Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant David Paschal was convicted of four counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of witness bribery. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part, and reversed and dismissed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict on the witness-bribery charge; and (2) erred in finding the sexual-degree sexual-assault statute constitutional as it was applied to Appellant because the statute, as applied in this case, infringed on Appellant's fundamental right to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy with an adult and was not the least restrictive method available for the promotion of a state interest.

Petitioner Robert Hoover was convicted of capital murder and aggravated robbery and was sentenced to two life sentences. Hoover subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden to show that the writ is warranted, as only one of Petitioner's three claims was of the ilk that may be cognizable in proceedings for the writ, and that claim was without merit because the asserted error did not raise a reasonable probability that the judgment of conviction would not have been rendered, or would have been prevented, if the facts Petitioner alleged were withheld had been available at trial.

After a jury trial, Charles Goodwin was convicted of attempted capital-felony murder with aggravated robbery as the underlying offense and sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. Approximately three-and-one-half years afterwards, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of mandamus, contending that the circuit court judge had not acted on the Rule 37.1 petition in a timely manner. The judge explained the cause of the delay, and the Rule 37.1 petition was acted on by the court. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the mandamus action was moot.

The City filed a complaint in eminent domain against Zara Thomas, trustee of two revocable trusts, and a motion for an order of immediate possession, seeking to procure a portion of Thomas's property for the purpose of constructing a bike trail. The circuit court granted the City's motion for order of immediate possession, and the City commenced construction on Thomas's property. Thomas appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that the order did not conclude the parties' rights as to the subject matter in controversy, and therefore, was not a final and appealable order, as the circuit court had not yet addressed the issue of Thomas's right to just compensation and the amount of damages.

Petitioner David Daniels was found guilty by a jury of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se motion seeking at public expense a copy of the transcript lodged on direct appeal, contending that the transcript was necessary to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus and that he was entitled to a copy. Appended to the motion was Petitioner's affidavit of indigency. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that Petitioner failed to show the transcript should be provided to him at no cost because he did not establish that there was a timely postconviction remedy available to him.

Appellant Barry Aaron received two life sentences for his convictions on charges of kidnapping and rape. Appellant subsequently filed two pro se motions referencing an action under Ark. Code Ann. 16-112-201 to -208, or Act 1780. The trial court denied the motions, and Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion to consolidate the two appeals. The Court declared the motion moot and dismissed the appeals, holding that relief under the Act was foreclosed to Appellant on the basis that he pursued a defense based upon a tactical decision not to have certain evidence disclosed, and therefore, it was clear that Appellant could not prevail on appeal of either of the orders that denied the motions.

After receiving complaints of narcotic activity, patrol officers began to watch an area around a trailer. An officer opened three trash bags from a nearby dumpster to investigate the names of the adults living in the trailer and discovered items relating to methamphetamine as well as fresh baby diapers. After obtaining a search warrant, which included a justification for nighttime clause because the search would be executed after 8 p.m., the officers discovered methamphetmine being manufactured in the bathroom while three small children were asleep inside the trailer. The circuit court Defendant Mark Tyson's motion to suppress, finding that none of the nighttime-search conditions in Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.2(c) applied to the search. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in granting Tyson's motion to suppress where (1) the facts did not provide a basis for reasonable cause for a nighttime search pursuant to Rule 13.2; but (2) the executing officers operated in good faith under U.S. v. Leon, and therefore, the exception to the Court's criminal rules applied to the defective search and seizure.

This interlocutory appeal stemmed from the circuit court's disqualification of Reggie Koch as counsel for appellants, Ae Samontry and Pornpiemon Phouangmany. Appellants were charged with prostitution and promoting prostitution. Jerry Richard, Samontry's ex-husband, was also charged with promoting prostitution. Richard was represented by Koch. Samontry and Phouangmany were found guilty as charged, and Richard was acquitted of all charges. Samontry and Phouangmany then retained Koch as their attorney and appealed their convictions to the circuit court. The circuit court subsequently granted the State's motion to disqualify Koch as counsel for Appellants based on his previous representation of a material witness, Richard, in the matter. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed the appeal with respect to Samontry, as there was no order contained in the record of this interlocutory appeal disqualifying Koch as counsel for Samontry; and (2) reversed Koch's disqualification as counsel for Phouangmany, as the State failed to meet its burden of proof to support Koch's disqualification in Phouangmany's case.

Appellant Yvonne Dockery pled no contest to one count of theft pursuant to a negotiated plea. On October 26, Appellant filed a motion to withdraw her no-contest plea. On October 30, the circuit court denied the motion after finding that sentencing had taken place prior to the filing of the motion and the court had lost jurisdiction to set aside the plea. Also on October 30, the court entered a judgment-and-commitment order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court clearly erred in determining whether it had jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's motion where the commitment order was not filed with the circuit clerk until four days after Appellant had filed her motion. Remanded.

Appellant Billy Culbertson, who was incarcerated at the Arkansas Department of Correction located in Lee County, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lee County circuit court. The petition pertained to three criminal judgments on charges to which Appellant had entered pleas of guilty. Appellant argued that he was innocent of the offenses and that he was entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus on a number of grounds. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion to file a belated brief on appeal. The Court declared the motion moot and denied the appeal, as Appellant failed to establish that the writ should issue.