Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jessie Hill was convicted of capital murder. Appellant subsequently filed a motion to vacate judgment under Act 1780, seeking a hearing to establish a scientific predicate for a new trial, the production of a report for the results of latent-fingerprint analysis that Appellant alleged the State performed on a marble rolling pin, and additional testing of evidence from his trial. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appealed. Before the Supreme Court were Appellant's motion to compel, requesting that the Supreme Court order production of the same latent-print report, and petition for writ of mandamus to the state attorney general to enforce the order that he sought in his motion. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion and petition moot, holding that Appellant's petition was properly dismissed, as his motion for relief did not establish that he was entitled to seek relief under Act 1780 or that the trial court could assume jurisdiction.

Appellant Kenneth Barrow was found guilty of sexual indecency with a child, second-degree sexual assault, rape, and first-degree terroristic threatening. The court of appeals affirmed. Barrow filed an amended petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court dismissed without prejudice for failing to comply with the requirements of Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1(b). The court then gave Barrow ten days to file a compliant petition. Barrow subsequently filed a second amended petition for postconviction relief within the ten-day period, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition, concluding that Barrow's counsel was not ineffective and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter because the second amended petition was not filed until after the sixty-day time period provided under Rule 37.1. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the facts of this case, the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear Barrow's amended petition; and (2) the court's order finding that Barrow did not meet his burden of proof by showing that his counsel was ineffective was conclusory in nature and failed to comply with Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3(c). Remanded.

On October 12, 1993, Appellee Harris Martin was found guilty of negligent homicide and sentenced to five years probation. On April 9, 2009, Martin filed a petition to seal the record of his negligent-homicide conviction. The circuit court granted the petition, noting Ark. Code Ann. 5-10-105 as the court's authority for the expungement. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by sealing Appellant's negligent-homicide conviction pursuant to section 5-10-105, as the statute lacked any provision for expungement of Appellant's record, and therefore, the circuit court's order did not provide a proper basis for expungement.

Petitioner Charles Rodgers was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition in the Supreme Court that sought to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis and two motions that sought to supplement and amend that request with a substituted petition or additional documents. The Supreme Court denied the requests to supplement and amend the petition and the petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court, holding that Petitioner did not meet his burden to state some basis that would warrant a proceeding for the writ.

Appellant Ronald Little pled no contest to one charge of manslaughter and one charge of second-degree battery, for which he received a cumulative sentence of 240 months' incarceration. Appellant subsequently filed a verified pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons. Before the Supreme Court were two pro se motions filed by Appellant related to his appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that the circuit court did not clearly err in concluding that counsel's performance was not ineffective, and therefore, Appellant could not prevail if his appeal were allowed to proceed.

Appellant Jessie Goins was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition was denied by a written order. Appellant then filed a second petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting the same grounds for the writ as he alleged in the earlier habeas petition. The petition was denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err in determining that the claims presented in Appellant's petition were not the kind that could support habeas-corpus relief; and (2) the circuit court did not err in determining that Appellant's second point was not cognizable in a habeas-corpus petition.

Appellant Cornelius Earl was convicted on three counts of delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to a total of 960 months' imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed his convictions and sentence. Earl subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel operated under an actual conflict of interest due to counsel's simultaneous representation of Earl and his girlfriend, who also faced charges stemming from the same incident. Earl alternatively asserted that any waiver by him of the conflict was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. The circuit court denied the petition. Earl appealed, arguing that the trial court did not meaningfully inquire into the propriety of multiple representation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because nothing in the circumstances of this case indicated that the trial court had a duty to inquire whether there was a conflict of interest, the inquiry was not insufficient, and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying postconviction relief.

In 1997, Phillip Sullivan pled guilty to theft of property and was sentenced pursuant to the Community Punishment Act. In 2011, Sullivan filed a petition to seal the record in his theft-of-property case, claiming he was entitled to have his record expunged pursuant to the Act. The circuit court denied the petition, determining that it was without jurisdiction to grant the relief. In its order, the circuit court quoted from the version of the Act in effect in 1997 instead of the 2011 version. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Sullivan failed to object below to the application of the 2011 version of the Act and failed to raise any arguments on appeal in relation to the 1997 version, the Court could not engage in an interpretation of the 1997 version of the statute; and (2) the Court could not address the arguments that were raised by Sullivan on appeal in relation to the 2011 version of the Act because to do so would be to issue an advisory opinion on a version of the statute that had no application to the instant case.

Petitioner Rickey Strain was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and was sentenced to 300 months' incarceration. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a timely petition for postconviction relief, asserting, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the petition following an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner then filed a petition for rehearing, asserting that the Court made specific errors of law or fact in its opinion. The Supreme Court denied the petition for rehearing, holding that the opinion did not contain any errors of fact or law that would warrant granting the instant petition.

Appellant James Lowe was convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, setting forth nine claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims not cognizable in a petition for postconviction relief. The circuit court denied the petition. Appellant then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to complete the record and a motion for appointment of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the petition, dismissed the appeal, and declared the motion moot, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the postconviction relief petition, as Appellant did not include in facts that would demonstrate prejudice for any of the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.