two counts of false imprisonment, theft of property, and domestic battery and was sentenced to the maximum sentence. The court of appeals affirmed. More than five years later, Justus pro se filed a belated petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied. Justus appealed and filed (1) a petition for writ of certiorari requesting the Supreme Court to supplement the record with copies of the original and amended judgment, and (2) motions to supplement the record and for a copy of the transcript. The Court (1) granted the writ in part, (2) declared Justus' motions moot, and (3) dismissed Justus' appeal, holding that, as Justus' petition for postconviction relief was untimely, the circuit court and Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider it.

Appellant Conray Carroll pled guilty to rape, for which he was sentenced as a habitual offender to 720 months' imprisonment. Approximately fourteen years later, Appellant filed a pro se motion for depositions and discovery pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 26. The motion was denied on the ground that it amounted to an untimely petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of certiorari and a motion to amend his appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the petition for writ of certiorari and motion to amend the appeal were moot, as the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's untimely petition.

Appellant Tony Thomas entered a plea of guilty in the circuit court to aggravated robbery and theft of property and was sentenced to serve an aggregate term of 240 months' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the circuit court denied. Appellant appealed, and before the Supreme Court were Appellant's motions related to that appeal. The Court declared the motions moot and dismissed the appeal, holding that Appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating a basis for writ of habeas corpus to issue, and he could not prevail on appeal of the order denying his petition.

Appellant Cameka Sullivan was convicted of permitting the abuse of her minor child and hindering the apprehension or prosecution of her child's abuser and sentenced to a cumulative sentence of 216 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed her convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly concluded that Appellant's right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict of acquittal on the charge of hindering the apprehension of her child's abuser; and (3) did not abuse its discretion in allowing certain challenged testimony.