Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Raymond Leach was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole. On appeal, Appellant claimed five points warranted reversal of his conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err (1) in denying Appellant's motion for directed verdict on capital murder, as there was sufficient evidence for the jury to support the conviction; (2) in denying Appellant's motion to suppress his custodial statement, as the statement was freely and voluntarily given; and (3) by allowing a law-enforcement officer to testify regarding his personal observation at the crime scene. The Court held that the remainder of Appellant's arguments were not preserved for appellate review.

Timothy Howard was convicted by a jury of two counts of capital murder and one count of attempted capital murder. Howard was sentenced to death plus thirty years and a $15,000 fine. The Supreme Court affirmed Howard's convictions and sentences on all counts. After unsuccessfully seeking relief through several postconviction motions, Howard filed the current petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the circuit court for purposes of error coram nobis relief. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part and denied it in part, holding that Howard asserted two claims regarding the guilt phase that were appropriate for reinvesting the circuit court with jurisdiction, both of which were based on alleged Brady violations that had apparent merit. The claims were the State's failure to disclose a DNA report with handwritten notes showing potential errors made during the DNA testing of certain hairs and the State's failure to disclose a report from the Arkansas Crime Lab indicating that wood particles found on Howard's alleged work boots did not match the doors of the victims' home. The Court further granted the petition in regards to Howard's claim that mitigation evidence was withheld from him prior to trial.

Following a jury trial, Appellant Danny Henington was convicted of felony rape and sentenced to thirty-six years' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant timely filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective. The circuit court denied Appellant's petition without a hearing. Appellant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing and that the court's written findings constituted reversible error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's petition, as (1) the recorded demonstrated that counsel did not perform deficiently, and thus the circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing; and (2) the court's written findings complied with Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3.

Petitioner Detrick Croston was convicted of aggravated robbery. The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's motion for belated appeal. Petitioner subsequently tendered a motion for belated appeal of the same case. Before the Supreme Court was Petitioner's motion for rule on clerk seeking to have the clerk file the tendered motion for belated appeal. The Court denied the motion, holding (1) Petitioner did not demonstrate that there was good cause for his own failure to comply with the time limitations for filing his motion for belated appeal, and (2) Petitioner did not establish good cause to grant an exception to the rule that Petitioner was not entitled to file a subsequent motion for relief after his original motion for belated appeal was denied.

Appellant Nickol Carter entered a negotiated plea of guilty to aggravated robbery, possession of a firearm by certain persons, and robbery. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged that his guilty plea had been coerced and that the State had withheld material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The circuit court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared the motions he filed in connection with the appeal moot, holding that the circuit court correctly followed the Arkansas rules of criminal procedure during Appellant's plea hearing and that none of the allegedly withheld evidence would have prevented the circuit court from accepting the plea. Therefore, the denial of Appellant's petition was not an abuse of discretion.

Appellant Anthony Williamson was convicted of aggravated robbery and kidnapping. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed four petitions for postconviction relief in the trial court, one original petition and three amended and supplemented petitions. Only Appellant's original petition was within the time limitations, but it was not otherwise in compliance with the rules of procedure because it was not verified. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal, holding that because Appellant did not file a timely petition for postconviction relief that was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court to consider his claims for relief, the trial court had not jurisdiction to consider Appellant's later-filed amended petitions.

After a jury trial, Appellant Chase Prater was convicted of rape, kidnapping, sexual assault in the second degree, and felony impersonation. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's conviction and sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no defective performance of trial counsel under Strickland v. Washington because (1) Appellant failed to show that counsel had a meritorious basis for making a motion for directed verdict on the issue of the amount of restraint used to commit the kidnapping; (2) Appellant failed to show that counsel made an unreasonable professional judgment in failing to use photographs showing the victim at a party in the days after the rape occurred; and (3) trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to a Doyle violation of Appellant's right to remain silent or for not properly preparing him for his testimony.

Appellant Lee Millsap entered a plea of guilty to multiple offenses and was sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without parole. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se "third motion for appointment of counsel," contending that he was entitled as an indigent prisoner charged with a capital offense to appointment of an attorney to process a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the circuit court. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by Appellant related to the appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that, as Appellant did not establish that he was entitled to the relief sought, the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion.

Appellant Michael Miller was placed under arrest for the offense of driving while intoxicated. Appellant's driver's license was suspended for six months and his commercial driver's license was disqualified for one year. At an administrative hearing, a hearing officer upheld the suspension of Appellant's driving privileges. Appellant appealed, asserting that his administrative hearing was flawed. The circuit court found (1) the administrative hearing did not violate Appellant's due process right, and therefore, Ark. Code Ann. 5-65-402, which governs the administrative suspension of driver's licenses, was not unconstitutional as applied to Appellant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 5-64-402 was no unconstitutional as applied to Appellant in this case.

Petitioner Greg Hogue was convicted of capital murder. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for forensics testing, seeking to challenge his conviction through a writ of habeas corpus. The lower court denied the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court clerk declined to lodge the appeal because its tender was untimely. Before the Court was Petitioner's motion seeking to proceed with the appeal and requesting that the Court permit him to lodge the record belatedly. The Court denied the motion, holding that Petitioner did not show good cause for his failure to tender the record within the ninety-day period required by Ark. R. App. P.-Crim 4(b).