Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

On September 2, 2011, the circuit court entered an order denying Petitioner's petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner was represented in the proceeding by his retained attorney, Ronald Davis. No appeal was taken from that order, and Petitioner subsequently sought to proceed with a belated appeal pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.-Crim. 2(e). Petitioner contended that he instructed Davis on the day the order was entered to perfect an appeal from the order and paid him to do so. Davis, however, claimed that he was not informed by Petitioner within the time period allowed for filing a notice of appeal that Petitioner desired to appeal from the order denying postconviction relief. Because the claims in Petitioner's motion were in conflict with the assertions made by Davis, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Davis was timely informed by Petitioner that Petitioner desired to appeal the order denying postconviction relief. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The court of appeals affirmed a judgment reflecting Petitioner's conviction and sentence on a charge of first-degree domestic battering. Petitioner filed a petition in the Supreme Court to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis concerning that conviction, and that petition was denied. Petitioner subsequently filed a second petition in the Court requesting the Court reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court in order that he may proceed with a petition for writ of error coram nobis, raising the same claims in his new petition. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that because Petitioner's subsequent petition did not allege new grounds or additional facts to cure the deficiencies in the previous petition, Petitioner's petition was an abuse of the writ and did not support renewal of the application. View "Russell v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed in the Supreme Court a pro se petition for writ of mandamus and an application for writ of prohibition, both of which referenced two criminal cases filed against him in the circuit court. The petition sought to have the Court compel Respondent, the circuit judge, to act on multiple pleadings filed in the two cases. The application for writ of prohibition sought to compel dismissal of one of the two cases on allegations of a speedy-trial violation. The Supreme Court (1) denied in part the petition for mandamus, as the record did not contain the motions Petitioner contended remained outstanding, and requested an amended response in part; and (2) denied the application for writ of prohibition, as Petitioner did not bring an adequate record to support his claim that he filed a motion to dismiss. View "Glaze v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees, the public school district, members of the district's board of directors, and others, alleging (1) subsequent to the federal decennial census, the district was required to adopt new district lines and the district had failed to do so in violation of Ark. Code Ann. 6-13-631; and (2) the voters were entitled to a new school board pursuant to section 6-13-631. The circuit court found in favor of Appellants. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for payment of prevailing-party attorneys' fees, which was denied. Appellants appealed, arguing that the circuit court' findings were equivalent to a finding that there had been a violation of the Arkansas Civil Rights Act and that, because the circuit court could have awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to the Act, Appellants were entitled to attorneys fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants did not prevail on anything other than the claim made pursuant to section 6-13-631, and because that statute does not provide for an award of attorneys' fees, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the same. View "Fluker v. Helena-West Helena Pub. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief, raising two allegations that his attorney was ineffective. The trial court denied the petition. Before the Supreme Court was Appellant's pro se motion for an extension of time to file his brief-in-chief. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared his motion moot, holding that Appellant could not prevail on appeal as Appellant did not meet his burden of demonstrating that his plea should be vacated under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1.

In 2003, Appellant entered a plea of guilty to four felony offenses. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 360 months' imprisonment. The judgment was amended later to reflect that the aggregate sentence imposed was 300 months. Eight years later, Appellant filed a pro se petition to correct the sentence, contending that the sentence imposed was illegal because he was denied a number of constitutional rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The petition was denied on the ground that it was untimely. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal and declared the motions related to the appeal as moot, holding that because Appellant's claims were untimely raised, the trial court and appellate court lacked jurisdiction to grant postconviction relief.

In 1994, Appellant was found guilty of multiple felony offenses and was sentenced to an aggregate term of forty years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a petition to correct his sentence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-90-111, contending that the sentenced imposed was illegal because Appellant was charged by information filed by the prosecuting attorney and not by grand jury indictment as required by the Fifth Amendment. The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and declared the motions related to the appeal moot, holding that the allegation that the charging instrument was invalid was without merit.

In 1990, a jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, which was denied. Petitioner later filed a pleading asking the trial court to rule on the merits of the issues under the nunc pro tunc rule. Petitioner subsequently filed in the Supreme Court a pro se petition for writ of mandamus, contending that the circuit court had not acted on the pleading in a timely manner. The trial court responded that the delay was due to the fact that the pleading was not contained in the record and noted that Petitioner claimed the pleading sought a ruling on Petitioner's original petition for postconviction relief, not the subsequent petition. The Supreme Court denying mandamus relief, holding (1) the circuit court's failure to act on Petitioner's motion was simply due to clerical error; and (2) on the merits, the circuit court acted on the underlying motion.

In 2000, Petitioner was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed. Petition subsequently filed a petition to reinvest jurisdiction in the trial court to consider a petition for writ of error coram nobis, claiming that the prosecution did not inform the defense that a deal had been made with a prosecution witness, who was Petitioner's former cellmate. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding (1) Petitioner did not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the witness's testimony or that the judgment would not have been rendered if the jury knew of a deal between the prosecution and the witness, whose testimony was not inculpatory; and (2) Petitioner did not exercise due diligence in bringing his claim.

Appellant was convicted in 1993 of first-degree murder. The judgment-and-commitment order showed that Appellant was sentenced to hard labor in the Arkansas Department of Correction for life. The Supreme Court affirmed. Later, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court, alleging that his sentence exceeded the statutory sentencing authority of the circuit court and was a violation of Appellant's right against cruel and unusual punishment. The circuit court denied the petition, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant subsequently filed a pro se petition for a hearing. The Supreme Court denied the petition because Appellant had not demonstrated that the Court's opinions contained errors of fact or law.