Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Sixteen-year-old C.B. was charged with the felony offenses of, inter alia, capital murder, aggravated robbery, first-degree escape, and theft of property. C.B. filed a motion to dismiss and to declare Ark. Code Ann. 9-27-318 unconstitutional and a motion to transfer to juvenile court. In challenging the constitutionality of section 9-27-318, C.B. contended that the statute, among other things, violated the separation of powers doctrine by improperly vesting in the local prosecuting attorney power to determine which court has initial jurisdiction over certain classes of juveniles. The circuit court denied both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 9-27-318 was constitutional; and (2) the circuit court did not clearly err in denying C.B.'s motion to transfer.

Following a jury trial, Appellant Simon Reed was convicted of one count of assault in the third degree and one count of assault in the first degree. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se "Intent to Appeal" with the circuit clerk. However, no notice of appeal was ever filed. Appellant, by and through his attorney, subsequently filed a motion for rule on clerk. The Supreme Court treated Appellant's motion as one for belated appeal and remanded, as no good reason for failure to file a notice of appeal was cited in the motion, fault was not admitted, and the Court could not tell from the record whether there was attorney error. Remanded for findings on attorney error.

Judgment was entered reflecting that Appellant Joe Jones had been found guilty of having violated the conditions of a suspended sentence imposed on him in 2002. The court of appeals affirmed the revocation of the suspended sentence. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, challenging the revocation order and arguing that his attorney was ineffective during the revocation proceedings. The trial court denied the petition. Before the Supreme Court were two motions filed by Appellant related to his appeal. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that Appellant failed to provide facts to affirmatively establish that he was entitled to postconviction relief.

On October 24, 2007, Napolean Johnson was charged with several drug-related offenses. On March 23, 2010, Johnson was charged with two misdemeanors and kidnapping, a felony. Johnson entered negotiated pleas of guilty in both cases and was sentenced to one year on each misdemeanor conviction and to ten years on each felony conviction. The sentences were to run concurrently for a total term of ten years. The Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) subsequently decided that Johnson would be required to serve the entirety of his ten-year sentence for kidnapping because he was ineligible for parole pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-93-609. Johnson filed a motion to modify sentence to conform with the intent of the parties, challenging the ADC's decision to apply section 16-93-609, a parole-eligibility statute, to his sentence. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed Johnson's appeal, holding (1) Johnson's argument that the ADC should make him eligible for parole was not a recognized exception for an appeal following a guilty plea; and (2) because Johnson's sentence had been placed into execution, the circuit court had no jurisdiction to grant Johnson the relief request, nor did the Court.

Appellant Johnny Craig, an incarcerated inmate, filed in the county in which he was incarcerated a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the information charging him was insufficient, the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction. The trial court dismissed the petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's motion for an extension of time in which to file his brief. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that because Appellant did not, in his petition, invoke Act 1780, plead facts cognizable in a habeas corpus petition, or make a showing of probable cause for issuance of the writ, Appellant's petition did not merit relief, and the trial court did not err in dismissing the petition.

Appellant Charles Wilson was found guilty by a jury of delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced as a habitual offender to serve a term of 480 months' imprisonment. Appellant subsequently filed an untimely pro se petition for postconviction relief, which the trial court denied. Appellant appealed, and before the Supreme Court were Appellant's pro se motions seeking an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief and a copy of the record. The Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions moot, holding that because Appellant did not timely file his petition, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his petition, and thus, the Supreme Court also lacked jurisdiction.

Appellant Elvis Thacker entered a plea of guilty to attempted capital murder and kidnapping. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his attorney was ineffective for several reasons, that his attorney violated the attorney-client privilege, and that the evidence was not sufficient to support the kidnapping charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's claim that the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction was not cognizable in a postconviction petition; (2) Appellant did not overcome the presumption that his counsel was competent; and (3) Appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that he was prejudiced by counsel's alleged violation of the attorney-client privilege.

Appellee Kenneth Harrison was tried and convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. Harrison subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief. The circuit court entered an order granting a new trial based on its finding that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to discover the juvenile adjudication for capital murder of one of the two eyewitnesses who testified to Harrison's murder of the victim, and for failing to use that conviction to impeach the witness at trial or to investigate the witness's background and develop a strategy of defense implicating the witness as the perpetrator of the victim's murder. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court's findings were not clearly erroneous, and therefore, the court did not err in granting postconviction relief.

Appellant Avery Scott entered a plea of guilty to sexual assault in the second degree and was sentenced to a term of 180 months' imprisonment. Scott subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea, arguing that his plea was involuntary because his attorney pressured him to accept it. The motion was denied. Scott then filed a petition for postconviction relief, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court did not err in denying the petition where (1) Scott's argument that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to convict and sentence him was without merit; (2) Scott's claim that the prosecutor acted in bad faith was not cognizable in a postconviction relief petition; and (3) trial counsel did not afford Scott ineffective assistance of counsel.

Appellant Broderick Laswell was found guilty of capital murder and aggravated robbery and was sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment without parole plus 720 months' imprisonment, respectively. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by (1) denying Appellant's motions for directed verdict, as there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict that Appellant committed aggravated robbery and capital murder; (2) admitting certain character evidence over Appellant's objection; (3) admitting certain crime-scene evidence over Appellant's chain-of-custody objections; and (4) excluding certain expert testimony during the guilt phase of trial.