Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant N.D. was a juvenile when he was adjudicated delinquent for commission of aggravated robbery and possession of a weapon. After N.D. escaped from the detention center, the State filed a felony information charging N.D. as an adult with capital murder, escape in the first degree, aggravated robbery, theft of property, and second-degree battery. After the Supreme Court reversed the criminal court's denial of N.D.'s motion to transfer his case to the juvenile court, the criminal court transferred N.D.'s case to juvenile court. The juvenile court subsequently entered a decision that N.D. be designated for extended juvenile jurisdiction (EJJ). N.D. appealed, asserting that the criminal court already declined to make such a designation, and because the Supreme Court did not reverse that refusal in N.D.'s first appeal, the issue was decided by law of the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court did not previously reach a decision or provide direction to the criminal court with respect to EJJ designation, nor did the criminal court make a decision regarding EJJ designation, and so the law-of-the case doctrine did not bar the juvenile court from granting the State's motion for an EJJ designation.

Appellant Frank Garner was found guilty by a jury of kidnapping and rape. Appellant subsequently filed in the circuit court in which he was convicted a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The circuit court denied the petition after finding that Appellant had failed to rebut the presumption against timeliness. Appellant appealed and filed a motion for extension of time in which to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motion moot, holding that the circuit court's denial of Appellant's original petition for writ of habeas corpus based on Apellant's failure to rebut the presumption against timeliness was not clearly erroneous.

This FOIA action stemmed from requests made by Appellant after she was stopped for speeding by a police officer. Appellant filed a complaint alleging (1) the police department (Department)'s refusal to provide the requested records violated the FOIA, (2) asserting that the Department's requirement that she pay $2,475 for copying of the records was not permitted under the FOIA, and (3) alleging that the Department engaged in spoliation of evidence in an attempt to circumvent the FOIA. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's complaint after finding the Department did not violate the FOIA. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) erred in finding there was no FOIA violation by the Department with regard to Appellant's first FOIA request; (2) erred in concluding that the Department's requirement of a fee in the amount of $2,475 was reasonable and not a violation of the FOIA; and (3) did not err in finding the Department did not violate the FOIA in purging the records pursuant to its forty-five-day policy.

The court of appeals reversed and remanded Petitioner David Anderson's original conviction for first-degree murder. Following a new trial on the same charge, Petitioner was again convicted, and he received a life sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition asking that the Supreme Court reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court and permit him to file a petition for writ of error coram nobis. Petitioner then filed a motion for addition, a motion seeking to amend the petition, six amendments, and motions to voluntarily dismiss, to compel, and to raise objections. The Supreme Court (1) granted the motion that sought to amend the petition; (2) denied the motions to dismiss and compel; and (3) denied the petition with its amendments, holding that none of the claims raised in Petitioner's petition or amendments had merit.

Appellants, a group of inmates incarcerated for certain methamphetamine offenses, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, writ of mandamus, and writ of prohibition, alleging that Act 1782 was an unconstitutional repeal of the sunset clause of the statutory provision that required persons convicted of certain methamphetamine offenses to serve seventy percent of their sentence prior to being eligible for parole. Specifically, Appellants asserted that the seventy-percent provision as it applied to methamphetamine-related offenses should not be applied to their sentences. The circuit court found that the Act was lawfully enacted and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Act 1782 did not unconstitutionally repeal Ark. Code Ann. 29-30-162 and 29-30-163.

Appellant Theodis Mitchell was convicted of commercial burglary, terroristic threatening, fleeing, and criminal mischief. Mitchell's convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Mitchell subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting that counsel was ineffective for failure to renew Appellant's motion for a directed verdict and for failure to offer instructions on lesser-included sentences. The circuit court denied the petition without a hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, as Appellant failed to offer facts to support his conclusion that counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict and offer instructions on lesser-inclded offenses in this case prejudiced him of his defense.

Appellant Rodney Mitchael was convicted of rape and first-degree terroristic threatening. The court of appeals affirmed. Nearly five years after the date of his conviction, Appellant filed a petition to vacate and/or set aside the judgment, which he based on Act 1780. The circuit court denied the petition. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for extension of time to lodge the record on appeal, and then tendered to the Supreme Court a petition for writ of mandamus seeking a ruling by the circuit court on the motion for extension of time. The Supreme Court treated the motion as one for rule on clerk and then denied the motion and the petition for writ of mandamus, holding that the portion of Appellant's petition seeking DNA testing under Act 1780 was untimely, and none of the other claims Appellant raised in the petition were grounds for relief under Act 1780.

Appellant Randall McArty was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to "hard labor" in the Department of Correction for life. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his sentence exceeded the statutory sentencing authority of the circuit court and was a violation of Appellant's right against cruel and unusual punishment. The circuit court denied the petition for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appellant appealed and filed pro se motions to file a supplemental abstract, addendum, and brief. The Supreme Court denied the motion and affirmed the circuit court's order, holding that Appellant's sentence was not illegal for exceeding the statutory range of punishment by imposing a condition on his incarceration, as the statement that Appellant was sentenced to "hard labor" merely reflected the continuing policy of the state of Arkansas.

Petitioner Robert Maxwell was found guilty by a jury of one count of first-degree discharge of a firearm from a vehicle and four counts of second-degree discharge of a firearm from a vehicle and was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate term of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. Petitioner subsequently sought leave to pursue a petition for writ of error coram nobis in this circuit court, which the Supreme Court denied. The Court also denied Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of that decision. Petitioner then filed a second petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming insanity at the time of trial. The Supreme Court denied the petition because Petitioner failed to show that the writ was warranted.

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of rape and one count of second-degree sexual assault, for which he was sentenced to a total of 100 years' imprisonment. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, asserting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for modification seeking specific rulings on each of his asserted claims. Petitioner then filed a pro se petition for certiorari or writ of mandamus, asking the Supreme Court to compel the circuit court to respond to Petitioner's motion for modification and provide a ruling on the issues that were raised in the postconviction relief petition. The Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus and denied the petition for writ of certiorari, holding that because the circuit court failed to provide the required rulings on each of the issues raised in Petitioner's petition, and because Petitioner properly filed a motion for modification to obtain the missing rulings, he was entitled to the relief sought.